The Practice of ὀνοματοποιεῖν: Some Peculiar Statements in the Ancient Neoplatonic Commentators on Aristotle

This paper shows the role of ὀνοματοποιεῖν in Neoplatonism and how this practice is ruled by an onto-logical canon. While ὀνοματοποιεῖν itself means the making of a brand new name, its usage is manifold. As Aristotle explains in Rh. III 2, poets take advantage of ὀνοματοποιεῖν to catch the undefined and give it a recognisable image, by means of a metaphorical name. In science, this practice, codified by Aristotle, is twofold: ὀνοματοποιεῖν meant both to re-semanticize words wellknown and to create names ex novo for things not discovered or studied yet. After analysing ὀνοματοποιεῖν’s recurrence in Aristotle, I illustrate that, according to Neoplatonic Commentators, impositio can be, both natural and technical, only of things in actuality, having a solid consistency. Intermediates between contraries, presumed relatives and powers as qualities are nameless – as  Philoponus notices in his In Categorias – since they haven’t an independent status and aren’t  definable. This bond between the original rhetorical practice and the ontological perspective, sketched in Int. 1, was strengthened by Alexander, who filled Aristotle’s gaps, stating that names signify things’ being, i.e. the form acquired in actuality

Virtue and Proper Use in Plato’s Euthydemus and Stoicism

The essay examines the description of virtue as a craft that governs the proper use of possessions in Plato’s Euthydemus and Stoicism. In the first part, I discuss Socrates’ parallel between wisdom and the crafts in the Euthydemus, and the resulting argument concerning the value of external and bodily possessions. I then offer some objections, showing how Socrates’ craft analogy allows one to think of possessions as (qualifiedly) good and ultimately fails to offer a defense of virtue’s sufficiency for happiness. In the second part, I examine the Stoics’ craft analogy and note a number of differences from Socrates’ account in the Euthydemus. These include the Stoic claim that external advantages never make any contribution to happiness, even when properly used, and the claim that, unlike other crafts, wisdom does not require any external possessions in order to be exercised and yield benefit and happiness. I then place these differences against the backdrop of the debate regarding virtue’s sufficiency for happiness and argue that the Stoic craft model of virtue fares better than its Socratic antecedent

Platone, Prm. 133b4- c1 / 134e9- 135b2. Quali logoi nella gumnasia per un tis refrattario alla persuasione e sensibile alle contraddizioni come Antistene?

In this study, I show how Plato in the Parmenides reprises the encounter with the Phaedo’s Antisthenes, whom I elsewhere assumed to be one of the various tis that get examined in the dialogue. Now, with the Parme­nides’ tis, a similar situation arises: this Antisthenes embodies such characteristics as being “an expert in many areas”, “not without natural gifts” and “capable of following with critical intelligence” the logoi taken from “distant premises.” In the four logoi of the gumnasia, I highlight how Plato, in developing his exercise, proceeds on his own way without openly arguing with any tis and how, despite his detached attitude, his hodos, while interweaving with that of his colleague Antisthenes, enters into a conflict. I then demonstrate how the two paths, despite having a common aporetic beginning (the objections of Gorgias to Parmenides and the testimony of Proclus against Antisthenes), at times overlap and at times are mutually exclusive. From this, I also argue that whoever wrote the dialogue must have been aware that the path, although appar­ently linear and rectilinear, was in fact bumpy and tortuous

Platone e Antistene nel Fedone: una lettura in controluce

The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine that to which Plato alludes. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is histori­cally very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing the Phaedo: a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo, given that the latter work in all prob­ability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study is divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced, given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immor­tality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attrib­utes, the differences and their opposites, and the opposites of opposites.The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine that to which Plato alludes. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is histori­cally very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing the Phaedo: a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo, given that the latter work in all prob­ability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study is divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced, given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immor­tality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attrib­utes, the differences and their opposites, and the opposites of opposites

