Reputation and Reward : Two Sides of the Same Bitcoin

In Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS), the power of the crowd, jointly with the sensing capabilities of the smartphones they wear, provides a new paradigm for data sensing. Scenarios involving user behavior or those that rely on user mobility are examples where standard sensor networks may not be suitable, and MCS provides an interesting solution. However, including human participation in sensing tasks presents numerous and unique research challenges. In this paper, we analyze three of the most important: user participation, data sensing quality and user anonymity. We tackle the three as a whole, since all of them are strongly correlated. As a result, we present PaySense, a general framework that incentivizes user participation and provides a mechanism to validate the quality of collected data based on the users' reputation. All such features are performed in a privacy-preserving way by using the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. Rather than a theoretical one, our framework has been implemented, and it is ready to be deployed and complement any existint MCS system

Cloud/fog computing resource management and pricing for blockchain networks

The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model.Comment: 16 pages, double-column version, accepted by IEEE Internet of Things Journa

A Blockchain-Based Reward Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a novel sensing scenario of cyber-physical-social systems. MCS has been widely adopted in smart cities, personal health care, and environment monitor areas. MCS applications recruit participants to obtain sensory data from the target area by allocating reward to them. Reward mechanisms are crucial in stimulating participants to join and provide sensory data. However, while the MCS applications execute the reward mechanisms, sensory data and personal private information can be in great danger because of malicious task initiators/participants and hackers. This article proposes a novel blockchain-based MCS framework that preserves privacy and secures both the sensing process and the incentive mechanism by leveraging the emergent blockchain technology. Moreover, to provide a fair incentive mechanism, this article has considered an MCS scenario as a sensory data market, where the market separates the participants into two categories: monthly-pay participants and instant-pay participants. By analyzing two different kinds of participants and the task initiator, this article proposes an incentive mechanism aided by a three-stage Stackelberg game. Through theoretical analysis and simulation, the evaluation addresses two aspects: the reward mechanism and the performance of the blockchain-based MCS. The proposed reward mechanism achieves up to a 10% improvement of the task initiator's utility compared with a traditional Stackelberg game. It can also maintain the required market share for monthly-pay participants while achieving sustainable sensory data provision. The evaluation of the blockchain-based MCS shows that the latency increases in a tolerable manner as the number of participants grows. Finally, this article discusses the future challenges of blockchain-based MCS

Empirical Analysis of Privacy Preservation Models for Cyber Physical Deployments from a Pragmatic Perspective

The difficulty of privacy protection in cyber-physical installations encompasses several sectors and calls for methods like encryption, hashing, secure routing, obfuscation, and data exchange, among others. To create a privacy preservation model for cyber physical deployments, it is advised that data privacy, location privacy, temporal privacy, node privacy, route privacy, and other types of privacy be taken into account. Consideration must also be given to other types of privacy, such as temporal privacy. The computationally challenging process of incorporating these models into any wireless network also affects quality of service (QoS) variables including end-to-end latency, throughput, energy use, and packet delivery ratio. The best privacy models must be used by network designers and should have the least negative influence on these quality-of-service characteristics. The designers used common privacy models for the goal of protecting cyber-physical infrastructure in order to achieve this. The limitations of these installations' interconnection and interface-ability are not taken into account in this. As a result, even while network security has increased, the network's overall quality of service has dropped. The many state-of-the-art methods for preserving privacy in cyber-physical deployments without compromising their performance in terms of quality of service are examined and analyzed in this research. Lowering the likelihood that such circumstances might arise is the aim of this investigation and review. These models are rated according to how much privacy they provide, how long it takes from start to finish to transfer data, how much energy they use, and how fast their networks are. In order to maximize privacy while maintaining a high degree of service performance, the comparison will assist network designers and researchers in selecting the optimal models for their particular deployments. Additionally, the author of this book offers a variety of tactics that, when used together, might improve each reader's performance. This study also provides a range of tried-and-true machine learning approaches that networks may take into account and examine in order to enhance their privacy performance

An Efficient Collaboration and Incentive Mechanism for Internet-of-Vehicles (IoVs) with Secured Information Exchange Based on Blockchains

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from IEEE via the DOI in this recordWith the rapid development of Internet-of-Things (IoT), mobile crowdsensing, i.e., outsourcing sensing tasks to mobile devices or vehicles, has been proposed to address the problem of data collection in the scenarios such as smart city. Despite its benefits for a wide range of applications, mobile crowdsensing lacks an efficient incentive mechanism, restricting the development of IoT applications, especially for Internet-ofVehicles (IoV) – a typical example of IoT applications; this is because vehicles are usually reluctant to participate these sensing tasks. Moreover, in practice some sensing tasks may arrive suddenly (called an emergent task) in the IoV environment, but the resources of a single vehicle may be insufficient to handle, and thus multi-vehicles collaboration is required. In this case, the incentive mechanisms for the participation of multiple vehicles and the task scheduling for their collaborations are collectively needed. To address this important problem, we firstly propose a new model for the scenario of two vehicles collaboration, considering the situation of emergent appearance of a task. In this model, for a general sensing task, we propose a bidding mechanism to better encourage vehicles to contribute their resources, and the tasks for those vehicles are scheduled accordingly. Secondly, for an emergent task, a novel time-window based method is devised to manage the tasks among vehicles and to incent the vehicles to participate. Finally, we develop a blockchain framework to achieve the secured information exchange through smart contract for the proposed models in IoV.National Key Research and Development Program of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC)Purple Mountain Laboratory: Networking, Communications and SecurityAcademician Expert Workstation of Bitvalue Technology (Hunan) Company Limite

A distributed deep learning approach with mobile edge computing for next generation IoT networks security

Along with recent development in Next Generation IoT, the Deep Learning (DL) has become a promising paradigm to perform various tasks such as computation and analysis. Many security researchers have proposed distributed DL supporting DL task at the IoT device level to deliver low latency and high accuracy. However, due to limited computing capabilities of IoT devices, distributed DL is failed to maintain Quality-of-service demand in practical IoT applications. To this end, BlockDeepEdge, a Blockchain-based Distributed DL with Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) is proposed where MEC supports the lightweight IoT devices by delivering computing operations to them at the edge of the network. The blockchain provide a secure, decentralized and P2P interaction among IoT devices and MEC server to carryout distributed DL operation