Infants\u27 reasoning about agents\u27 identity: the case of sociomoral kinds

Recent studies in development psychology suggest that early on infants are able to distinguish characters who display a cooperative behavior from characters who display an antisocial behavior. The current research builds on these findings and aims at determining the extent to which infants possess the sociomoral distinction of “good” and “mean” agents. In particular, we propose that infants represent sociomoral behaviors through kind-based categories. This hypothesis was tested in the current research across 5 different experiments by investigating how infants represent the identity of agents in sociomoral situations. Experiment 1 used a looking-time paradigm to demonstrate 11-month-old infants’ bias to individuate distinct agents based upon their “mean” and “nice” behaviors in a spatiotemporal ambiguous situation. Experiment 2 and 3 ruled out alternative explanations of this effect by controlling for the number of actions presented and differences in motion, respectively. These findings suggest that infants expect agents to display coherent sociomoral behaviors over time in a particular context. Experiment 4 tested whether infants’ are biased to identify prosocial agents more by their internal than their external properties. Fourteen-month-olds showed a bias to identify the ‘helper’ character based on the color of its internal properties. Experiment 5 aimed to clarify whether infants have this biased because they attribute a causal role to the agents’ internal properties. In two different conditions the causal relevance of the agents’ internal or external property was manipulated. We hypothesized that when the causal relevance of the internal property was undermined infants would no longer be biased toward the agents’ internal properties when identifying it as the “helper” character. So far, the results do not show a clear support for this hypothesis. Overall, the results of all these experiments indicate that infants represent sociomoral behaviors in a relatively categorical fashion, and more strongly associated to the agents’ internal rather than external properties. These findings are discussed from both a strong version of kind-based representations in terms of intrinsic natural kinds, and a weaker version in terms of more graded and extrinsic sociomoral kinds

Preschoolers Think Strangers Will Share The Same Knowledge As Other Group Members, But Will Not Behave Like Them

Children learn much of what they know from others’ testimony. But, they are selective: children as young as 3 consider cues to credibility like past accuracy, benevolence, and group membership to decide whom to trust. Research on credulity has centered on how children’s judgments about an individual influences their trust for that same person later. The current study explores whether children generalize epistemic behavior (i.e., knowledgeability) and social behavior (i.e., benevolence) to members who are part of the same group but whom children have not “met”. Four- and 5-year-olds learned that people belonging to one group always either provide accurate information or are nice, and the other group always demonstrates the opposite behavior. Half the children heard the group being labeled and the other half did not. Next, children were introduced to two strangers; one wore a red shirt and the other a blue shirt. These strangers offered the same behaviors as their group earlier demonstrated. Children’s generalizations were conditional, only generalizing the epistemic trait when the stranger’s group was explicitly labeled; they never generalized the social trait to strangers. These data suggest that children use group membership to make inferences about strangers’ epistemic and social characteristics in different ways

Exploring the origins and nature of social-group based inferences across early childhood

Categorization is a vital aspect of human cognition that helps guide learning and knowledge. However, when categorization is applied to social categories, it can have pernicious downstream effects such as stereotypes and prejudice. By preschool, children believe that members of a social category will share inherent, stable characteristics. Thus, it is important to understand when the tendency to use social categories to draw inferences about other people unfolds in early childhood. I began to address these issues in the current dissertation. Specifically, in three projects I examine the origins of social-group based inferences and how environmental influences shape these inferences across early childhood. Project 1 examined the types of characteristics that infants expect members of a social group to share. Twenty-month-old infants expected that a single individual would be consistent in her social dispositions. Infants did not generalize behavioral dispositions across members of a social group. However, additional results from Experiment 1 and 2 suggested that infants might have difficulty reasoning about social dispositions at this age. Project 2 showed that the manner in which parents discuss social groups influences how children learn about social categories and the beliefs that children form about social categories. Children that had generic statements read to them about a novel social category were more likely to view members of that category as being highly similar to one another than children that did not hear the generic statements. Project 3 demonstrated the relative salience of social categories in the environment, a more distal environmental influence, impacts the social categories that children attend to when making inductive inferences. Together, these studies shed light on the origins of social-group based inferences in infancy, and how the environment impacts these inferences across early childhood

Evolved priors for ethnolinguistic categorization: A case study from the Quechua-Aymara boundary in the Peruvian Altiplano.

