The role of reciprocation in social network formation, with an application to blogging

This paper deals with the role of reciprocation in the formation of individuals' social networks, that is to what extent initiating a relation brings about its reciprocation. Following the activity of a panel of bloggers over more than a year, we seek to establish whether bloggers are mainly involved in social networking or are part of the media industry. We adapt a standard capital investment model to study the effect of reciprocation on the building of social capital. Results of our analysis confirm that activity and reciprocation both play a role in the dynamics of social media.Bloggers, Friendship, LiveJournal, Media, Panel Data, Reciprocation, Reci procity, Social Capital, Social Networks

The role of reciprocation in social network formation, with an application to blogging

This paper deals with the role of reciprocation in the formation of individuals' social networks. We follow the activity of a panel of bloggers over more than a year and investigate the extent to which initiating a relation brings about its reciprocation. We adapt a standard capital investment model to study how reciprocation affects the build-up of the individual social capital of bloggers, as measured by their links and interactions with others. This allows us to measure the role of content production and relationship building in the dynamics of online social networks and to distinguish between the social networking and media aspects of blogging.Blogs, Friendship, LiveJournal, Reciprocation, Social Capital, Social Networks

Net-Loss Reciprocation and the Context Dependency of Economic Choices

This paper proposes a novel explanation for the context dependency of individual choices in two-player games. Context dependency refers to the well-established phenomenon that a player, when choosing from a given opportunity set created by the other player’s strategy, chooses differently in different situations because of different alternatives to the other player’s strategy. The utility model used to explain this kind of context dependency incorporates a preference for net-loss reciprocation. Net-loss reciprocation means that a player’s willingness to impose a net loss (i.e., loss minus gain) on the other player increases in the net loss that he or she derives from the other player’s strategy. I show that net-loss reciprocation together with the method for calculating net losses developed in this paper explains the context dependencies in individual behaviour that have been documented in a number of experimental studies, whereas existing models of intention-based reciprocity fail to explain all the evidence

Discriminating strategic reciprocity and acquired trust in the repeated trust-game

In repeated trust-game offers made by investors can be attributed to strategic reciprocation-based behavior. However, when a trustee is loyal, personal trust can build up between players, in the same way that lack of positive reciprocation on the part of trustees can motivate investors' distrust. Acquired personal trust or distrust and strategic reciprocation of the opponent's offers have then a cumulative and convergent influence on behavior in the trust game and are not prima facie distinguishable. We propose an experimental protocol which discriminates between these two determinants of trust. We furthermore show that acquired trust is the mere outcome of anonymous repeated interactions taking place during the experiment in the sense that it does not co-vary with an initial and independent baseline disposition to trust among investors: acquired trust crowds out background trust. Moreover, offers are sensitive to the amount and variance of trustees' returns. High returns-rate contribute to increase acquired trust between the players while the volatility of trustees' counter-offers makes them perceive as opportunistic, triggers investors' strategic behavior and detriments the acquisition of personal trust.repeated trust-game, reputation, strategic reciprocation.

Reciprocity - an indirect evolutionary analysis

This paper investigates strategic interaction between rational agents whose preferences evolve over time. Players face a pecuniary �game of life� comprising the ultimatum game and the dictator game. Utility may but need not be attached to the reciprocation of fair and unfair play by the opponent and equitable payoff distributions as proposed by Falk and Fischbacher (2001). Evolutionary fitness is determined solely by material success � regardless of the motives for its achievement. Agents cannot explicitly condition the social component of their preferences on whether they face the ultimatum or dictator game. Under these conditions, agents develop a strong preference for reciprocation but little interest in an equitable distribution as such. This corresponds to equitable ultimatum offers but full surplus appropriation by dictators. Adding an exogenous constraint on the possible divergence between preference for reciprocation and for an equitable distribution either makes ultimatum divisions asymmetric or dictators become generous depending on the relative frequency of ultimatum and dictator interaction.

Bah Humbug: Unexpected Christmas Cards and the Reciprocity Norm

The reciprocity norm refers to the expectation that people will help those who helped them. A well-known study revealed that the norm is strong with Christmas cards, with 20% of people reciprocating a Christmas card received from a stranger. I attempted to conceptually replicate and extend this effect. In Study 1, 755 participants received a Christmas card supposedly from a more- versus less-similar stranger. The reciprocation rate was unexpectedly low (2%), which did not allow for a test of a similarity effect. Two potential reasons for this low rate were examined in Study 2 in which 494 participants reported their likelihood of reciprocating a Christmas card from a stranger as well as their felt suspicions/threat about the card and their frequency of e-mail use. Reciprocation likelihood was negatively correlated with perceived threat/suspicion and e-mail use. It appears that reciprocating a gift from a stranger in offline settings may be less likely than expected

Sustaining interaction in a mathematical community of practice

This paper focuses on an activity in which students explore sequences through a game, using ToonTalk programming and a web-based collaboration system. Our analytical framework combines theory of communities of practice with domain epistemology. We note three factors which influence the length and quality of interactions: facilitation, reciprocation and audience-awareness

Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal models that predict accurately

Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria