Intrinsic Motivation Systems for Autonomous Mental Development

Exploratory activities seem to be intrinsically rewarding for children and crucial for their cognitive development. Can a machine be endowed with such an intrinsic motivation system? This is the question we study in this paper, presenting a number of computational systems that try to capture this drive towards novel or curious situations. After discussing related research coming from developmental psychology, neuroscience, developmental robotics, and active learning, this paper presents the mechanism of Intelligent Adaptive Curiosity, an intrinsic motivation system which pushes a robot towards situations in which it maximizes its learning progress. This drive makes the robot focus on situations which are neither too predictable nor too unpredictable, thus permitting autonomous mental development.The complexity of the robot’s activities autonomously increases and complex developmental sequences self-organize without being constructed in a supervised manner. Two experiments are presented illustrating the stage-like organization emerging with this mechanism. In one of them, a physical robot is placed on a baby play mat with objects that it can learn to manipulate. Experimental results show that the robot first spends time in situations which are easy to learn, then shifts its attention progressively to situations of increasing difficulty, avoiding situations in which nothing can be learned. Finally, these various results are discussed in relation to more complex forms of behavioral organization and data coming from developmental psychology. Key words: Active learning, autonomy, behavior, complexity, curiosity, development, developmental trajectory, epigenetic robotics, intrinsic motivation, learning, reinforcement learning, values

Introduction: The Fourth International Workshop on Epigenetic Robotics

As in the previous editions, this workshop is trying to be a forum for multi-disciplinary research ranging from developmental psychology to neural sciences (in its widest sense) and robotics including computational studies. This is a two-fold aim of, on the one hand, understanding the brain through engineering embodied systems and, on the other hand, building artificial epigenetic systems. Epigenetic contains in its meaning the idea that we are interested in studying development through interaction with the environment. This idea entails the embodiment of the system, the situatedness in the environment, and of course a prolonged period of postnatal development when this interaction can actually take place. This is still a relatively new endeavor although the seeds of the developmental robotics community were already in the air since the nineties (Berthouze and Kuniyoshi, 1998; Metta et al., 1999; Brooks et al., 1999; Breazeal, 2000; Kozima and Zlatev, 2000). A few had the intuition – see Lungarella et al. (2003) for a comprehensive review – that, intelligence could not be possibly engineered simply by copying systems that are “ready made” but rather that the development of the system fills a major role. This integration of disciplines raises the important issue of learning on the multiple scales of developmental time, that is, how to build systems that eventually can learn in any environment rather than program them for a specific environment. On the other hand, the hope is that robotics might become a new tool for brain science similarly to what simulation and modeling have become for the study of the motor system. Our community is still pretty much evolving and “under construction” and for this reason, we tried to encourage submissions from the psychology community. Additionally, we invited four neuroscientists and no roboticists for the keynote lectures. We received a record number of submissions (more than 50), and given the overall size and duration of the workshop together with our desire to maintain a single-track format, we had to be more selective than ever in the review process (a 20% acceptance rate on full papers). This is, if not an index of quality, at least an index of the interest that gravitates around this still new discipline

Social Situatedness: Vygotsky and Beyond

The concept of ‘social situatedness’, i.e. the idea that the development of individual intelligence requires a social (and cultural) embedding, has recently received much attention in cognitive science and artificial intelligence research. The work of Lev Vygotsky who put forward this view already in the 1920s has influenced the discussion to some degree, but still remains far from well known. This paper therefore aims to give an overview of his cognitive development theory and discuss its relation to more recent work in primatology and socially situated artificial intelligence, in particular humanoid robotics

Learning, Social Intelligence and the Turing Test - why an "out-of-the-box" Turing Machine will not pass the Turing Test

The Turing Test (TT) checks for human intelligence, rather than any putative general intelligence. It involves repeated interaction requiring learning in the form of adaption to the human conversation partner. It is a macro-level post-hoc test in contrast to the definition of a Turing Machine (TM), which is a prior micro-level definition. This raises the question of whether learning is just another computational process, i.e. can be implemented as a TM. Here we argue that learning or adaption is fundamentally different from computation, though it does involve processes that can be seen as computations. To illustrate this difference we compare (a) designing a TM and (b) learning a TM, defining them for the purpose of the argument. We show that there is a well-defined sequence of problems which are not effectively designable but are learnable, in the form of the bounded halting problem. Some characteristics of human intelligence are reviewed including it's: interactive nature, learning abilities, imitative tendencies, linguistic ability and context-dependency. A story that explains some of these is the Social Intelligence Hypothesis. If this is broadly correct, this points to the necessity of a considerable period of acculturation (social learning in context) if an artificial intelligence is to pass the TT. Whilst it is always possible to 'compile' the results of learning into a TM, this would not be a designed TM and would not be able to continually adapt (pass future TTs). We conclude three things, namely that: a purely "designed" TM will never pass the TT; that there is no such thing as a general intelligence since it necessary involves learning; and that learning/adaption and computation should be clearly distinguished.Comment: 10 pages, invited talk at Turing Centenary Conference CiE 2012, special session on "The Turing Test and Thinking Machines