Ethnic categories uniquely structure human social worlds. People readily form stereotypes about these, and other social categories, but it is unclear whether certain dimensions are privileged for making predictions about strangers when information is limited. If humans have been living in culturally-structured groups for much of their evolutionary history, we might expect them to have adaptations for prioritizing ethno-linguistic cues as a basis for making predictions about others. We provide a strong test of this possibility through a series of studies in a field context along the Quechua-Aymara linguistic boundary in the Peruvian Altiplano where the language boundary is not particularly socially meaningful. We find evidence of such psychological priors among children and adults at this site by showing that their age, and the social categories' novelty affect participants' reliance on ethno-linguistic inductive inferences (i.e. one-to-many predictions). Studies 1-3 show that participants make more ethno-linguistic inferences when the social categories are more removed from their real-world context. Additionally, in Study 4 when the category is marked with acoustic cues of language use, young children rely heavily on ethno-linguistic predictions, even though adults do not

Developing a Concept of Social Power Relationships.

Power differences organize social relations across species. They emerge early in development, and are observed in children’s early relationships with peers and adults. Despite the ubiquity of social power relations, little is known about how children conceptualize them. This dissertation provides an experimental examination of children’s developing understanding of social power relationships between individuals, and among members of social groups. In Part I, Studies 1, 2, and 3 provide an extensive investigation of 3- to 9-year-old children’s and adults’ sensitivity to interpersonal social power relations across five manifestations of power: resource control, goal achievement, permission, giving orders, and setting norms. These studies examine children’s understanding of power both in situations where the powerful individual may be perceived as unkind (Studies 1 and 2), and in situations where the powerful individual may be perceived as benevolent (Study 3). Findings reveal that children as young as 3 or 4 years old represent social power relations between individuals across several dimensions of power, when presented with powerful individuals who were malevolent as well as benevolent. As predicted, sensitivity to social power in resource control, goal achievement, and permission situations emerges earlier in development. With age, children’s sensitivity extends over all five of the dimensions tested, becoming almost adult-like by age 7 to 9. Part II of the dissertation examines children’s sensitivity to power relations between members of social categories. Participants are shown vignettes depicting two individuals contrasting in power, and are asked to identify the relative age (Study 4) or gender (Study 5) of the individuals. Findings indicate that young children are more likely to infer relative age than gender based on power differentials, and that even adults do not consistently map power onto these social categories. Overall, this dissertation provides one of the first in-depth experimental examinations of children’s developing concepts of social power. The findings show that children are sensitive to social power relations early on, and even use these power relations to make inferences about people’s social group memberships.PhDPsychologyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/111623/1/sgulgoz_1.pd

Child categorization

Categorization is a process that spans all of development, beginning in earliest infancy yet changing as children's knowledge and cognitive skills develop. In this review article, we address three core issues regarding childhood categorization. First, we discuss the extent to which early categories are rooted in perceptual similarity versus knowledge-enriched theories. We argue for a composite perspective in which categories are steeped in commonsense theories from a young age but also are informed by low-level similarity and associative learning cues. Second, we examine the role of language in early categorization. We review evidence to suggest that language is a powerful means of expressing, communicating, shaping, and supporting category knowledge. Finally, we consider categories in context. We discuss sources of variability and flexibility in children's categories, as well as the ways in which children's categories are used within larger knowledge systems (e.g., to form analogies, make inferences, or construct theories). Categorization is a process that is intrinsically tied to nearly all aspects of cognition, and its study provides insight into cognitive development, broadly construed. WIREs Cogn Sci 2011 2 95–105 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.96 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs websitePeer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78491/1/96_ftp.pd

Children\u27s beliefs about hierarchical structures and relationships.

