The Legal Enforceability of Contracts made by Electronic Agents under Islamic Law: A Critical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Legal Reform in Saudi Arabia

The aim of this dissertation is to analyse whether contracts made by electronic agents1 might be made enforceable under Islamic law. It discusses what constitutes an enforceable contract under Islamic law and whether this is applicable when a contract is made by an electronic agent. The enforceability of these contracts under Islamic law is especially important in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) where Islamic law constitutes the legal system. Ignoring the doctrine of Islamic law in relation to the enforceability of these contracts could, therefore, fundamentally affect the future viability of these contracts in the KSA. The dissertation argues first that the principle of mutual consent under Islamic law is not satisfied in contracts made by electronic agents because there is no communication of an offer and acceptance by the contracting parties (users). Secondly, while electronic agents function like human agents, there are a number of doctrinal requirements under Islamic agency theory that prevent electronic agents from being agents proper. Thirdly, the term ‘legal personality’ is categorised in Islamic law under ‘Dhimmah’, an ethical concept designed principally for human beings which cannot, therefore, be attributed to electronic agents. This dissertation demonstrates that Islamic law creates conceptual obstacles which prevent contracts made by electronic agents being enforceable in the KSA. One implication of this will be a risk of negative impact on the development of these contracts in the KSA because they are contradictory to Islamic law. Islamic law must avoid narrow traditional interpretations of its legal concepts, because a lack of reform in this area will create difficulties and barriers against the enforceability of these contracts under Islamic law

Contracts Concluded by Electronic Agents - Comparative Analysis of American and Polish Legal Systems

This article analyzes the US and Polish law on contract formation by electronic agents. It persents the main similarities and differences in the approaches of common and civil legal systems. Finally, it discusses changes in legal theories in Poland that had to be made in order to comply with standards of electronic commerce

Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence

The aim of this exploratory paper is to discuss a sometimes recognized but still under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical

Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era--The Human-like Authors are Already Here- A New Model

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are creative, unpredictable, independent, autonomous, rational, evolving, capable of data collection, communicative, efficient, accurate, and have free choice among alternatives. Similar to humans, AI systems can autonomously create and generate creative works. The use of AI systems in the production of works, either for personal or manufacturing purposes, has become common in the 3A era of automated, autonomous, and advanced technology. Despite this progress, there is a deep and common concern in modern society that AI technology will become uncontrollable. There is therefore a call for social and legal tools for controlling AI systems’ functions and outcomes. This Article addresses the questions of the copyrightability of artworks generated by AI systems: ownership and accountability. The Article debates who should enjoy the benefits of copyright protection and who should be responsible for the infringement of rights and damages caused by AI systems that independently produce creative works. Subsequently, this Article presents the AI Multi- Player paradigm, arguing against the imposition of these rights and responsibilities on the AI systems themselves or on the different stakeholders, mainly the programmers who develop such systems. Most importantly, this Article proposes the adoption of a new model of accountability for works generated by AI systems: the AI Work Made for Hire (WMFH) model, which views the AI system as a creative employee or independent contractor of the user. Under this proposed model, ownership, control, and responsibility would be imposed on the humans or legal entities that use AI systems and enjoy its benefits. This model accurately reflects the human-like features of AI systems; it is justified by the theories behind copyright protection; and it serves as a practical solution to assuage the fears behind AI systems. In addition, this model unveils the powers behind the operation of AI systems; hence, it efficiently imposes accountability on clearly identifiable persons or legal entities. Since AI systems are copyrightable algorithms, this Article reflects on the accountability for AI systems in other legal regimes, such as tort or criminal law and in various industries using these systems

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations as Legal Persons : Evaluating the Legal Personhood of DAOs in Light of the Bundle Theory