The Contribution of Society to the Construction of Individual Intelligence

It is argued that society is a crucial factor in the construction of individual intelligence. In other words that it is important that intelligence is socially situated in an analogous way to the physical situation of robots. Evidence that this may be the case is taken from developmental linguistics, the social intelligence hypothesis, the complexity of society, the need for self-reflection and autism. The consequences for the development of artificial social agents is briefly considered. Finally some challenges for research into socially situated intelligence are highlighted

The imperfect observer: Mind, machines, and materialism in the 21st century

The dualist / materialist debates about the nature of consciousness are based on the assumption that an entirely physical universe must ultimately be observable by humans (with infinitely advanced tools). Thus the dualists claim that anything unobservable must be non-physical, while the materialists argue that in theory nothing is unobservable. However, there may be fundamental limitations in the power of human observation, no matter how well aided, that greatly curtail our ability to know and observe even a fully physical universe. This paper presents arguments to support the model of an inherently limited observer and explores the consequences of this view

Being-in-the-world-with: Presence Meets Social And Cognitive Neuroscience

In this chapter we will discuss the concepts of “presence” (Inner Presence) and “social presence” (Co-presence) within a cognitive and ecological perspective. Specifically, we claim that the concepts of “presence” and “social presence” are the possible links between self, action, communication and culture. In the first section we will provide a capsule view of Heidegger’s work by examining the two main features of the Heideggerian concept of “being”: spatiality and “being with”. We argue that different visions from social and cognitive sciences – Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Enactive Approach, Situated Simulation, Covert Imitation - and discoveries from neuroscience – Mirror and Canonical Neurons - have many contact points with this view. In particular, these data suggest that our conceptual system dynamically produces contextualized representations (simulations) that support grounded action in different situations. This is allowed by a common coding – the motor code – shared by perception, action and concepts. This common coding also allows the subject for natively recognizing actions done by other selves within the phenomenological contents. In this picture we argue that the role of presence and social presence is to allow the process of self-identification through the separation between “self” and “other,” and between “internal” and “external”. Finally, implications of this position for communication and media studies are discussed by way of conclusion

Inter-Brain Synchronization during Social Interaction

During social interaction, both participants are continuously active, each modifying their own actions in response to the continuously changing actions of the partner. This continuous mutual adaptation results in interactional synchrony to which both members contribute. Freely exchanging the role of imitator and model is a well-framed example of interactional synchrony resulting from a mutual behavioral negotiation. How the participants' brain activity underlies this process is currently a question that hyperscanning recordings allow us to explore. In particular, it remains largely unknown to what extent oscillatory synchronization could emerge between two brains during social interaction. To explore this issue, 18 participants paired as 9 dyads were recorded with dual-video and dual-EEG setups while they were engaged in spontaneous imitation of hand movements. We measured interactional synchrony and the turn-taking between model and imitator. We discovered by the use of nonlinear techniques that states of interactional synchrony correlate with the emergence of an interbrain synchronizing network in the alpha-mu band between the right centroparietal regions. These regions have been suggested to play a pivotal role in social interaction. Here, they acted symmetrically as key functional hubs in the interindividual brainweb. Additionally, neural synchronization became asymmetrical in the higher frequency bands possibly reflecting a top-down modulation of the roles of model and imitator in the ongoing interaction

Motion as manipulation: Implementation of motion and force analogies by event-file binding and action planning\ud

Tool improvisation analogies are a special case of motion and force analogies that appear to be implemented pre-conceptually, in many species, by event-file binding and action planning. A detailed reconstruction of the analogical reasoning steps involved in Rutherford's and Bohr's development of the first quantized-orbit model of atomic structure is used to show that human motion and force analogies generally can be implemented by the event-file binding and action planning mechanism. Predictions that distinguish this model from competing concept-level models of analogy are discussed, available data pertaining to them are reviewed, and further experimental tests are proposed