Children are surrounded by social structures such as families, schools, and workplaces which are often arranged hierarchically with some people holding more power than others. This dissertation explores how children think about hierarchical relationships and more complex hierarchical structures. In Chapter 2, children were asked to evaluate the traits of people who hold hierarchically dominant and subordinate social roles. With age, 4- to 6-year-olds increasingly inferred that dominant individuals have social power and they deferred to their instructions (Chapter 2, Study 1). Furthermore, 5- and 6-year-olds attributed knowledgeability to individuals with dominant social roles but overall children did not prefer to ask those individuals for information (Chapter 2, Study 2). Chapter 3 extended these studies by presenting children with larger social structures depicting gender and racial inequality and asking children to recognize inequality (Study 1), rectify inequality (Study 2) and create social hierarchies (Study 3). Regardless of age, participants judged hierarchies with more than one woman or Black man in a position of power as fair. However, hierarchies with only one minoritized individual were judged as neutral in gender hierarchies or unfair in racial hierarchies (Chapter 3, Study 1). Children were also asked to rectify inequality by promoting individuals to positions of power in unequal control (arbitrary non-social color groups), gender, and racial hierarchies. Children selected to promote majoritized individuals to positions of power when they were arbitrary groups and children’s gender influenced their responses to gender inequality where girls promoted more women to positions of power than boys (Chapter 3, Study 2). Lastly, children created a social hierarchy without the influence of representations of inequality. In-group gender favoritism drove children’s selections where girls selected more women than men for every tier of the hierarchy but boys were only influenced by gender when selecting someone for the top of the hierarchy. When making racial hierarchies, children selected both White men and Black men equally to be in positions of power (Chapter 3, Study 3). These studies suggest that children can infer power from simple hierarchical structures and that they are motivated to rectify inequalities in more complex social structures

My Heart Made Me Do It: Children’s Essentialist Beliefs About Heart Transplants

Psychological essentialism is a folk theory characterized by the belief that a causal internal essence or force gives rise to the common outward behaviors or attributes of a category’s members. In two studies, we investigated whether 4â to 7â yearâ old children evidenced essentialist reasoning about heart transplants by asking them to predict whether trading hearts with an individual would cause them to take on the donor’s attributes. Control conditions asked children to consider the effects of trading money with an individual. Results indicated that children reasoned according to essentialism, predicting more transfer of attributes in the transplant condition versus the nonâ bodily money control. Children also endorsed essentialist transfer of attributes even when they did not believe that a transplant would change the recipient’s category membership (e.g., endorsing the idea that a recipient of a pig’s heart would act pigâ like, but denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from a strong interpretation of the â minimalistâ position, an alternative to essentialism.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/138236/1/cogs12431_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/138236/2/cogs12431.pd

