Social Interactions

Prepared for Annual Reviews of Economics.

Fashion, Cooperation, and Social Interactions

Fashion plays such a crucial rule in the evolution of culture and society that it is regarded as a second nature to the human being. Also, its impact on economy is quite nontrivial. On what is fashionable, interestingly, there are two viewpoints that are both extremely widespread but almost opposite: conformists think that what is popular is fashionable, while rebels believe that being different is the essence. Fashion color is fashionable in the first sense, and Lady Gaga in the second. We investigate a model where the population consists of the afore-mentioned two groups of people that are located on social networks (a spatial cellular automata network and small-world networks). This model captures two fundamental kinds of social interactions (coordination and anti-coordination) simultaneously, and also has its own interest to game theory: it is a hybrid model of pure competition and pure cooperation. This is true because when a conformist meets a rebel, they play the zero sum matching pennies game, which is pure competition. When two conformists (rebels) meet, they play the (anti-) coordination game, which is pure cooperation. Simulation shows that simple social interactions greatly promote cooperation: in most cases people can reach an extraordinarily high level of cooperation, through a selfish, myopic, naive, and local interacting dynamic (the best response dynamic). We find that degree of synchronization also plays a critical role, but mostly on the negative side. Four indices, namely cooperation degree, average satisfaction degree, equilibrium ratio and complete ratio, are defined and applied to measure people's cooperation levels from various angles. Phase transition, as well as emergence of many interesting geographic patterns in the cellular automata network, is also observed.Comment: 21 pages, 12 figure

Social Interactions and Unemployment

This paper is concerned with social interactions and their importance for unemployment. A theoretical model is specified in which the social and psychological costs of unemployment depend upon the unemployment level. The theoretical analysis reveals social multiplier effects, and shows that multiple unemployment equilibria may emerge. Data on all 20- to 24-year-olds living in the Stockholm metropolitan area during the 1990s are used to test key hypotheses derived from the model. The focus is on the role of neighborhood-based reference groups, and the results support the theoretical predictions: unemployment levels vary more across neighborhood-groups than what would be expected based on variation in observable characteristics, and individuals' transition rates out of unemployment appear to be strongly influenced by the unemployment level within their neighborhood-based reference groups.Social interaction; social norms; social multipliers; unemployment

Intentions and Social Interactions

In psychological games, higher-order beliefs, emotions, and motives - in addition to actions - affect players’ payoffs. Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely accepted by your peers and “friends”. In particular, suppose you are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if she did not invite you. In all of these cases, it is conceivable that the intention behind the action will matter and hence will affect your payoffs. I model intentions in a dynamic psychological game under incomplete information. I find a complex social interaction in this game. In particular, a player may stick to a strategy of accepting every invitation with the goal of discouraging insincere invitations. This may lead one to erroneously infer that this player is eagerly waiting for an invitation, when indeed his behavior is driven more by strategic considerations than by an excessive desire for social acceptance. I discuss how being tolerated but not being truly accepted can explain the rejection of mutually beneficial trades, the choice of identity, social exclusion, marital divorce, and its implication for political correctness and affirmative action.guilt, intentions, psychological game, second-order beliefs, social interaction

Residents\u27 Social Interactions in Market Square and Its Impact on Community Well-Being

This study aims at ameliorating the associated challenges emanated from the ineffective planning, management and design of market square as well as appraisal of the interactions among people of diverse ethnicity. Hence, the study explores users\u27 interactions and activities within three markets square in rural neighborhoods of South-west, Nigeria. The significant relationship between resident\u27s interactions and the community well-being was explored. Consequently, this study highlights the influence of the market square as a typical neighborhood open space on residents\u27 well-being. The study\u27s quantitative approach encircled the purposive structured survey questionnaire data obtained from Yorubas, Hausas, and Ibos respondents (n=382); and analyzed by SPSS statistical package (version 22). Meanwhile, the qualitative data included observation of various activity pattern among the three ethnic groups. The study\u27s findings revealed that an improvement in the market square quality becomes necessary in order to increase residents\u27 interactions and well-being. Also, the study elucidates the appropriate link between the built environment, residents\u27 interactions, and well-being. It is concluded that residents\u27 well-being is a reflection of an experience manifested within the interplay of individuals and groups\u27 social interactions. This study of people and place relationships could better equip the professionals in the built environment on the importance of creating a sustainable open space towards improving residents\u27 well-being and rural community revitalization efforts

Topologies of Social Interactions

The paper adapts to richer social structures the Brock-Durlauf model of interactive discrete choice, where individuals’ decisions are influenced by the decisions of others. Social structure is modelled by a description of who interacts with whom, by means of a graph, with individuals as vertices and interaction between individuals as edges. The paper extends the mean field case to such alternative stylized interaction topologies as when individuals are connected through a common intermediary, the graph topology of interactions is a cycle or an one-dimensional lattice. Some results are qualitatively similar to the mean field case, but a richer class of anisotropic equilibria is also explored, for the case of the cycle and one-dimensional lattice. Social equilibria are also explored under the condition that individuals’ behavior is affected by the actual behavior of their neighbors and links are made with the econometric theory of systems of simultaneous equations modelling discrete decisions. The paper studies the role of interaction topology for the dynamics of adjustment towards isotropic equilibria. It compares circular interaction along a one-dimensional lattice with and without closure and shows that both lead to endogenous and generally transient spatial oscillations. However, closure of the social structure is responsible for relative persistence.interactions, dynamics, spatial oscillations, interactive discrete choice, neighborhood effects, Ising model, random fields

Social interactions and spillovers.

The aim of this paper is to provide a tractable model where both socialization (or network formation) and productive efforts can be analyzed simultaneously. This permits a fullfledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous productive efforts and heterogeneous agents. We show that there exist two stable interior equilibria, which we can Pareto rank. The socially efficient outcome lies between these two equilibria. When the intrinsic returns to production and socialization increase, all equilibrium actions decrease at the Pareto-superior equilibrium, while they increase at the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. In both cases, the percentage change in socialization effort is higher (in absolute value) than that of the productive effortPeer effects; Network formation; Welfare;