329,357 research outputs found
Sectors Expansion, Allocation of Talent and Adverse Selection in Development
This paper proposes a theory in which informational failures hindering an efficient operation of the economy are solved over the course development. Individuals are heterogeneous in terms of entrepreneurial talent, exhibiting different comparative advantages. Talent is subject to private information, giving rise to adverse selection problems. In this paper, adverse selection stems from sectors scarcity, which prevents some individuals from finding their "appropriate" sector. The availability of many sectors facilitates the allocation of individuals' unobservable talent. As a result, sectors expansion fosters growth because it helps to solve adverse selection problems. Successful long-run development is characterised by a continuous process of sectoral expansion, improved allocation of talent, and more efficient operation of financial institutions. Nevertheless, this model may also lead to poverty-traps; where economies are confined to a rudimentary situation with few sectors, poor allocation of talent, and underdeveloped financial institutions.Horizontal Innovation, Talent Allocation, Adverse Selection, Risk-Sharing
What are Benefits and Pitfalls of Using Technical Selection Tests During the Hiring Process?
[Excerpt] Talent Acquisition departments are the frontline soldiers in the war for talent. Selection tests and simulations are common mechanisms by which firm’s filter through potential job candidates. Nevertheless, a 2017 Deloitte survey reported that 71% of firms believed they were weak in their ability to use these tools effectively. Using assessments is a balancing act between false positives (hiring the wrong candidate) and false negatives (rejecting the right candidate). As such it is important to understand the benefits and pitfalls. This is especially true with technical assessments for coders and programmers
Redistribution, Occupational Choice and Intergenerational Mobility: Does Wage Equality Nail the Cobbler to His Last?
The classical Roy-model of selection on the labor market is extended in order to analyze intergenerational mobility. This is done by linking ability uncertainty to family background. I derive implications for the allocation of talent and for background dependent earnings patterns within occupations and show that a very compressed wage structure can cause negative sorting of people with family background in the occupation with low returns to ability. I also study the effects of income redistribution on mobility and talent allocation. It is found that a redistributive welfare system either reduces vertical mobility or enhances it at the cost of a shrinking proportion of people choosing the occupation with high returns.Intergenerational mobility; Occupational choice; Allocation of talent; redistribution
Self-selection into teamwork: A theoretical and experimental analysis
We analyze self-selection decisions regarding teamwork both theoretically and empirically. While we focus on individual talent, we also investigate the effects of team tasks, individual teamwork skills, and expectations concerning the talent and teamwork skills of potential teammates as further determinants in the self-selection process. Putting our hypotheses derived from a basic self-selection model in dialogue with original data from a real-task laboratory experiment, we are able to show that it is the less talented who find teamwork appealing but that individual teamwork skills and expectations concerning the talent of potential teammates might compensate for this adverse effect
Psychosocial and Physiological Factors Affecting Selection to Regional Age-Grade Rugby Union Squads: A Machine Learning Approach
Talent selection programmes choose athletes for talent development pathways. Currently, the set of psychosocial variables that determine talent selection in youth Rugby Union are unknown, with the literature almost exclusively focusing on physiological variables. The purpose of this study was to use a novel machine learning approach to identify the physiological and psychosocial models that predict selection to a regional age-grade rugby union team. Age-grade club rugby players (n = 104; age, 15.47 ± 0.80; U16, n = 62; U18, n = 42) were assessed for physiological and psychosocial factors during regional talent selection days. Predictive models (selected vs. non-selected) were created for forwards, backs, and across all players using Bayesian machine learning. The generated physiological models correctly classified 67.55% of all players, 70.09% of forwards, and 62.50% of backs. Greater hand-grip strength, faster 10 m and 40 m sprint, and power were common features for selection. The generated psychosocial models correctly classified 62.26% of all players, 73.66% of forwards, and 60.42% of backs. Reduced burnout, reduced emotional exhaustion, and lower reduced sense of accomplishment, were common features for selection. Selection appears to be predominantly based on greater strength, speed, and power, as well as lower athlete burnout
Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management
The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy’s best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial positions in the public and private sector, using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always higher in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers self-select into the private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient.public management, public service motivation, managerial ability, self-selection
Enterprise Recruitment System Designed to Study the Effectiveness of Indicators
The quality of the design for a company’s employing system index has a close relationship with a principle that the corporation whether can practice during the human resource employing or not. At present, the basic reason for low-effect in talents selection of a corporation in china is lack of a normative and scientific selection of talent effectiveness index system. This article is designed for a selection of talent effectiveness index system to help the corporation to select a talent who is fit for the development of the corporation, and to promote the stable and sustainable development of corporations
Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management
The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy’s best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial and non-managerial positions in the public and private sector,using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector. As aresult, relatively many of the more able managers self-select into the private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient.public management, public service motivation, managerial ability, self-selection
Peer choice in CEO compensation
Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm's selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent
- …