Subprime mortgages and the housing bubble

This paper explores the link between the house-price expectations of mortgage lenders and the extent of subprime lending. It argues that bubble conditions in the housing market are likely to spur subprime lending, with favorable price expectations easing the default concerns of lenders and thus increasing their willingness to extend loans to risky borrowers. Since the demand created by subprime lending feeds back onto house prices, such lending also helps to fuel an emerging housing bubble. The paper, however, focuses on the reverse causal linkage, where subprime lending is a consequence rather than a cause of bubble conditions. These ideas are illustrated in a theoretical model, and empirical work tests for a connection between price expectations and the extent of subprime lending.Subprime mortgage ; Global financial crisis

Local Predatory Lending Laws: Going Beyond North Carolina

Following the lead of federal regulations, numerous states, counties and cities have enacted laws designed to reduce predatory lending. There is at least anecdotal evidence that predatory or abusive mortgage lending is primarily concentrated in the subprime market. However, the impact of these local predatory lending laws on the subprime mortgage market is unknown. The primary questions we examine are: do these laws affect the supply and flow of subprime mortgage credit and does the experience in North Carolina, the first state to enact a local predatory lending law, apply to other local laws

State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: The Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms

Subprime mortgage lending has grown rapidly in recent years and with it, so have concerns about predatory lending. In response to evidence of predatory lending, most states have enacted new laws or expanded existing laws to address abuses in the subprime home loan market. The effect of these statutes is a matter of debate. This paper seeks to improve the understanding of this increasingly important issue and pays particular attention to the role that legal enforcement mechanisms play in this context. The results of the analysis are consistent with the view that anti-predatory lending laws influence subprime lending markets and that disaggregating the details of the overall legal framework into its component parts is essential for understanding subprime market dynamics. The restrictions, coverage, and enforcement components all have significant relationships with subprime market outcomes, with the coverage relationship found to be broadly consistent with the reverse lemons hypothesis put forward by Ho and Pennington-Cross (2007). The results also suggest that the newer mini-HOEPA laws have had an impact on the subprime market above and beyond the older preexisting laws, particularly for subprime originations. Broader coverage through these new laws is associated with higher origination likelihoods, while increased restrictions through the mini-HOEPA laws are associated with lower origination propensities

Neighborhood Subprime Lending and the Performance of Community Reinvestment Mortgages

This study analyzes the spillover effect of the spatial concentration of subprime lending on the performance of recently originated community reinvestment mortgages targeting low- to moderate-income borrowers. The level of subprime lending in a census tract is found to be a significant predictor of the default and prepayment probability of the community reinvestment loans in the same neighborhoods. The results suggest that the concentration of subprime lending and the resulting clusters of foreclosed properties reduce neighborhood property values and increase price volatility. The lowered property values and the increased volatility increase the default probability of borrowers holding any loan product, including community reinvestment mortgages. This study provides new evidence concerning the negative impacts of the concentration of subprime lending in certain neighborhoods.

The CRA and subprime lending

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has been under much scrutiny amid the subprime lending bust. Critics of the CRA contend that the law pushed banking institutions to undertake high-risk mortgage lending. A Federal Reserve Board staff analysis finds that the CRA was neither a source nor driver of the housing market's collapse. In this issue, we examine the CRA and its role in the mortgage market and distinguish it from causes of the subprime failure.Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 ; Subprime mortgage ; Subprime market

Understanding Predatory Lending: Moving Toward a Common Definition and Workable Solutions

To date, various parties have used the term "predatory lending" to describe a wide range of abuses. Regulators, industry and advocates have not agreed on a single definition, but have used the term individually to refer to different practices and loan terms. This paper describes predatory lending as a set of loan terms and practices that falls between appropriate risk-based pricing by subprime lenders and blatant fraud. Thus, all subprime lending is not predatory, but typically relies on risk-based pricing to serve borrowers who cannot obtain credit in the prime market. The higher degree of risk associated with subprime borrowers requires a higher cost for a subprime loan. At the other end of the spectrum, cases of blatant fraud are predatory, but less common and can generally be combated with current criminal statutes. The most difficult cases are those in which loan terms seem out of line with standard prices. In particular, high-cost loans coupled with unscrupulous practices that pressure a borrower into a loan are predatory. The paper sets forth three potential regulatory and legislative solutions that may address the issue of predatory lending

