Artificiality in Social Sciences

This text provides with an introduction to the modern approach of artificiality and simulation in social sciences. It presents the relationship between complexity and artificiality, before introducing the field of artificial societies which greatly benefited from the computer power fast increase, gifting social sciences with formalization and experimentation tools previously owned by "hard" sciences alone. It shows that as "a new way of doing social sciences", artificial societies should undoubtedly contribute to a renewed approach in the study of sociality and should play a significant part in the elaboration of original theories of social phenomena.artificial societies; multi-agent systems; distributed artificial intelligence; complexity

Artificiality in Social Sciences

This text provides with an introduction to the modern approach of artificiality and simulation in social sciences. It presents the relationship between complexity and artificiality, before introducing the field of artificial societies which greatly benefited from the computer power fast increase, gifting social sciences with formalization and experimentation tools previously owned by "hard" sciences alone. It shows that as "a new way of doing social sciences", artificial societies should undoubtedly contribute to a renewed approach in the study of sociality and should play a significant part in the elaboration of original theories of social phenomena.Comment: 14 page

How Far Can We Go Through Social System?

The paper elaborates an endeavor on applying the algorithmic information-theoretic computational complexity to meta-social-sciences. It is motivated by the effort on seeking the impact of the well-known incompleteness theorem to the scientific methodology approaching social phenomena. The paper uses the binary string as the model of social phenomena to gain understanding on some problems faced in the philosophy of social sciences or some traps in sociological theories. The paper ends on showing the great opportunity in recent social researches and some boundaries that limit them

The Explanatory Potential of Artificial Societies

It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Instead, artificial societies may sometimes provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our understanding, considerably differ from the standard kind of potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum. The paper discusses how these two kinds of potential explanations differ, and how possible functional analyses can be appraised

Validation of Simulation: Patterns in the Social and Natural Sciences

In most cases, the meaning of computer simulation is strongly connected to the idea numerical calculations. A computer simulation is a numerical solution of a complex mathematical problem. Therefore, the problem of validation of its results should be only a problem of judging the underlying computational methods. However, it will be argued, that this is not the case. It is consensus in literature that validation constitutes one of the central epistemological problems of computer simulation methods. Especially in the case of simulations in the social sciences the answers given by many authors are not satisfactory. The following paper attempts to show how the characteristics of simulation, i.e. the imitation of a dynamic, constitute the problem of validation even in the case of the natural sciences and what consequences arise. Differences as well as common grounds between social and natural sciences will be discussed.Generative Mechanism, Imitation, Patterns, Simulation, Validation

Emerging Artificial Societies Through Learning

The NewTies project is implementing a simulation in which societies of agents are expected to de-velop autonomously as a result of individual, population and social learning. These societies are expected to be able to solve environmental challenges by acting collectively. The challenges are in-tended to be analogous to those faced by early, simple, small-scale human societies. This report on work in progress outlines the major features of the system as it is currently conceived within the project, including the design of the agents, the environment, the mechanism for the evolution of language and the peer-to-peer infrastructure on which the simulation runs.Artificial Societies, Evolution of Language, Decision Trees, Peer-To-Peer Networks, Social Learning

How Far Can We Go Through Social System?

The paper elaborates an endeavor on applying the algorithmic information-theoretic computational complexity to meta-social-sciences. It is motivated by the effort on seeking the impact of the well-known incompleteness theorem to the scientific methodology approaching social phenomena. The paper uses the binary string as the model of social phenomena to gain understanding on some problems faced in the philosophy of social sciences or some traps in sociological theories. The paper ends on showing the great opportunity in recent social researches and some boundaries that limit them.meta-sociology, algorithmic information theory, incompleteness theorem, sociological theory, sociological methods

The Logic of the Method of Agent-Based Simulation in the Social Sciences: Empirical and Intentional Adequacy of Computer Programs

The classical theory of computation does not represent an adequate model of reality for simulation in the social sciences. The aim of this paper is to construct a methodological perspective that is able to conciliate the formal and empirical logic of program verification in computer science, with the interpretative and multiparadigmatic logic of the social sciences. We attempt to evaluate whether social simulation implies an additional perspective about the way one can understand the concepts of program and computation. We demonstrate that the logic of social simulation implies at least two distinct types of program verifications that reflect an epistemological distinction in the kind of knowledge one can have about programs. Computer programs seem to possess a causal capability (Fetzer, 1999) and an intentional capability that scientific theories seem not to possess. This distinction is associated with two types of program verification, which we call empirical and intentional verification. We demonstrate, by this means, that computational phenomena are also intentional phenomena, and that such is particularly manifest in agent-based social simulation. Ascertaining the credibility of results in social simulation requires a focus on the identification of a new category of knowledge we can have about computer programs. This knowledge should be considered an outcome of an experimental exercise, albeit not empirical, acquired within a context of limited consensus. The perspective of intentional computation seems to be the only one possible to reflect the multiparadigmatic character of social science in terms of agent-based computational social science. We contribute, additionally, to the clarification of several questions that are found in the methodological perspectives of the discipline, such as the computational nature, the logic of program scalability, and the multiparadigmatic character of agent-based simulation in the social sciences.Computer and Social Sciences, Agent-Based Simulation, Intentional Computation, Program Verification, Intentional Verification, Scientific Knowledge