Bycie – nie bycie, prawda – fałsz w koncepcji Arystotelesa

The basis of Aristotle’s arguments about truth and falsity is formulated syntactically according to the distinctions of ‘to be’ as the predicative affirmation - composition and, correspondingly, ‘not to be’ as negation – separation. As the nominal defining characteristic of falsity is contradic­tion, so of truth is non-contradiction. The expression of truth or falsity in the declarative sentence of affirmation or negation is a function of thinking as a human cognitive disposition under the semantic figures of categorical predication. In addition, we cite Aristotle’s more important texts on the true intellection of non-composites (indivisibles), the inves­tigation of truth and probability, the diagnosis of falsehood, the truthful­ness and lying. Finally, a mention of modern adaptations of Aristotle’s concept of truth

Aristotle’s solution for Parmenides’ inconclusive argument in Physics I.3

I discuss the argument Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides at Physics 186a23-32. I discuss (i) the reasons why Aristotle considers it as eristic and inconclusive and (i) the solution (lusis) Aristotle proposes against it

John Italos Seen by Anna Komnene

The historical work of Anna Komnene is one of the main sources which provides crucial information about John Italos. It is worth noting though that princess Komnene sketches in the Alexiad a portrait of this eminent Byzantine thinker that is anything but flattering. Despite the wide range of perspectives and diverse representations of the philosopher, it is actually quite difficult to find in her opus any comments or opinions of decisively positive nature. As a matter of fact, the final opinion regarding the famous “Consul Philosophorum” is formed solely on the basis of downright hostile statements. John Italos is not regarded as an outstanding figure, but rather as a controversial thinker that hardly deserves any recognition. While the present paper investigates the figure of Italos as shown in the Alexiad by Anna Komnene, its aim is to unravel those elements in the work that caused Komnene to express such an opinion about the philosopher

Divine Eros and Divine Providence in Proclus’ Educational System

This study examines the way in which the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus treats an episode of the dialectic communication between Socrates and Alcibiades in the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I. More specifically, it refers to how the characteristics and the choices of two different types of lovers – the divinely inspired one and the vulgar one – are displayed in the aforementioned text. The characterization ‘divinely inspired lover’ befits a person who communicates in a pure way with his beloved one and attempts to teach the latter the objective values of the intellect. By contrast, the characterization of the ‘vulgar lover’ befits that individual that approaches another individual exclusively on the basis of his external beauty. The first type of lover is presented within the realms of the permanently qualitative, while the second as someone who satisfies solemnly his subjectivity and his instincts. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Proclus argues that Socrates, whom he considers to represent the very definition of a divinely inspired lover, is inspired by divine powers and attempts to act towards to his fellows – in this instance to Alcibiades – in the way through which the divine providence is revealed

An Ontology for the In-Between of Motion: Aristotle’s Reaction to Zeno’s Arguments

This paper proposes an interpretation of Books V and VI of Aristotle’s Physics as being (at least partly) a reaction to Zeno’s four “arguments against motion” that Aristotle expounds and discusses in Phys. VI 9. On the basis of a detailed textual analysis of that chapter, I show that Zeno’s arguments rest on a frame of a priori notions such as part and whole, in contact, between, limit, etc., which Aristotle takes over in order to account for the inner structure (here called “the In-Between”) common to all facts of motion and change. That frame allows him to develop a specific ontology for that inner structure – although it exists only potentially according to the Aristotelian orthodoxy – because he needs such an ontology in order to vindicate the reality of motion and change

Providential Disorder in Plato’s Timaeus?

Plato tries to explain the becoming of the cosmos by referring to the concepts of order and disorder. Scholars have usually focused on the relationship between the cosmos and the demiurge that Plato puts forward to explain the reasonable (i.e., well-ordered) development. Along these lines, scholarship has examined the providential role played by both the demiurge and the soul of the world. Yet, an interesting prob­lem still remains open: what exactly is the function of disorder? What is the sense of the concept of a perfectly established order if we do not know the manner in which it is achieved, since we have no understand­ing of the conditions that make it possible? Pursuing this line of thought, one may point to a providential role of the disorder given the balance of forces that operates in Plato’s cosmic becoming