15 research outputs found
Time is of the Essence: Machine Learning-based Intrusion Detection in Industrial Time Series Data
The Industrial Internet of Things drastically increases connectivity of
devices in industrial applications. In addition to the benefits in efficiency,
scalability and ease of use, this creates novel attack surfaces. Historically,
industrial networks and protocols do not contain means of security, such as
authentication and encryption, that are made necessary by this development.
Thus, industrial IT-security is needed. In this work, emulated industrial
network data is transformed into a time series and analysed with three
different algorithms. The data contains labeled attacks, so the performance can
be evaluated. Matrix Profiles perform well with almost no parameterisation
needed. Seasonal Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average performs well in the
presence of noise, requiring parameterisation effort. Long Short Term
Memory-based neural networks perform mediocre while requiring a high training-
and parameterisation effort.Comment: Extended version of a publication in the 2018 IEEE International
Conference on Data Mining Workshops (ICDMW
Remote fidelity of Container-Based Network Emulators
This thesis examines if Container-Based Network Emulators (CBNEs) are able to instantiate emulated nodes that provide sufficient realism to be used in information security experiments. The realism measure used is based on the information available from the point of view of a remote attacker. During the evaluation of a Container-Based Network Emulator (CBNE) as a platform to replicate production networks for information security experiments, it was observed that nmap fingerprinting returned Operating System (OS) family and version results inconsistent with that of the host Operating System (OS). CBNEs utilise Linux namespaces, the technology used for containerisation, to instantiate \emulated" hosts for experimental networks. Linux containers partition resources of the host OS to create lightweight virtual machines that share a single OS kernel. As all emulated hosts share the same kernel in a CBNE network, there is a reasonable expectation that the fingerprints of the host OS and emulated hosts should be the same. Based on how CBNEs instantiate emulated networks and that fingerprinting returned inconsistent results, it was hypothesised that the technologies used to construct CBNEs are capable of influencing fingerprints generated by utilities such as nmap. It was predicted that hosts emulated using different CBNEs would show deviations in remotely generated fingerprints when compared to fingerprints generated for the host OS. An experimental network consisting of two emulated hosts and a Layer 2 switch was instantiated on multiple CBNEs using the same host OS. Active and passive fingerprinting was conducted between the emulated hosts to generate fingerprints and OS family and version matches. Passive fingerprinting failed to produce OS family and version matches as the fingerprint databases for these utilities are no longer maintained. For active fingerprinting the OS family results were consistent between tested systems and the host OS, though OS version results reported was inconsistent. A comparison of the generated fingerprints revealed that for certain CBNEs fingerprint features related to network stack optimisations of the host OS deviated from other CBNEs and the host OS. The hypothesis that CBNEs can influence remotely generated fingerprints was partially confirmed. One CBNE system modified Linux kernel networking options, causing a deviation from fingerprints generated for other tested systems and the host OS. The hypothesis was also partially rejected as the technologies used by CBNEs do not influence the remote fidelity of emulated hosts.Thesis (MSc) -- Faculty of Science, Computer Science, 202
Understanding the difference in malicious activity between Surface Web and Dark Web
The world has seen a dramatic increase in illegal activities on the Internet. Prior research has investigated different types of cybercrime, especially in the Surface Web, which is the portion of the content on the World Wide Web that popular engines may index. At the same time, evidence suggests cybercriminals are moving their operations to the Dark Web. This portion is not indexed by conventional search engines and is accessed through network overlays such as The Onion Router network. Since the Dark Web provides anonymity, cybercriminals use this environment to avoid getting caught or blocked, which represents a significant challenge for researchers. This research project investigates the modus operandi of cybercriminals on the Surface Web and the Dark Web to understand how cybercrime unfolds in different layers of the Web. Honeypots, specialised crawlers and extraction tools are used to analyse different types of online crimes. In addition, quantitative analysis is performed to establish comparisons between the two Web environments. This thesis is comprised of three studies. The first examines the use of stolen account credentials leaked in different outlets on the Surface and Dark Web to understand how cybercriminals interact with stolen credentials in the wild. In the second study, malvertising is analysed from the user's perspective to understand whether using different technologies to access the Web could influence the probability of malware infection. In the final study, underground forums on the Surface and Dark Web are analysed to observe differences in trading patterns in both environments. Understanding how criminals operate in different Web layers is essential to developing policies and countermeasures to prevent cybercrime more efficiently
Computer Science 2019 APR Self-Study & Documents
UNM Computer Science APR self-study report and review team report for Spring 2019, fulfilling requirements of the Higher Learning Commission
On the malware detection problem : challenges and novel approaches