The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed Rate Mortgages

Adjustable-rate and hybrid loans have been a larger component of subprime mortgage lending in the mortgage market than prime lending. The typical adjustable-rate loan in subprime is a hybrid of fixed and adjustable characteristics in which the first 2 years are fixed and the remaining 28 years adjustable. Hybrid loans terminate at elevated probabilities even before the first adjustment date. Hybrid loan terminations are sensitive to interest rates and teaser rates (payment shocks). Default probabilities increase dramatically when payment shocks are mixed with low or no equity in the home. This is the mixture of events that helped to trigger the 2007/2008 subprime mortgage crisis

Borrowing Trouble? IV: Subprime Mortgage Refinance Lending in Greater Boston, 2000-2002

The present report is the fourth in the annual series begun by that initial study; it extends the time period covered through 2002, and expands the number of individual cities and towns for which data on subprime refinance lending are provided to 108. Although motivated by a concern with predatory lending, this study and its predecessors – like all of the other quantitative studies of which I am aware – analyzes and reports on lending by subprime lenders. It is therefore important to emphasize that although all predatory loans are subprime, only a fraction of subprime loans are predatory. While predatory loans are by their nature abusive and harmful to borrowers, responsible subprime lending can provide a useful service. Subprime lenders can do this by making credit available to borrowers who might not otherwise be able to obtain it, at a somewhat higher cost that bears a reasonable relationship to the increased expenses and risks borne by the lender. Nevertheless, the existence of high levels of subprime lending in certain types of neighborhoods or among certain groups of borrowers indicates that these neighborhoods or borrowers are more likely to be targeted by predatory lenders and more vulnerable to being exploited by them. While acknowledging this very important distinction, the present study attempts to shed light on the problem of predatory lending – an unknown portion of total subprime lending – by examining data on lending by subprime lenders. The reason is very simple: systematic data on predatory lending are not available, but data on lending by subprime lenders are

Borrowing Trouble? V: Subprime Mortgage Lending in Greater Boston, 2000-2003

Four years ago, in response to numerous reports of the growth of predatory lending, both locally and nationwide, the Massachusetts Community & Banking Council (MCBC) – whose Board of Directors has an equal number of bank and community representatives – commissioned a study of subprime refinance lending in the city of Boston and surrounding communities. The resulting report, Borrowing Trouble? Subprime Mortgage Lending in Greater Boston, 1999, was the first detailed look at subprime lending in the city of Boston and in twenty-seven surrounding communities. This is the fifth report in the annual series begun by that initial study. Geographic coverage has expanded to include data on subprime lending in 108 individual cities and towns. This is the first year that the report has examined subprime home purchase loans in addition to subprime loans made to refinance existing mortgages. Responsible subprime lending can provide a useful service. Subprime lenders can do this by making credit available to borrowers otherwise unable to obtain it, while charging somewhat higher interest rates and fees that bear a reasonable relationship to the increased expenses and risks borne by the lender. There is, however, considerable evidence that much or most subprime lending does not satisfy this definition of responsibility

Borrowing Trouble? VI: High-Cost Mortgage Lending in Greater Boston, 2004

Five years ago, in response to numerous reports of the growth of predatory lending, both locally and nationwide, the Massachusetts Community & Banking Council (MCBC) – whose Board of Directors has an equal number of bank and community representatives – commissioned a study of subprime refinance lending in the city of Boston and surrounding communities. The resulting report, Borrowing Trouble? Subprime Mortgage Lending in Greater Boston, 1999, was the first detailed look at subprime lending in the city of Boston and in twenty-seven surrounding communities. This is the sixth report in the annual series begun by that initial study. Geographic coverage has now expanded to include data on subprime lending in 108 individual cities and towns and the reports now cover subprime home purchase loans in addition to subprime loans made to refinance existing mortgages. This year’s report utilizes information on the pricing of high-cost subprime loans that became available for the first time in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data for 2004. Responsible subprime lending can provide a useful service. Subprime lenders can do this by making credit available to borrowers otherwise unable to obtain it, while charging somewhat higher interest rates and fees that bear a reasonable relationship to the increased expenses and risks borne by the lender. There is, however, considerable evidence that much subprime lending does not satisfy this definition of responsibility