Evaluating Resilience of Electricity Distribution Networks via A Modification of Generalized Benders Decomposition Method

This paper presents a computational approach to evaluate the resilience of electricity Distribution Networks (DNs) to cyber-physical failures. In our model, we consider an attacker who targets multiple DN components to maximize the loss of the DN operator. We consider two types of operator response: (i) Coordinated emergency response; (ii) Uncoordinated autonomous disconnects, which may lead to cascading failures. To evaluate resilience under response (i), we solve a Bilevel Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Program which is computationally challenging due to mixed-integer variables in the inner problem and non-convex constraints. Our solution approach is based on the Generalized Benders Decomposition method, which achieves a reasonable tradeoff between computational time and solution accuracy. Our approach involves modifying the Benders cut based on structural insights on power flow over radial DNs. We evaluate DN resilience under response (ii) by sequentially computing autonomous component disconnects due to operating bound violations resulting from the initial attack and the potential cascading failures. Our approach helps estimate the gain in resilience under response (i), relative to (ii)

Opportunities for Price Manipulation by Aggregators in Electricity Markets

Aggregators are playing an increasingly crucial role in the integration of renewable generation in power systems. However, the intermittent nature of renewable generation makes market interactions of aggregators difficult to monitor and regulate, raising concerns about potential market manipulation by aggregators. In this paper, we study this issue by quantifying the profit an aggregator can obtain through strategic curtailment of generation in an electricity market. We show that, while the problem of maximizing the benefit from curtailment is hard in general, efficient algorithms exist when the topology of the network is radial (acyclic). Further, we highlight that significant increases in profit are possible via strategic curtailment in practical settings

Contingency-Constrained Unit Commitment With Intervening Time for System Adjustments

The N-1-1 contingency criterion considers the con- secutive loss of two components in a power system, with intervening time for system adjustments. In this paper, we consider the problem of optimizing generation unit commitment (UC) while ensuring N-1-1 security. Due to the coupling of time periods associated with consecutive component losses, the resulting problem is a very large-scale mixed-integer linear optimization model. For efficient solution, we introduce a novel branch-and-cut algorithm using a temporally decomposed bilevel separation oracle. The model and algorithm are assessed using multiple IEEE test systems, and a comprehensive analysis is performed to compare system performances across different contingency criteria. Computational results demonstrate the value of considering intervening time for system adjustments in terms of total cost and system robustness.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figure

Second best toll and capacity optimisation in network: solution algorithm and policy implications

This paper looks at the first and second-best jointly optimal toll and road capacity investment problems from both policy and technical oriented perspectives. On the technical side, the paper investigates the applicability of the constraint cutting algorithm for solving the second-best problem under elastic demand which is formulated as a bilevel programming problem. The approach is shown to perform well despite several problems encountered by our previous work in Shepherd and Sumalee (2004). The paper then applies the algorithm to a small sized network to investigate the policy implications of the first and second-best cases. This policy analysis demonstrates that the joint first best structure is to invest in the most direct routes while reducing capacities elsewhere. Whilst unrealistic this acts as a useful benchmark. The results also show that certain second best policies can achieve a high proportion of the first best benefits while in general generating a revenue surplus. We also show that unless costs of capacity are known to be low then second best tolls will be affected and so should be analysed in conjunction with investments in the network

Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices

CWPE0619 (EPRG0602) Xinmin Hu and Daniel Ralph (Feb 2006) Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal prices. Each player faces a bilevel optimization problem that we remodel as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC. This gives an EPEC, equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We establish sufficient conditions for existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for this class of bilevel games and give some applications. We show by examples the effect of network transmission limits, i.e. congestion, on existence of equilibria. Then we study, for more general EPECs, the weaker pure strategy concepts of local Nash and Nash stationary equilibria. We model the latter via complementarity problems, CPs. Finally, we present numerical examples of methods that attempt to find local Nash or Nash stationary equilibria of randomly generated electricity market games. The CP solver PATH is found to be rather effective in this context

An Approximation Algorithm for Stackelberg Network Pricing

We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue raised from tolls set on the arcs of a transportation network, under the constraint that users are assigned to toll-compatible shortest paths. We first prove that this problem is strongly NP-hard. We then provide a polynomial time algorithm with a worst-case precision guarantee of ${1/2}\log_2 m_T+1$, where $m_T$ denotes the number of toll arcs. Finally we show that the approximation is tight with respect to a natural relaxation by constructing a family of instances for which the relaxation gap is reached.Comment: 38 page

The Network Improvement Problem for Equilibrium Routing

In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number of methods to control this average delay have received substantial attention, including network tolls, Stackelberg routing, and edge removal. A related approach with arguably greater practical relevance is that of making investments in improvements to the edges of the network, so that, for a given investment budget, the average delay at equilibrium in the improved network is minimized. This problem has received considerable attention in the literature on transportation research and a number of different algorithms have been studied. To our knowledge, none of this work gives guarantees on the output quality of any polynomial-time algorithm. We study a model for this problem introduced in transportation research literature, and present both hardness results and algorithms that obtain nearly optimal performance guarantees. - We first show that a simple algorithm obtains good approximation guarantees for the problem. Despite its simplicity, we show that for affine delays the approximation ratio of 4/3 obtained by the algorithm cannot be improved. - To obtain better results, we then consider restricted topologies. For graphs consisting of parallel paths with affine delay functions we give an optimal algorithm. However, for graphs that consist of a series of parallel links, we show the problem is weakly NP-hard. - Finally, we consider the problem in series-parallel graphs, and give an FPTAS for this case. Our work thus formalizes the intuition held by transportation researchers that the network improvement problem is hard, and presents topology-dependent algorithms that have provably tight approximation guarantees.Comment: 27 pages (including abstract), 3 figure