Orientador: AndrĂ© Ricardo Abed GrĂ©gioCoorientador: Paulo LĂcio de GeusTese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal do ParanĂĄ, Setor de CiĂȘncias Exatas, Programa de PĂłs-Graduação em InformĂĄtica. Defesa : Curitiba,Inclui referĂȘnciasĂrea de concentração: CiĂȘncia da ComputaçãoResumo: Software Malicioso (malware) Ă© uma das maiores ameaças aos sistemas computacionais atuais, causando danos Ă imagem de indivĂduos e corporaçÔes, portanto requerendo o desenvolvimento de soluçÔes de detecção para prevenir que exemplares de malware causem danos e para permitir o uso seguro dos sistemas. Diversas iniciativas e soluçÔes foram propostas ao longo do tempo para detectar exemplares de malware, de Anti-VĂrus (AVs) a sandboxes, mas a detecção de malware de forma efetiva e eficiente ainda se mantĂ©m como um problema em aberto. Portanto, neste trabalho, me proponho a investigar alguns desafios, falĂĄcias e consequĂȘncias das pesquisas em detecção de malware de modo a contribuir para o aumento da capacidade de detecção das soluçÔes de segurança. Mais especificamente, proponho uma nova abordagem para o desenvolvimento de experimentos com malware de modo prĂĄtico mas ainda cientĂfico e utilizo-me desta abordagem para investigar quatro questĂ”es relacionadas a pesquisa em detecção de malware: (i) a necessidade de se entender o contexto das infecçÔes para permitir a detecção de ameaças em diferentes cenĂĄrios; (ii) a necessidade de se desenvolver melhores mĂ©tricas para a avaliação de soluçÔes antivĂrus; (iii) a viabilidade de soluçÔes com colaboração entre hardware e software para a detecção de malware de forma mais eficiente; (iv) a necessidade de predizer a ocorrĂȘncia de novas ameaças de modo a permitir a resposta Ă incidentes de segurança de forma mais rĂĄpida.Abstract: Malware is a major threat to most current computer systems, causing image damages and financial losses to individuals and corporations, thus requiring the development of detection solutions to prevent malware to cause harm and allow safe computers usage. Many initiatives and solutions to detect malware have been proposed over time, from AntiViruses (AVs) to sandboxes, but effective and efficient malware detection remains as a still open problem. Therefore, in this work, I propose taking a look on some malware detection challenges, pitfalls and consequences to contribute towards increasing malware detection system's capabilities. More specifically, I propose a new approach to tackle malware research experiments in a practical but still scientific manner and leverage this approach to investigate four issues: (i) the need for understanding context to allow proper detection of localized threats; (ii) the need for developing better metrics for AV solutions evaluation; (iii) the feasibility of leveraging hardware-software collaboration for efficient AV implementation; and (iv) the need for predicting future threats to allow faster incident responses
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Identifying and Preventing Large-scale Internet Abuse
The widespread access to the Internet and the ubiquity of web-based services make it easy to communicate and interact globally. Unfortunately, the software and protocols implementing the functionality of these services are often vulnerable to attacks. In turn, an attacker can exploit them to compromise, take over, and abuse the services for her own nefarious purposes. In this dissertation, we aim to better understand such attacks, and we develop methods and algorithms to detect and prevent them, which we evaluate on large-scale datasets.First, we detail Meerkat, a system to detect a visible way in which websites are being compromised, namely website defacements. They can inflict significant harm on the websitesâ operators through the loss of sales, the loss in reputation, or because of legal ramifications. Meerkat requires no prior knowledge about the websitesâ content or their structure, but only the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) at which they can be reached. By design, Meerkat mimics how a human analyst decides if a website was defaced when viewing it in a browser, by using computer vision techniques. Thus, it tackles the problem of detecting website defacements through their attention-seeking nature, their goal and purpose, rather than code or data artifacts that they might exhibit. In turn, it is much harder for an attacker to evade our system, as she needs to change her modus operandi. When Meerkat detects a website as defaced, the website can automatically be put into maintenance mode or restored to a known good state.An attacker, however, is not limited to abuse a compromised website in a way that is visible to the websiteâs visitors. Instead, she can misuse the website to infect its visitors with malicious software (malware). Although malware is well studied, identifying malicious websites remains a major challenge in todayâs Internet. Second, we introduce Delta, a novel, purely static analysis approach that extracts change-related features between two versions of the same website, uses machine learning to derive a model of website changes, detects if an introduced change was malicious or benign, identifies the underlying infection vector based on clustering, and generates an identifying signature. Furthermore, due to the way Delta clusters campaigns, it can uncover infection campaigns that leverage specific vulnerable applications as a distribution channel, and it can greatly reduce the human labor necessary to uncover the application responsible for a serviceâs compromise.Third, we investigate the practicality and impact of domain takeover attacks, which an attacker can similarly abuse to spread misinformation or malware, and we present a defense on how such takeover attacks can be rendered toothless. Specifically, the new elasticity of Internet resources, in particular Internet protocol (IP) addresses in the context of Infrastructure-as-a-Service cloud service providers, combined with previously made protocol assumptions can lead to security issues. In Cloud Strife, we show that this dynamic component paired with recent developments in trust-based ecosystems (e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates) creates so far unknown attack vectors. For example, a substantial number of stale domain name system (DNS) records points to readily available IP addresses in clouds, yet, they are still actively attempted to be accessed. Often, these records belong to discontinued services that were previously hosted in the cloud. We demonstrate that it is practical, and time and cost-efficient for attackers to allocate the IP addresses to which stale DNS records point. Further considering the ubiquity of domain validation in trust ecosystems, an attacker can impersonate the service by obtaining and using a valid certificate that is trusted by all major operating systems and browsers, which severely increases the attackersâ capabilities. The attacker can then also exploit residual trust in the domain name for phishing, receiving and sending emails, or possibly distributing code to clients that load remote code from the domain (e.g., loading of native code by mobile apps, or JavaScript libraries by websites). To prevent such attacks, we introduce a new authentication method for trust-based domain validation that mitigates staleness issues without incurring additional certificate requester effort by incorporating existing trust into the validation process.Finally, the analyses of Delta, Meerkat, and Cloud Strife have made use of large-scale measurements to assess our approachesâ impact and viability. Indeed, security research in general has made extensive use of exhaustive Internet-wide scans over the recent years, as they can provide significant insights into the state of security of the Internet (e.g., if classes of devices are behaving maliciously, or if they might be insecure and could turn malicious in an instant). However, the address space of the Internetâs core addressing protocol (Internet Protocol version 4; IPv4) is exhausted, and a migration to its successor (Internet Protocol version 6; IPv6), the only accepted long-term solution, is inevitable. In turn, to better understand the security of devices connected to the Internet, in particular Internet of Things devices, it is imperative to include IPv6 addresses in security evaluations and scans. Unfortunately, it is practically infeasible to iterate through the entire IPv6 address space, as it is 296 times larger than the IPv4 address space. Without enumerating hosts prior to scanning, we will be unable to retain visibility into the overall security of Internet-connected devices in the future, and we will be unable to detect and prevent their abuse or compromise. To mitigate this blind spot, we introduce a novel technique to enumerate part of the IPv6 address space by walking DNSSEC-signed IPv6 reverse zones. We show (i) that enumerating active IPv6 hosts is practical without a preferential network position contrary to common belief, (ii) that the security of active IPv6 hosts is currently still lagging behind the security state of IPv4 hosts, and (iii) that unintended default IPv6 connectivity is a major security issue
Multipath Routing on Anonymous Communication Systems: Enhancing Privacy and Performance
We live in an era where mass surveillance and online tracking against civilians and organizations have reached alarming levels. This has resulted in more and more users relying on anonymous communications tools for their daily online activities. Nowadays, Tor is the most popular and widely deployed anonymization network, serving millions of daily users in the entire world.
Tor promises to hide the identity of users (i.e., IP addresses) and prevents that external agents disclose relationships between the communicating parties.
However, the benefit of privacy protection comes at the cost of severe performance loss. This performance loss degrades the user experience to such an extent that many users do not use anonymization networks and forgo the privacy protection offered. On the other hand, the popularity of Tor has captured the attention of attackers wishing to deanonymize their users.
As a response, this dissertation presents a set of multipath routing techniques, both at transport and circuit level, to improve the privacy and performance offered to Tor users. To this end, we first present a comprehensive taxonomy to identify the implications of integrating multipath on each design aspect of Tor.
Then, we present a novel transport design to address the existing performance unfairness of the Tor traffic.In Tor, traffic from multiple users is multiplexed in a single TCP connection between two relays. While this has positive effects on privacy, it negatively influences performance and is characterized by unfairness as TCP congestion control gives all the multiplexed Tor traffic as little of the available bandwidth as it gives to every single TCP connection that competes for the same resource. To counter this, we propose to use multipath TCP (MPTCP) to allow for better resource utilization, which, in turn, increases throughput of the Tor traffic to a fairer extend.
Our evaluation in real-world settings shows that using out-of-the-box MPTCP leads to 15% performance gain. We analyze the privacy implications of MPTCP in Tor settings and discuss potential threats and mitigation strategies.
Regarding privacy, in Tor, a malicious entry node can mount website fingerprinting (WFP) attacks to disclose the identities of Tor users by only observing patterns of data flows.In response to this, we propose splitting traffic over multiple entry nodes to limit the observable patterns that an adversary has access to. We demonstrate that our sophisticated splitting strategy reduces the accuracy from more than 98% to less than 16% for all state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. Additionally, we show that this defense, initially designed against WFP, can also be used to mitigate end-to-end correlation attacks.
The contributions presented in this thesis are orthogonal to each other and their synergy comprises a boosted system in terms of both privacy and performance. This results in a more attractive anonymization network for new and existing users, which, in turn, increases the security of all users as a result of enlarging the anonymity set