Payments and Mechanism Design

We use mechanism design to study efficient intertemporal payment arrangements when the ability of agents to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to random and unobservable shocks. Efficiency is achieved via a payment system that assigns balances to participants, adjusts them based on the histories of transactions, and periodically resets them through settlement. Our analysis has several implications for the design of actual payment systems. Efficiency requires that, in order to overcome informational frictions, agents participating in transactions that do not involve monitoring frictions subsidize those that are subject to such frictions. Optimal settlement frequency should balance liquidity costs from settlement against the need to provide intertemporal incentives. Settlement costs must be borne by agents for whom the incentives to participate in the system are highest. Finally, an increase in settlement costs implies that, in order to counter a higher exposure to default, the frequency of settlement must increase and, at the same time, the volume of transactions must decrease.Payment Systems, Frequency of Settlement, Liquidity Costs, Subsidization across Transactions

Optimizing Liquidity Usage and Settlement Speed in Payment Systems

The operating speed of a payment system depends on the stage of technology of the system's communication and information processing environment. Frequent intraday processing cycles and real-time processing have introduced new means of speeding up the processing and settlement of payments. In a real-time environment banks face new challenges in liquidity management. They need to plan for intraday as well as interday fluctuations in liquidity. By employing various types of hybrid settlement structures, banks may be able to even out intraday fluctuations in liquidity demand. The aim of this study is to develop a framework for analysing fluctuations in liquidity demand and assessing the efficiency of different settlement systems in terms of speed and liquidity needs. In this study we quantify the relationship between liquidity usage and settlement delay in net settlement systems, real-time gross settlement systems and hybrid systems, as well as the combined costs of liquidity and delay in these systems. We analyse ways of reducing costs via optimization features such as netting of queues, offsetting of payments and splitting of payments. We employ a payment system simulator developed at the Bank of Finland, which enables us to evaluate the impact of changes in system parameters and thus to compare the effects of alternative settlement schemes with given payment flows. The data used covers 100 days of actual payments processed in the Finnish BoF-RTGS system. Our major findings relate to risk reduction via real-time settlement, effects of optimization routines in hybrid systems, and the effects of liquidity costs on banks' choice of settlement speed. A system where settlement takes place continuously in real-time and with queuing features is more efficient from the perspective of liquidity and risks than a net settlement system with batch processing. Real-time processing enables a reduction in payment delay and risks without necessarily increasing liquidity needs. Participants will operate under immediate payment/settlement if liquidity costs are low enough relative to delay costs and if the liquidity arrangements are sufficiently flexible. The central bank can therefore support risk reduction and payment speed objectives by providing low cost intraday liquidity as well as more flexible ways for participants to add or withdraw liquidity from the system. Optimizing and gridlock solving features were found to be effective at very low levels of liquidity. The efficiency of the different optimization methods for settlement systems are affected by the actual flow of payments processed. Gains from netting schemes with multiple daily netting cycles were found to be somewhat more limited.payment systems; clearing/settlement; liquidity; efficiency; gridlock

What Costs for Settlement?

Besides tax costs, what other kinds of costs are involved in settling an estate? This fifth article in the series deals with these, how to anticipate them and also with the importance of financial liquidity of an estate

Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives

In this paper we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves, but increases moral hazard problems. The "put option" value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Net settlement becomes more attractive relative to gross settlement if bank assets have to be liquidated at less than book value. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers G21, G28. This paper was presented at the Financial Institutions Center's conference on Performance of Financial Institutions, May 8-10, 1997.

Settlement finality as a public good in large-value payment systems

Target is a real time gross settlement (RTGS) large value payment network operated by European central banks that eliminates systemic risk. Euro1 is a privately operated delayed net settlement (DNS) network that reduces substantially systemic risk but does not eliminate it. This difference makes RTGS networks more expensive to users even if both networks had the same unit operating costs. This provides an incentive for users to shift payments to the more risky network in normal times and back to Target in times of financial market disruption. The estimated extra cost to a DNS network from posting collateral sufficient to cover all exposures (and eliminate systemic risk) is from 15 to 42 cents per transaction. If full cost recovery on an RTGS system were reduced by this amount, user collateral costs — but not risks — would be equalized between networks. Full collateralization on DNS networks would equalize both user costs and risks.payments, settlement, public good

Behind the money market: clearing and settling money market instruments

When a money market instrument is traded, the clearing and settlement process establishes the change in ownership. Because the process involves both costs and risks, money market participants have developed means of making clearing and settlement more efficient and less risky.Money market ; Payment systems

Behind the money market: clearing and settling money market instruments

When a money market instrument is traded, the clearing and settlement process establishes the change in ownership. Because the process involves both costs and risks, money market participants have developed means of making clearing and settlement more efficient and less risky.Money market ; Payment systems

Settlement finality as a public good in large-value payment systems

Target is a real time gross settlement (RTGS) large value payment network operated by European central banks that eliminates systemic risk. Euro1 is a privately operated delayed net settlement (DNS) network that reduces substantially systemic risk but does not eliminate it. This difference makes RTGS networks more expensive to users even if both networks had the same unit operating costs. This provides an incentive for users to shift payments to the more risky network in normal times and back to Target in times of financial market disruption. The estimated extra cost to a DNS network from posting collateral sufficient to cover all exposures (and eliminate systemic risk) is from 15 to 42 cents per transaction. If full cost recovery on an RTGS system were reduced by this amount, user collateral costs but not risks would be equalized between networks. Full collateralization on DNS networks equalizes both user costs and risks. JEL Classification: E58, G15, H23, H41payments, public good, settlement

Guess what: It's the Settlements!

Exchanges and other trading platforms are often vertically integrated to carry out trading and settlement as one operation. We show that these vertical silos can prevent the full realization of efficincy gains from horizontal consolidation of trading and settlement platforms. Independent of the gains from such consolidation, when costs of settlement are private information, a merger of vertical silos cannot be designed to always ensure efficient trading and settlement after the merger. Furthermore, we show that efficiency can nevertheless be guaranteed either by delegating the operation of settlement platforms to agents or by forcing competition across vertical silos through cross-listings.Clearing and Settlement, Cross-listing, Vertical and Horizontal Integration, Mechanism Design

Guess what: it's the settlements!

Exchanges and other trading platforms are often vertically integrated to carry out trading, clearing and settlement as one operation. We show that such vertical silos can prevent efficiency gains from horizontal consolidation of trading and settlement platforms to be realized. Independent of the gains from such consolidation, when costs of settlement are private information, there is no mechanism that achieves the merger of the vertical silos in a way that trading and settlement are produced efficiently after the merger. Furthermore, we show that such an ex-post efficient merger can always be implemented by delegating the operation of settlement platforms to agents. JEL Classification: C73, G20, G34, L22Clearing and Settlement, Horizontal and Vertical Integration, Mechanism Design