Thinking About Fairness & Achieving Balance in Mediation

This Article identifies five sources of bias present in mediation practice: (1) categorization, (2) attribution, (3) metaphorical expression, (4) norming, and (5) framing. For each of these cognitive efficiencies, which contribute to bias in mediation, the author provides practice recommendations. Finally, the author suggests that the Article be read as a proposal for further thought and inquiry to improve the fairness of mediators

Sales and Sincerity: The Role of Relational Framing in Word-of-Mouth Marketing

In the current research, we study relationship norms in a word-of-mouth marketing context. The presence of a financial incentive for a recommendation implies that the word-of-mouth behavior may be driven by ulterior motives. This setting triggers both friendship (Equality Matching; EM) and sales (Market Pricing; MP) relationship norms. However, the evaluation of the recommendation depends crucially on the relationship norm activated during the interaction. We show that, compared to MP relationship norms, activating EM norms leads to less sincere agent evaluations, but at the same time to higher intentions to comply with the target offer. We show that these norms can be activated outside awareness and influence our evaluations of interaction partners in a cognitively efficient manner. A second study shows that disclosing the financial motive has a positive effect on agent evaluations, but only when the recommendation target can devote full attention to the interaction.relationship norms;word-of-mouth;disclosure of ulterior motive;rewarded recommendations

Ingroup Attitude: A Reliance-Based Analysis

People as group members tend to exhibit a partial attitude to either conform to the dominant group view or form beliefs—such as climate change denial and religious belief—based on other ingroup members’ testimony when the evidence for such a belief is insufficient. Philosophers have conceptualized this phenomenon of ingroup attitudes in terms of belief. In this paper, I argue that reliance, a cognitive attitude that is goal-oriented and primarily regulated by pragmatic concerns, is more fitting to illuminate cases of ingroup attitudes. Framing the discussion of ingroup attitudes in terms of reliance has three virtues: it captures the volitional aspect of the ingroup attitude that the norm governing belief fails to offer; it explains the indifference to evidence that occurs in cases of ingroup attitudes; and it resolves the seeming irrationality in acting against what one believes

Social and interpersonal approaches to design for behaviour change

Copyright @ 2012 Social Science Electronic PublishingThis paper reviews a diverse set of social and interpersonal infl uence approaches and techniques which could be relevant to designers seeking to infl uence behavior change for social and environmental bene fit. These include work on social proof (which already has some practical applications in household energy use reduction studies) and dramaturgical and contextual approaches to modelling interaction. Perspectives on interpersonal infl uence are also covered, such as techniques extracted from Dale Carnegie's 'How to Win Friends and In fluence People', and a brief dive into the world of neuro-linguistic programming. In each case, implications for designers are highlighted and summarized at the end of the paper

Framing descriptive norms as self-benefit versus environmental benefit : self-construal’s moderating impact in promoting smart energy devices

Recently, awareness has been raised concerning the importance of sustainable energy use. Nevertheless, many obstacles must be overcome to change individuals’ energy consumption habits. This study examines how a message should be framed to convince individuals to purchase a smart energy device that provides feedback on household energy use. As such, this device can assist households in adjusting their energy-wasting habits. Through two experimental studies, this paper examines how a descriptive normative message, indicating that the majority of US households have already purchased a smart energy device, can increase individuals’ intention to purchase the device. Both studies consider the moderating influence of the self-construal, which refers to individuals’ consideration of themselves as either part of a group (interdependent self-construal) or independent from others (independent self-construal). The first study (n = 231) reveals that a descriptive norm (versus no norm) leads to a higher purchase intention through an enhanced normative influence regardless of participants’ self-construal. The second study (n = 128) adds to the finding that combining a descriptive norm with a self-benefit (versus environmental) frame more strongly impacts the purchase intent of individuals with a dominant independence. No significant differences are identified between the two benefit frames’ effectiveness among individuals with a dominant interdependence

Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement

Intellectual autonomy has long been identified as an epistemic virtue, one that has been championed influentially by (among others) Kant, Hume and Emerson. Manifesting intellectual autonomy, at least, in a virtuous way, does not require that we form our beliefs in cognitive isolation. Rather, as Roberts and Wood (Intellectual virtues: an essay in regulative epistemology, OUP Oxford, Oxford, pp. 259–260, 2007) note, intellectually virtuous autonomy involves reliance and outsourcing (e.g., on other individuals, technology, medicine, etc.) to an appropriate extent, while at the same time maintaining intellectual self-direction. In this essay, I want to investigate the ramifications for intellectual autonomy of a particular kind of epistemic dependence: cognitive enhancement. Cognitive enhancements (as opposed to therapeutic cognitive improvements) involve the use of technology and medicine to improve cognitive capacities in healthy individuals, through mechanisms ranging from smart drugs to brain-computer interfaces. With reference to case studies in bioethics, as well as the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, it is shown that epistemic dependence, in this extreme form, poses a prima facie threat to the retention of intellectual autonomy, specifically, by threatening to undermine our intellectual self-direction. My aim will be to show why certain kinds of cognitive enhancements are subject to this objection from self-direction, while others are not. Once this is established, we’ll see that even some extreme kinds of cognitive enhancement might be not merely compatible with, but constitutive of, virtuous intellectual autonomy

Measuring “Awareness of Environmental Consequences”: Two Scales and Two Interpretations

Moderate or poor reliabilities, worrisome correlation patterns and ambiguous dimensionality raise questions about the awareness of consequences scale being a valid measure of egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric value orientations. These results may, however, indicate something else. An exploratory analysis performed on three samples collected from the general public provides evidence for a reinterpretation of the scale. We believe the concepts of egoistic, social and biospheric value orientations remain important as a potential explanation of behaviour. However, our results imply that whether people cognitively organise their beliefs in this way when considering adverse environmental consequences requires a different approach from the current awareness of consequences scale. The evidence shows the current scale must be reinterpreted as a measure of concern over the positive and negative consequences of environmental action and inaction.environmental beliefs, value orientations, environmental scales, egoistic, altruistic, biospheric, value-belief-norm model

Framing social security reform: Behavioral responses to changes in the full retirement age

We use a US Social Security reform as a quasi-experiment to provide evidence on framing effects in retirement behavior. The reform increased the full retirement age (FRA) from 65 to 66 in two month increments per year of birth for cohorts born from 1938 to 1943. We find strong evidence that the spike in the benefit claiming hazard at 65 moved in lockstep along with the FRA. Results on self-reported retirement and exit from employment are less clear-cut, but go in the same direction. The responsiveness to the new FRA is stronger for people with higher cognitive skills. We interpret the findings as evidence of reference dependence with loss aversion. We develop a simple labor supply model with reference dependence that can explain the results. The model has potentially important implications for framing of future Social Security reforms.social security ; framing ; loss aversion ; retirement