Error Management in Learning and Generalisation: The Domain of Food

Whilst many societies today rely on industrially processed foods, this is atypical compared to other societies across the world and across history. Acquiring food through means of hunting or gathering poses risks that an individual must balance with a dependence on these means for survival. One strategy to help minimise these risks is to learn about the threats in one’s environment, and it appears learning systems are specialised for this, with certain information being more learnable than others. Past research has shown that infants appear to possess learning biases relating to edibility for plants, and more broadly studies have demonstrated children and adults to be biased towards learning information pertinent to survival (e.g. danger, threat).One explanation for the emergence of such biases is Error Management Theory, which argues that in instances where certain mistakes are more costly than others, cognitive biases emerge to minimise the more costly errors. The present dissertation reasons that this logic may also apply to generalisation processes, and looks to examine whether different kinds of information are generalised differently, and how this differs across the lifecourse, whilst also further investigating learning biases towards certain types of information. Chapter 2 (Rioux, Russell & Wertz, 2022) investigates whether generalisation systems are biased in regards to certain types of information, testing whether generalisation of edibility and toxicity information reflects the relative costs of generalisation errors for these kinds of information in adults and in children. We find this to be the case, with adults generalising toxicity more and edibility information less. Interestingly, it is observed that this appears to only be the case under the highest level of uncertainty, and the effect is not observed in children Moreover, we find evidence that there does appear to be an overall negativity effect on generalisation, but that this cannot fully account for the differences in generalisation for edibility and toxicity information. These results offer the first indication that human generalisation is biased to reflect the relative costs of possible generalisation mistakes and support the notion of a generalisation system shaped to minimise costly generalisation errors. In Chapter 3 we investigate the effects of information type on generalisation further using a different method, look deeper at the role of uncertainty, and examine the role played by individual differences, specifically anxiety, on generalisation. We also looked to build upon existing work demonstrating learning is biased towards certain kinds of information (e.g., threat, danger) by examining learning biases towards danger and edibility information in the domain of food. We find a limited effect of information type on generalisation for adults, but unlike in Chapter 1, did not observe this effect to be greater under uncertainty. Moreover, whilst we did not find the predicted effect of information type on recall accuracy observed in previous research, it was found that information type influenced the kinds of mistakes made, with participants making more false positive errors compared to the more costly false negative for toxicity information. Finally, we present evidence that, contrary to predictions, individual differences do not increase risk minimising behaviour, rather in certain circumstances greater anxiety may lead to risk increasing behaviours. In Chapter 4 we looked to replicate a finding from Wertz & Wynn (2014), who observed 18-month-old infants would selectively associate plants with edibility over a control artifact. We were not able to replicate this finding. Following this non-replication we tested the effect using an alternative method to examine possible methodological reasons for our results and again did not observe an effect. Taken in concert the results presented in this dissertation provide evidence that generalisation, but not learning, appears to be sensitive to the type of information being generalised. Consistent with the predictions of Error Management Theory, generalisation systems seem to be biased towards reducing the more costly mistakes, yet only under certain circumstances. This calls for further research to elucidate the moderating factors on the generalisation of potentially costly information, and further replications in the study of learning biases.Während viele Gesellschaften sich heute auf industriell verarbeitete Nahrung verlassen, ist dies im Vergleich zu anderen Gesellschaften in der Welt und in der Geschichte untypisch. Die Beschaffung von Nahrung durch Jagen oder Sammeln birgt Risiken, die eine Person gegen die Abhängigkeit von diesen Mitteln zum Überleben abwägen muss. Eine Strategie zur Minimierung dieser Risiken besteht darin, sich über die