Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance , Ukuran Perusahaan dan Leverage terhadap Kinerja Keuangan Perusahaan

This research aims to empirically prove that influence the size of commissioners, size of independent commissioners, size of directors, the size of audit committee, the size of corporation andleverage toward corporation's financial performances partially and simultaneously. The objectof this research is manufacturing corporation sector and chemical industry base which is registered in Indonesian stock exchange 2012-2013.The date which is used is secondary data directlyobatained from website of BEI and each of corporations' website by using documentationtehcnique. The data is analyzed by using double regression analysis method and hypotheses.This research concludes that simultaneously test shows the result that commssioners variable,independent commssioners, directors, audit committee, size of corporation,and Leverage whichhas positive influence and significant on the change of financial performance dependent variable. Meanwhile partially test shows the result that only variable of directors and leveragewhich has significantly influence toward financial performance and partially commissionersvariable, indeopendent coommissioners,audit committee,and the size of corporation do not havethe significant influence toward financial performances.Ke ywords: Size of commissioners, size of independent commissioners, size of directors, size ofaudit committee, size of the corporation,and Leverage, financial performance

Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance, Ukuran Perusahaan, dan Leverage terhadap Integritas Laporan Keuangan

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of good corporate governance being inspected toindependent commissioners and institutional ownership, firm size and influence on the integrity of financial statements. The population of this study is a mining company listed on theIndonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2012-2015. The sample is determined by purposive samplingmethod, with total samples of 11 mining companies for total observation in this research are 44observations. The results of this study prove that independent commissioners have a positiveimpact on the integrity of financial statements. As for institutional ownership and leverage havea negative impact on the integrity of financial statements. And firm size proved not to affect theintegrity of financial statements.Ke y wo rds: Company Size, Good Corporate Governance, Integrity of Financial Statement,Leverag

Key drivers of 'good' corporate governance and the appropriateness of UK policy responses : final report

The DTI’s Corporate Law and Governance strategy aims to promote and deliver an effective framework for corporate governance in the UK, giving confidence to investors, business, and other stakeholders to underpin the relationship between an organisation and those who hold future financial claims against that organisation. However, corporate governance involves various problems of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts that generate a need for public policy responses to mitigate market failures and ensuring that companies moves towards ‘good’ corporate governance. Since the early 1990s, the UK has been very active in undertaking policy reforms that includes a number of corporate governance codes, expert reports, a high level review of company law, and new regulations and legislation. These policy initiatives need to be monitored and evaluated in terms of their success in influencing the key drivers of ‘good’ corporate governance. This Report undertaken for the DTI has several aims: to identify key drivers of good corporate governance based on a review of social science literature; to describe the content of UK regulatory initiatives with regard to those drivers; and to evaluate gaps in the content and implementation of UK policy regarding corporate governance, using those drivers as benchmarks. In addition, some further implications of this study are discussed for future policy and research on UK corporate governance. The Report identifies key drivers of good corporate governance based on extensive review of the broad social science literature. Good corporate governance is defined here with regard to the rights and responsibilities of company stakeholders, and the wealth-creating and wealthprotecting functions of corporate governance within this context. Based on this definition, a detailed review of the theoretical and empirical social science literature on corporate governance was undertaken across seven broad areas: boards of directors, shareholder activism, information disclosure, auditing and internal controls, executive pay, the market for corporate control, and stakeholders. The result was the identification of 18 key ‘drivers’ or governance mechanisms, which promote ‘good’ corporate governance. An internet-based survey of international corporate governance experts was conducted in order to confirm and further specify these drivers in relation to the UK context. Next, key gaps in the UK regulatory framework are explored with reference to the drivers of good corporate governance. A comprehensive review was undertaken to evaluate corporate governance-related developments in UK regulation since 1990. Policy initiatives were analysed with regard to both their content and effectiveness in promoting each of the identified drivers. Several potential gaps in coverage were identified in the areas of executive pay and employees stakeholders. A number of potential gaps in effectiveness were also identified with regard to other key drivers such as boards, shareholder involvement, information disclosure, auditing, and the market for corporate control. The analysis was supported by feedback from a Focus Group of expert practitioners that took place at the DTI in January 2006. The Report also emphasises that the effectiveness of corporate governance regulation depends very much on balancing different governance demands and regulatory trade-offs. Corporate governance is shaped by a number of contingencies, complementarities, and costs. Various organisational contingencies may place different demands on corporate governance drivers, and their implementation is also associated with different sorts of costs. Looking more generally, different drivers may act as complements or substitutes for one another. Better appreciation of such interdependencies is crucial to formulating a coherent regulatory strategy and balancing important regulatory trade-offs between the following - mandatory regulation (uniform requirements) and more flexible forms of soft-law such as codes based on comply-or-explain principles and self-regulatory norms of professional groups. This analysis suggests a number of areas for future research. Bearing in mind the depth and breadth of the UK regulatory initiatives, it is important to verify whether they were followed by behavioural changes of the participants in corporate governance mechanisms, including unintended consequences such as the development of ‘gaming’ practices. Further research is needed on a potential ‘gatekeeper failure’ in situations where reliance on ‘reputational intermediaries’, such as auditors, securities analysts, attorneys, and other professionals, is not fully justified. Other research recommendations are related to wealth creation and performance trade-offs. It is important to go beyond the question of maximizing shareholder returns and consider to what extent different corporate governance configurations promote long-term, value-creating economic production in a fashion that benefits not only shareholders but also other groups that make specific investments in corporations. Finally, a more holistic approach to the effectiveness of corporate governance drivers requires further research on such aspects as stakeholder involvement, contingencies, complementarities, and cost aspects that may affect the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. The authors would like to point out that, since the report was written, there have been various developments, not least changes in UK law, which have overtaken some of the details in our analysis. However, the basic review of the evidence basis and the perspectives offered remain very much current

Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Profitabilitas Perusahaan Manufaktur Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia Periode 2013-2015

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh Good Corporate Governance terhadap rasio profitabilitas pada Perusahaan manufaktur yang terdapat di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada periode 2013 – 2015. Mekanisme Good Corporate Governance dalam penelitian ini diproksikan dengan ukuran dewan direksi, dewan komisaris, dan komite audit. Sedangkan, rasio profitabilitas diproksikan dengan return on equity (ROE). Sampel penelitian ini terdiri dari 8 Perusahaan dengan metode pengambilan sampel purposive sampling. Data yang digunakan adalah laporan tahunan dan laporan keuangan masing masing Perusahaan sampel yang dipublikasikan melalui website www.idx.co.id. Hipotesis dalam penelitian ini diuji dengan menggunakan regresi linier berganda. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa Good Corporate Governance berpengaruh terhadap rasio profitabilitas pada Perusahaan manufaktur dimana Good Corporate Governance yang terdiri dari dewan direksi signifikan dan berpengaruh negatif terhadap profitabilitas, dewan komisaris signifikan dan berpengaruh positif terhadap profitabilitas serta komite audit signifikan dan berpengaruh negatif terhadap profitabilitas. Secara simultan, dewan direksi, dewan komisaris, dan komite audit signifikan dan berpengaruh positif terhadap profitabilitas

DEVELOPING A GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Good corporate governance is an important step in building market confidence and encouraging more stable, long-term international investment flows. The business corporation is an increasingly important engine for wealth creation worldwide, and how companies are run will influence welfare in society as a whole. In order to serve this wealth creating function, companies must operate within a framework that keeps them focused on their objectives and accountable for their actions. Many countries see better corporate governance practices as a way to improve economic dynamism and thus enhance overall economic performance.corporate governance, ownership, shareholders, top management

