Bounded Rationality and Heuristics in Humans and in Artificial Cognitive Systems

In this paper I will present an analysis of the impact that the notion of “bounded rationality”, introduced by Herbert Simon in his book “Administrative Behavior”, produced in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). In particular, by focusing on the field of Automated Decision Making (ADM), I will show how the introduction of the cognitive dimension into the study of choice of a rational (natural) agent, indirectly determined - in the AI field - the development of a line of research aiming at the realisation of artificial systems whose decisions are based on the adoption of powerful shortcut strategies (known as heuristics) based on “satisficing” - i.e. non optimal - solutions to problem solving. I will show how the “heuristic approach” to problem solving allowed, in AI, to face problems of combinatorial complexity in real-life situations and still represents an important strategy for the design and implementation of intelligent systems

A Continuation Method for Nash Equilibria in Structured Games

Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in structured game representations, including both graphical games and multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs). The algorithms are derived from a continuation method for normal-form and extensive-form games due to Govindan and Wilson; they follow a trajectory through a space of perturbed games and their equilibria, exploiting game structure through fast computation of the Jacobian of the payoff function. They are theoretically guaranteed to find at least one equilibrium of the game, and may find more. Our approach provides the first efficient algorithm for computing exact equilibria in graphical games with arbitrary topology, and the first algorithm to exploit fine-grained structural properties of MAIDs. Experimental results are presented demonstrating the effectiveness of the algorithms and comparing them to predecessors. The running time of the graphical game algorithm is similar to, and often better than, the running time of previous approximate algorithms. The algorithm for MAIDs can effectively solve games that are much larger than those solvable by previous methods

Modeling Human Ad Hoc Coordination

Whether in groups of humans or groups of computer agents, collaboration is most effective between individuals who have the ability to coordinate on a joint strategy for collective action. However, in general a rational actor will only intend to coordinate if that actor believes the other group members have the same intention. This circular dependence makes rational coordination difficult in uncertain environments if communication between actors is unreliable and no prior agreements have been made. An important normative question with regard to coordination in these ad hoc settings is therefore how one can come to believe that other actors will coordinate, and with regard to systems involving humans, an important empirical question is how humans arrive at these expectations. We introduce an exact algorithm for computing the infinitely recursive hierarchy of graded beliefs required for rational coordination in uncertain environments, and we introduce a novel mechanism for multiagent coordination that uses it. Our algorithm is valid in any environment with a finite state space, and extensions to certain countably infinite state spaces are likely possible. We test our mechanism for multiagent coordination as a model for human decisions in a simple coordination game using existing experimental data. We then explore via simulations whether modeling humans in this way may improve human-agent collaboration.Comment: AAAI 201

The structure and formation of natural categories

Categorization and concept formation are critical activities of intelligence. These processes and the conceptual structures that support them raise important issues at the interface of cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. The work presumes that advances in these and other areas are best facilitated by research methodologies that reward interdisciplinary interaction. In particular, a computational model is described of concept formation and categorization that exploits a rational analysis of basic level effects by Gluck and Corter. Their work provides a clean prescription of human category preferences that is adapted to the task of concept learning. Also, their analysis was extended to account for typicality and fan effects, and speculate on how the concept formation strategies might be extended to other facets of intelligence, such as problem solving