Fusing Binary Interface Defects in Topological Phases: The Vec⁡(Z/pZ)\operatorname{Vec}(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}) case

A binary interface defect is any interface between two (not necessarily invertible) domain walls. We compute all possible binary interface defects in Kitaev's $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ model and all possible fusions between them. Our methods can be applied to any Levin-Wen model. We also give physical interpretations for each of the defects in the $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ model. These physical interpretations provide a new graphical calculus which can be used to compute defect fusion.Comment: 27+10 pages, 2+5 tables, comments welcom

Computing data for Levin-Wen with defects

We demonstrate how to do many computations for non-chiral topological phases with defects. These defects may be 1-dimensional domain walls or 0-dimensional point defects. Using $\operatorname{Vec}(S_3)$ as a guiding example, we demonstrate how domain wall fusion and associators can be computed using generalized tube algebra techniques. These domain walls can be both between distinct or identical phases. Additionally, we show how to compute all possible point defects, and the fusion and associator data of these. Worked examples, tabulated data and Mathematica code are provided.Comment: 17+25 pages, many tables and attached cod

A Bundle Theory of Words

It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is ontologically more parsimonious, and coheres with claims in linguistics

A One Category Ontology

I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular and property, replacing it with a single fundamental category of intrinsic characters or qualities. We may describe the qualities as qualitative charactersor as modes, perhaps on the model of Aristotelian qualitative (nonsubstantial) kinds, and I will use the term “properties” interchangeably with “qualities”. The qualities are repeatable and reasonably sparse, although, as I discuss in section 2.6, there are empirical reasons that may suggest, depending on one’s preferred fundamental physical theory, that they include irreducibly intensive qualities. There are no uninstantiated qualities. I also assume that the fundamental qualitative natures are intrinsic, although physics may ultimately suggest that some of them are extrinsic. On my view, matter, concrete objects, abstract objects, and perhaps even spacetime are constructed from mereological fusions of qualities, so the world is simply a vast mixture of qualities, including polyadic properties (i.e., relations). This means that everything there is, including concrete objects like persons or stars, is a quality, a qualitative fusion, or a portion of the extended qualitative fusion that is the worldwhole. I call my view mereological bundle theory

The Use of Sets (and Other Extensional Entities) in the Analysis of Hylomorphically Complex Objects

Hylomorphically complex objects are things that change their parts or matter or that might have, or have had, different parts or matter. Often ontologists analyze such objects in terms of sets (or functions, understood set-theoretically) or other extensional entities such as mereological fusions or quantities of matter. I urge two reasons for being wary of any such analyses. First, being extensional, such things as sets are ill-suited to capture the characteristic modal and temporal flexibility of hylomorphically complex objects. Secondly, sets are often appealed to because they seem to contain their members. But the idea that sets do contain their members, in the ordinary sense of containment, is a substantive metaphysical position that makes analyses that rely on that idea for their plausibility much more metaphysically committing than is generally thought