Bedrohungen in seiner Umgebung zu informieren, und es scheint, dass die Lernsysteme darauf spezialisiert sind, wobei bestimmte Informationen leichter erlernt werden können als andere. Frühere Untersuchungen deuten darauf hin, dass Säuglinge in Bezug auf die Essbarkeit von Pflanzen selektiv lernen, und allgemein haben Studien gezeigt, dass Kinder und Erwachsene dazu neigen, überlebenswichtige Informationen bevorzugt zu lernen (z. B. Gefahr, Bedrohung). Eine Erklärung für die Entstehung solcher Präferenzen („biases“) ist die Fehlermanagement-Theorie (Error Management Theory), die besagt, dass in Fällen, in denen bestimmte Fehler kostspieliger sind als andere, kognitive Präfenzen („biases“) entstehen, um die kostspieligeren Fehler zu minimieren. Die vorliegende Dissertation argumentiert, dass diese Logik auch auf Generalisierungsprozesse angewendet werden kann, und untersucht, inwiefern verschiedene Arten von Informationen unterschiedlich verallgemeinert werden und wie sich dies über den Lebensverlauf hinweg unterscheidet. Außerdem wird selektives Lernen („learning biases“) gegenüber bestimmten Arten von Informationen weiter untersucht. In Kapitel 2 (Rioux, Russell & Wertz, 2022) wird untersucht, ob Generalisierungssysteme in Bezug auf bestimmte Arten von Informationen voreingenommen sind, indem geprüft wird, ob die Generalisierung von Informationen durch Erwachsene und Kinder über Genießbarkeit und Toxizität die relativen Kosten von Generalisierungsfehlern für diese Arten von Informationen widerspiegelt. Wir stellen fest, dass dies der Fall ist: Erwachsene verallgemeinern Informationen zur Toxizität stärker und Informationen zur Genießbarkeit weniger. Interessanterweise scheint dies nur bei dem höchsten Maß an Unsicherheit der Fall zu sein, und der Effekt wird bei Kindern nicht beobachtet. Darüber hinaus finden wir Hinweise darauf, dass es einen allgemeinen Negativitätseffekt auf die Generalisierung zu geben scheint, der jedoch die Unterschiede bei der Generalisierung von Informationen über Genießbarkeit und Toxizität nicht vollständig erklären kann. Diese Ergebnisse liefern den ersten Hinweis darauf, dass bei Menschen die Generalisierung die relativen Kosten möglicher Generalisierungsfehler widerspiegelt, und unterstützen die Auffassung eines Generalisierungssystems, das so gestaltet ist, dass kostspielige Generalisierungsfehler minimiert werden. In Kapitel 3 untersuchen wir die Auswirkungen der Art der Information auf die Generalisierung mit einer anderen Methode, gehen näher auf die Rolle von Unsicherheit ein und untersuchen die Rolle, die individuelle Unterschiede, insbesondere Angst, bei der Generalisierung spielen. Wir haben auch versucht, auf bestehenden Arbeiten aufzubauen, die zeigen, dass das Lernen für bestimmte Arten von Informationen (z. B. Bedrohung, Gefahr) spezialisiert ist, indem wir selektives Lernen („learning biases“) in Bezug auf Informationen über Gefahr und Genießbarkeit im Bereich der Nahrung untersucht haben. Wir fanden eine begrenzte Auswirkung der Art der Information auf die Generalisierung bei Erwachsenen, konnten aber im Gegensatz zu Kapitel 1 nicht feststellen, dass dieser Effekt bei Unsicherheit größer ist. Darüber hinaus fanden wir zwar nicht den vorhergesagten Effekt des Informationstyps auf die Erinnerungsgenauigkeit, der in früheren Untersuchungen beobachtet wurde, aber es wurde festgestellt, dass der Informationstyp die Art der gemachten Fehler beeinflusste, wobei die Teilnehmer mehr falsch-positive Fehler im Vergleich zu den kostspieligeren falsch-negativen Fehlern bei Toxizitätsinformationen machten. Schließlich konnten wir nachweisen, dass entgegen den Vorhersagen individuelle Unterschiede nicht zu risikominimierendem Verhalten führen, sondern dass unter bestimmten Umständen größere Angst zu risikoerhöhendem Verhalten führen kann. In Kapitel 4 versuchten wir, ein Ergebnis von Wertz & Wynn (2014) zu replizieren, die beobachteten, dass 18 Monate alte Säuglinge Pflanzen selektiv mit Essbarkeit assoziierten und nicht mit einem Kontroll-Artefakt. Wir konnten diesen Befund nicht replizieren. Daraufhin testeten wir den Effekt mit einer alternativen Methode, um mögliche methodische Gründe für unsere Ergebnisse zu untersuchen, und konnten erneut keinen Effekt beobachten. Insgesamt belegen die in dieser Dissertation vorgestellten Ergebnisse, dass die Generalisierung, nicht aber das Lernen, von der Art der verallgemeinerten Informationen abhängig zu sein scheint. In Übereinstimmung mit den Vorhersagen der Fehlermanagement-Theorie (Error Management Theory) scheinen Generalisierungssysteme darauf ausgerichtet zu sein, die kostspieligeren Fehler zu reduzieren, allerdings nur unter bestimmten Umständen. Dies erfordert weitere Untersuchungen, um die moderierenden Faktoren für die Generalisierung potenziell kostspieliger Informationen zu klären, sowie weitere Replikationen bei der Untersuchung von selektiven Lernprozessen