A uniform approach to semi-marginalistic values for set games

Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of solutions, each of which allocates to any player some type of marginalistic contribution with respect to any coalition containing the player. Here the marginalistic contribution may be interpreted as an individual one, or a coalitionally one. For any value of the relevant family, an axiomatization is given by three properties, namely one type of an efficiency property, the substitution property and one type of a monotonocity property. We present two proof techniques, each of which is based on the decomposition of any arbitrary set game into a union of either simple set games or elementary set games, the solutions of which are much easier to determine. A simple respectively elementary set game is associated with an arbitrary, but fixed item of the universe respectively coalition

Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions

The classical literature [Pigou, A.C., 1920. The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan, London; Coase, R.H., 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44; Arrow, K., 1970. The organization of economic activity: issues pertinent to the choice of market versus non-market allocation. In: Haveman, R.H., Margolis, J. (Eds.), Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis. Markham, Chicago, pp. 59-73] and the relatively recent studies [cf. Varian, H.R., 1994. A solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well-informed. American Economic Review 84, 1278-1293] associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of inter-individual externalities, this paper constructs a new game-theoretic framework: primeval games. These games are used to design normative compensation rules for the underlying compensation problems: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and the primeval rule. Characterizations of the marginalistic rule and the concession rule are provided and specific properties of the primeval rule are studied. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

A potential approach to solutions for set games

Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper introduces a new solution by allocating, to any player, the items (taken from an universe) that are attainable for the player, but can not be blocked (by any coalition not containing the player). The resulting value turns out to be an utmost important concept for set games to characterize the family of set game solutions that possess a so-called potential representation (similar to the potential approaches applied in both physics and cooperative game theory). An axiomatization of the new value, called Driessen--Sun value, is given by three properties, namely one type of an efficiency property, the substitution property and one type of a monotonocity property

Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.externalities, sharing the surplus, Shapley value.

Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy I. A Perspective From the Point of View of The Monetary Circuit

In two recent contributions Alain Parguez and Jean-Gabriel Bliek argued in favour of assigning a full employment objective to European economic policies and their coordination (Bliek and Parguez (2007) and Parguez (2007b)). Their argument is based on the approach of the monetary circuit, whose treatment of full employment is the object of this article. The approach is presented here as emblematic of out of equilibrium models, i.e. models where the equilibrium conditions of pure competition are not fulfilled. A forthcoming contribution will show how the description of economic reality suggested by the circuit can help interpreting recent macroeconomic developments in the US, Canada, Japan and the EU and will discuss some empirical studies confirming its relevance for policy analysis.Unemployment, Capacity Utilisation, Circuit, Disequilibrium, Investment, Savings, Price Equation

Sharing the surplus : a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements

Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements