Phenomenal knowledge why: the explanatory knowledge argument against physicalism

Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge of what it is like to be in conscious states, such as seeing red or being in pain. According to the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986), phenomenal knowledge is knowledge that, i.e., knowledge of phenomenal facts. According to the ability hypothesis (Nemirow 1979; Lewis 1983), phenomenal knowledge is mere practical knowledge how, i.e., the mere possession of abilities. However, some phenomenal knowledge also seems to be knowledge why, i.e., knowledge of explanatory facts. For example, someone who has just experienced pain for the first time learns not only that this is what pain is like, but also why people tend to avoid it. Some philosophers have claimed that experiencing pain gives knowledge why in a normative sense: it tells us why pain is bad and why inflicting it is wrong (Kahane 2010). But phenomenal knowledge seems to explain not (only) why people should avoid pain, but why they in fact tend to do so. In this paper, I will explicate and defend a precise version of this claim and use it as a basis for a new version of the knowledge argument, which I call the explanatory knowledge argument. According to the argument, some phenomenal knowledge (1) explains regularities in a distinctive, ultimate or regress-ending way, and (2) predict them without induction. No physical knowledge explains and predicts regularities in the same way. This implies the existence of distinctive, phenomenal explanatory facts, which cannot be identified with physical facts. I will show that this argument can be defended against the main objections to the original knowledge argument, the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy, even if it turns out that the original cannot. In this way, the explanatory knowledge argument further strengthens the case against physicalism

A physical distinction between a covariant and non covariant reduction process in relativistic quantum theories

Causality imposes strong restrictions on the type of operators that may be observables in relativistic quantum theories. In fact, causal violations arise when computing conditional probabilities for certain partial causally connected measurements using the standard non covariant procedure. Here we introduce another way of computing conditional probabilities, based on an intrinsic covariant relational order of the events, which differs from the standard one when these type of measurements are included. This alternative procedure is compatible with a wider and very natural class of operators without breaking causality. If some of these measurements could be implemented in practice as predicted by our formalism, the non covariant, conventional approach should be abandoned. Furthermore, the description we promote here would imply a new physical effect where interference terms are suppressed as a consequence of the covariant order in the measurement process.Comment: 7 pages, latex file, 1 ps figure. Major presentation changes. To appear in New Journal of Physic

Necessitarianism and Dispositions

In this paper, I argue in favor of necessitarianism, the view that dispositions, when stimulated, necessitate their manifestations. After introducing and clarifying what necessitarianism does and does not amount to, I provide reasons to support the view that dispositions once stimulated necessitate their manifestations according to the stimulating conditions and the relevant properties at stake. In this framework, I will propose a principle of causal relevance and some conditions for the possibility of interference that allow us to avoid the use of ceteris paribus clauses. I then defend necessitarianism from recent attacks raised by, among others, Mumford and Anjum, noting that the antecedent strengthening test is a test for causal relevance that raises no difficulties for necessitarianism