PRACTICE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Corporate governance reforms are implemented around the world and may impact upon the population worldwide. In developing countries, such reforms are implemented in a broader context that is primarily defined by previous attempts of promoting “development” and recent processes of economic globalization. In this context, corporate governance reforms (in combination with the liberalization reforms associated with the economic globalization), in effect, represent a new development strategy for third world countries. The basic questions arising with respect to this situation are: what are the prospects for this new development model and whether alternatives should be considered.governance; corporate governance; economic globalization; development

Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance terhadap Kinerja Keuangan dan Nilai Perusahaan (Studi pada Badan USAha Milik Negara (Bumn) yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia Periode 2012-2015)

This research aims to ecposure and explain the influence of simultaneous dominant and Good Corporate Governance, which consists of the Board of Commissioners of the independent variables and the Audit Committee's response to the Financial performance of the Company and the value calculated using the Return On Assets and Tobins'Q. The first hypothesis test results known f. sig α (0.000) 0.05 < shows there significant influence simultaneously from the Board of Commissioners of the independent variables and the Audit Committee's response to financial performance. The second hypothesis test results known f. sig α (0.000) 0.05 < shows there significant influence simultaneously from the Board of Commissioners of the independent variables and the Audit Committee of the company. Partially each Good Corporate Governance variables effect significantly to financial performance and the value of the company. The value of the Adjusted R Square towards Good Corporate Governance financial performance is of 40.2% whereas 59.8% influenced by other variables that are not discussed in this study. Adjusted R Square value of Good Corporate Governance of the company is of 51.8% whereas 48.2% influenced by other variables that are not discussed in this study. Keywords: Good Corporate Governance, Independent Commissioners, Audit Committee, Financial Performance, Return On Assets, Corporate Value, Tobins'Q АBSTRАK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganilisis dan menjelaskan pengaruh simultan dan dominan Good Corporate Governance yang terdiri dari variabel Dewan Komisaris Independen dan Komite Audit terhadap Kinerja Keuangan dan Nilai Perusahaan yang dihitung menggunakan Return On Assets dan Tobins'Q. Hasil pengujian hipotesis pertama diketahui F.sig α (0,000) < 0,05 menunjukkan ada pengaruh signifikan secara simultan dari variabel Dewan Komisaris Independen dan Komite Audit terhadap Kinerja Keuangan. Hasil pengujian hipotesis kedua diketahui F

Analisis Good Corporate Governance pada Perusahaan yang Mengalami Kesulitan Keuangan dan yang Tidak Mengalami Kesulitan Keuangan (Studi pada Perusahaan yang Terindeks di Majalah Swa Tahun 2013-2015)

This rеsеаrch conductеd to dеtеrminе if thеrе аrе аny Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе significаnt diffеrеncеs bеtwееn finаnciаl distrеssеd firms аnd hеаlthy firms. Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе is systеms, procеss, аnd rеgulаtions thаt orgаnizе stаkеholdеr rеlаtionship, gеnеrаlly rеlаtionship bеtwееn shаrеholdеrs, boаrd commissionеrs, аnd boаrd of dirеctors to аchiеvе orgаnizаtion's objеctivеs. Corporаtе Govеrnаncе is mаdе to rеgulаtе rеlаtionships аnd prеvеnt fаilurеs in corporаtе's strаtеgy аnd аssurе thаt fаilurеs cаn bе fixеd immеdiаtеly. Thе rеsеаrch mеthod wаs conductеd by compаrаtivе rеsеаrch with quаntitаtivе аpproаch. This rеsеаrch usеs sеcondаry dаtа from Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе indеxеs of SWА Mаgаzinеs in thе yеаr of 2013 to 2015 аnd finаnciаl highlights. Thе аnаlyticаl mеthod usеs thе clаssic аssumption tеst аnd t-tеst. This rеsеаrch usеs sаturаtion sаmpling. Indicаtors in this study аrе trаnspаrеncy, аccountаbility, rеsponsibility, indеpеndеncy, аnd fаirnеss. Thе rеsults of this study indicаtе thаt in thе yеаr of 2013 аnd 2014, thеrе is Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе significаnt diffеrеncеs bеtwееn finаnciаl distrеssеd firms аnd hеаlthy firms; othеrwisе, in thе yеаr of 2015, thеrе is no Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе significаnt diffеrеncе bеtwееn finаnciаl distrеssеd firms аnd hеаlthy firms. Kеyword : Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе, Finаnciаl Distrеss АBSTRАK Pеnеlitiаn ini dilаkukаn untuk mеngеtаhui аpаkаh tеrdаpаt pеrbеdааn Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе yаng signifikаn аntаrа pеrusаhааn yаng mеngаlаmi kеsulitаn kеuаngаn dаn yаng tidаk mеngаlаmi kеsulitаn kеuаngаn. Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе аdаlаh suаtu sistеm, prosеs, dаn pеrаturаn-pеrаturаn yаng mеngаtur hubungаn аntаrа pihаk yаng bеrkеpеntingаn (stаkеholdеrs) dеmi tеrcаpаinyа tujuаn orgаnisаsi. Corporаtе Govеrnаncе dibuаt untuk mеngаtur hubungаn-hubungаn dаn mеncеgаh tеrjаdinyа kеsаlаhаn-kеsаlаhаn signifikаn dаlаm strаtеgi korporаsi dаn untuk mеmаstikаn bаhwа kеsаlаhаn yаng tеrjаdi dаpаt sеgеrа dipеrbаiki. Jеnis pеnеlitiаn ini аdаlаh pеnеlitiаn kompаrаtif dеngаn mеnggunаkаn pеndеkаtаn kuаntitаtif. Pеnеlitiаn ini mеnggunаkаn dаtа sеkundеr dаri indеks Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе di mаjаlаh SWА Tаhun 2013-2015 dаn ringkаsаn kinеrjа kеuаngаn pеrusаhааn yаng didаpаt dаri Bursа Еfеk Indonеsiа. Pеnеlitiаn ini mеnggunаkаn sаmpеl jеnuh di mаnа sеluruh аnggotа populаsi digunаkаn dаlаm pеnеlitiаn ini. Аnаlisis dаtа mеnggunаkаn uji аsumsi klаsik dаn uji t indеpеndеn. Indikаtor Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе pаdа pеnеlitiаn ini аdаlаh trаnspаrаnsi, аkuntаbilitаs, rеsponsibilitаs, indеpеndеnsi, dаn kеsеtаrааn. Hаsil pеnеlitiаn ini mеnunjukkаn bаhwа pаdа tаhun 2013 dаn 2014, tеrdаpаt pеrbеdааn Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе yаng signifikаn аntаrа pеrusаhааn yаng mеngаlаmi kеsulitаn kеuаngаn; pаdа tаhun 2015, tidаk tеrdаpаt pеrbеdааn Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе yаng signifikаn аntаrа pеrusаhааn yаng mеngаlаmi kеsulitаn kеuаngаn dаn yаng tidаk mеngаlаmi kеsulitаn kеuаngаn. Kаtа Kunci : Good Corporаtе Govеrnаncе, Kеsulitаn Kеuаngа

Reasonably good corporate governance

Attempts to determine what constitutes “good” corporate governance have become mired in the quicksand of the ethical conflict between duty and utility, virtue and rights, as well as the fight over for whose good the organization exists. This paper takes a different tack. Drawing upon evidence from the efforts to build and develop the UK code of corporate governance, it argues that the nature of “good” is intractable, but that in the practical world a philosophically pragmatic approach applies, exemplified in the preference for a comply-or-explain approach rather than more formal modes of regulation. Using Toulmin’s (2001) of advocacy the reasonable, in opposition to the rational, it argues that “reasonably good” governance is the best that can be expected, given the contingent nature of organizational life and strategies and the uncertain and potentially fungible benefits of various mechanisms of corporate governance