Kryzys podstaw matematyki przełomu XIX i XX wieku

By the end of the 19th century, mathematics had become very intensively developed. Mathematical logic became an independent discipline, and in the 1880s Cantor published his work on set theory. All this led to questions about the consistency of mathematical theories and decidability theorems. Therefore, for the second time in the history of mathematics, there emerged a crisis of the basis of mathematics.There were a few ideas for overcoming the crisis. In this paper, there will be described three trends in the philosophy of mathematics in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: logicism (Frege), intuitionism (Brouwer) and formalism (Hilbert). These three trends were described from the philosophical point of view and in the context of the crisis. Moreover, for each of them there will be present the most important methodological assumptions, and I will briefly describe attempts to achieve them. This will describe the problem in such a way that allows for the grasping of important differences and similarities between logicism, intuitionism and formalism and better understand their causes.By the end of the 19th century, mathematics had become very intensively developed. Mathematical logic became an independent discipline, and in the 1880s Cantor published his work on set theory. All this led to questions about the consistency of mathematical theories and decidability theorems. Therefore, for the second time in the history of mathematics, there emerged a crisis of the basis of mathematics.There were a few ideas for overcoming the crisis. In this paper, there will be described three trends in the philosophy of mathematics in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: logicism (Frege), intuitionism (Brouwer) and formalism (Hilbert). These three trends were described from the philosophical point of view and in the context of the crisis. Moreover, for each of them there will be present the most important methodological assumptions, and I will briefly describe attempts to achieve them. This will describe the problem in such a way that allows for the grasping of important differences and similarities between logicism, intuitionism and formalism and better understand their causes

What is a logical diagram?

Robert Brandom’s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously - as more than a mere “heuristic aid” to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind does exist in Charles Peirce’s conception of iconic signs, but that fully understood, logical diagrams involve a structured array of normative reasoning practices, as well as just a “picture on a page”

Mathematical Abstraction, Conceptual Variation and Identity

One of the key features of modern mathematics is the adoption of the abstract method. Our goal in this paper is to propose an explication of that method that is rooted in the history of the subject

Mathematical Abstraction, Conceptual Variation and Identity

One of the key features of modern mathematics is the adoption of the abstract method. Our goal in this paper is to propose an explication of that method that is rooted in the history of the subject

A Burgessian critique of nominalistic tendencies in contemporary mathematics and its historiography

We analyze the developments in mathematical rigor from the viewpoint of a Burgessian critique of nominalistic reconstructions. We apply such a critique to the reconstruction of infinitesimal analysis accomplished through the efforts of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass; to the reconstruction of Cauchy's foundational work associated with the work of Boyer and Grabiner; and to Bishop's constructivist reconstruction of classical analysis. We examine the effects of a nominalist disposition on historiography, teaching, and research.Comment: 57 pages; 3 figures. Corrected misprint