The proliferation of blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies has led to widespread experimentation with modes of operation that are predicated on decentralization. Among these innovations are so-called Decentralized Autonomous Organizations—essentially blockchain-native organizations whose operations are predicated on a high level of automation and whose functions are managed by a human collectivity leveraging some sort of decentralized governance model. These entities are steeped in novelty, for example with regard to their technological makeup, the context in which they operate, as well as the method of forming an intention based on which to operate. As such, they constitute a very unique, decidedly digital type of entity, whose ontology is quite vague. This thesis, then, aims to examine DAOs as novel entities that engage in legally relevant behaviour, focusing specifically on the question of whether or not they can be considered legal persons. This question is approached in light of Visa Kurki’s Bundle Theory of Legal Personhood, which provides quite a nuanced framework through which to examine the concept. Indeed, his theory brings this thesis to the conclusion that DAOs can, in fact, be considered legal persons, although there is still room for more nuance in the discussion, as there remains ambiguity in a term as wide as ‘DAO’ , as well as in the whole concept of legal personhood as applied to entities that tread the vague line between traditiona

Corporate Autonomy: Law, Constitutional Democracy, and the Rights of Big Business

Corporate Autonomy: Law, Constitutional Democracy, and the Rights of Big Business is a normative, interdisciplinary and analytical examination of the rights and internal governance of business corporations in constitutional liberal democracies. Drawing from political theory, economics and law, it concludes that corporations should not merit legal protections unless they first exhibit some internal democratic credentials. In contrast to theories of collective moral personhood, I argue that the question of corporate ontology should not determine the kinds of legal rights it can claim. Rather, following Dewey (1926) and Habermas (1996), I maintain that the law, as a reflection of popular sovereignty, should respond flexibly to shifting social configurations by defending the principle of equal human worth (Arendt) regardless of whether or not corporations are properly understood as “real” entities with a will of their own, aggregations of individual rights-holders, or state-created legal fictions. I argue that corporations can make a prima facie case for legal autonomy rights based upon human beings’ associational freedoms. I then conclude that corporate legal autonomy rights are more likely to vindicate associational liberty if corporations first exhibit some internal democratic credentials. Permitting corporate members a voice in decision-making can ensure that corporate purposes align with the individual purposes upon which associational freedom derives. (Laborde, 2017) Nevertheless, after consideration of the literature on group agency (e.g., List and Pettit 2011) and group rights, (e.g., Benhabib 2002; Levy 2014) I also conclude that autonomy rights founded on associationalism must be tempered to protect the equal rights and liberties of those that might be harmed by corporate action. Given labor markets characterized by monopsony, financial markets characterized by the “forced capitalism,” (Strine, Jr., 2017) and the ongoing control exercised by corporate leadership under the constraints of product market competition, I find that ascribing associational rights to corporations is a tall order indeed. It may require that corporations assume further democratic institutions designed to protect those whose rights are vulnerable to corporate autonomy: e.g., intra-corporate individual autonomy rights, accountability mechanisms, internal counter-powers, and systems of discursive justification. I then argue that this theory of corporate autonomy rights incorporates the best, and jettisons the worst, of alternative theories of workplace democracy. In particular, it integrates and tempers the associationalist instincts of syndicalist, participatory democratic theories while building on the protective instincts of republican theories. The dissertation concludes by addressing a common objection to workplace democracy: that it is so inefficient that it would destroy the very good its members mean to pursue as they exercise their associational freedoms. It finds that accountable representation, delegation of decision-making functions, and market exit can help a corporation maintain its democratic credentials while permitting it to respond to market constraint

THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES OF U.S. REGULATION: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) growing catalog of applications and methods has the potential to profoundly affect public policy by generating instances where regulations are not adequate to confront the issues faced by society, also known as regulatory gaps. The objective of this article is to improve our understanding of how AI influences U.S. public policy. It does so by systematically exploring, for the first time, this technology’s role in the generation of regulatory gaps. Specifically, it addresses two research questions: What U.S. regulatory gaps exist due to AI methods and applications? When looking across all of the gaps identified in the first research question, what trends and insights emerge that can help stakeholders plan for the future? These questions are answered through a systematic review of four academic literature databases in the hard and social sciences. Its implementation is guided by a protocol that identified 5,240 candidate articles. A screening process reduced this sample to 241 articles (published between 1976 and February of 2018) relevant to answering the research questions. This article contributes to the literature by adapting the work of Bennett-Moses and Calo to effectively characterize regulatory gaps caused by AI in the U.S. In addition, it finds that most gaps: do not require new regulation or the creation of governance frameworks for their resolution, are found at the federal and state levels of government, and AI applications are recognized more often than methods as their cause