Privately informed parties and policy divergence

This paper presents a Downsian model of political competition in which parties have incomplete but richer information than voters on policy effects. Each party can observe a private signal of the policy effects, while voters cannot. In this setting, voters infer the policy effects from the party platforms. In this political game with private information, we show that there exist weak perfect Bayesian equilibria (WPBEs) at which the parties play different strategies, and thus, announce different platforms even when their signals coincide. This result is in contrast with the conclusion of the Median Voter Theorem in the classical Downsian model. Our equilibrium analysis suggests similarity between the set of WPBEs in this model and the set of uniformly perfect equilibria of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) in the model with completely informed parties which we studied in a previous paper (Kikuchi, 2010).

A Data-informed Public Health Policy-Makers Platform

Hearing loss is a disease exhibiting a growing trend due to the number of factors, including but not limited to the mundane exposure to the noise and ever-increasing amount of older population. In the framework of a public health policymaking process, modeling of the hearing loss disease based on data is a key factor in alleviating the issues related to the disease issuing effective public health policies. First, the paper describes the steps of the data-driven policymaking process. Afterward, a scenario along with the part of the proposed platform, responsible for supporting policymaking are presented. With the aim of demonstrating the capabilities and usability of the platform for the policy-makers, some initial results of preliminary analytics are presented in a framework of a policy-making process. Ultimately, the utility of the approach is validated throughout the results of the survey which was presented to the health system policy-makers professionals involved in the policy development process in Croatia

Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect

In this paper we contribute to the study of how democracy works when politicians are better informed than the electorate about conditions relevant for policy choice. We do so by setting up and analyzing a game theoretic model of electoral competition. An important feature of the model is that candidate quality is state-dependent. Our main insight is that if the electorate is sufficiently well informed then there exists an equilibrium where the candidates' policy positions reveal their information and the policy outcome is the same as it would be if voters were fully informed (the median policy in the true state of the world).terrorist cells; optimal anti-terrorism; copycat effect; dynamic pattern of terrorism

Nineteenth Colin Clark Lecture: November 2009: What Have we Learnt? The Great Depression in Australia from the Perspective of Today

This lecture examines the lessons learnt from Australia’s experience in the 1930s, and how these lessons have informed more recent economic policy decisions including the policy responses to the current global financial crisis. The lecture argues that the lessons learnt from the Great Depression have informed the macroeconomic frameworks of today. While Australia’s policy frameworks of the 1930s were tragically ill equipped to cope with anything other than small, inconsequential macroeconomic or financial market shocks, the policy frameworks put in place in the modern era have rendered the economy much more resilient to such shocks.

Housing affordability: Proper Measurement for Informed Policy Making

The broadly accepted housing affordability indicator is calculated as the housing cost-to income ratio. But this only takes into consideration two averaged variables: household housing costs and household income, both of which are ambiguous and misleading as an across-the- board average. An alternative system of housing affordability measurement is suggested in this paper based on disposable income left after accounting for housing expenses. In contrary to the broadly used conventional indicator, the proposed measurement takes into account different income groups, ages and types of households as well as the level of housing consumption. This indicator, combined with the "after housing poverty line" allows for the singling out of groups of households most in need of housing help, and therefore develop more informed housing polices. Based on the proposed system of measurement, an extensive empirical work is presented using the series of the ABS Income and Housing Surveys. The results demonstrate, from a new angle, the dynamics of housing affordability in Australia during the recent decade which leads to policy implications different to polices currently in use.Housing affordability measurement, income after housing costs.

What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It?

A long tradition in economic theory models economic policy decisions as solutions to optimization problems solved by rational and well-informed agents: A single policymaker minimizes a loss function subject to some constraints. Another body of literature models policy decisions as if they were made by well-informed voters in elections of some sort.

Policy instruments in the Common Agricultural Policy

Policy changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be explained in terms of the exhaustion and long-term contradictions of policy instruments. Changes in policy instruments have reoriented the policy without any change in formal Treaty goals. The social and economic efficacy of instruments in terms of evidence-based policy analysis was a key factor in whether they were delegitimized. The original policy instruments were generally dysfunctional, but reframing the policy in terms of a multifunctionality paradigm permitted the development of more efficacious instruments. A dynamic interaction takes place between the instruments and policy informed by the predominant discourses

Interpreting the Outsider Tradition in British European Policy Speeches from Thatcher to Cameron

The article investigates how British European policy thinking has been informed by what it identifies as an ‘outsider’ tradition of thinking about ‘Europe’ in British foreign policy dating from imperial times to the presen. The article begins by delineating five phases in the evolution of the outsider tradition through a survey of the relevant historiography back to 1815. The article then examines how prime ministers from Margaret Thatcher to David Cameron have looked to various inflections of the outsider tradition to inform their European discourses. The focus in the speech data sections is on British identity, history and the realist appreciation of international politics that informed the leaders’ suggestions for EEC/EU reform. The central argument is that historically informed narratives such as those making up the outsider tradition do not determine opinion-formers’ outlooks, but that they can be deeply impervious to rapid change

Research shapes policy: but the dynamics are subtle

Major policy initiatives such as the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in the national contract for UK general practitioners might variably be informed by evidence at their inception, implementation and subsequent evolution. But what evidence gets admitted into these policy debates—and what is left out? Using QOF as an example, this article demonstrates what an analysis of the relationship between policy and the associated research can tell us about the underlying policy assumptions and about the role of evidence in policy debates