120,977 research outputs found

    Mojave remote sensing field experiment

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    The Mojave Remote Sensing Field Experiment (MFE), conducted in June 1988, involved acquisition of Thermal Infrared Multispectral Scanner (TIMS); C, L, and P-band polarimetric radar (AIRSAR) data; and simultaneous field observations at the Pisgah and Cima volcanic fields, and Lavic and Silver Lake Playas, Mojave Desert, California. A LANDSAT Thematic Mapper (TM) scene is also included in the MFE archive. TM-based reflectance and TIMS-based emissivity surface spectra were extracted for selected surfaces. Radiative transfer procedures were used to model the atmosphere and surface simultaneously, with the constraint that the spectra must be consistent with field-based spectral observations. AIRSAR data were calibrated to backscatter cross sections using corner reflectors deployed at target sites. Analyses of MFE data focus on extraction of reflectance, emissivity, and cross section for lava flows of various ages and degradation states. Results have relevance for the evolution of volcanic plains on Venus and Mars

    The spillover effects of monitoring:A field experiment

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    Published Online: March 13, 2015We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multidimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivized. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the direct effects of monitoring and penalizing mistakes on work quality and evaluate spillovers on unmonitored dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We find that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are harsh, but substantially reduces punctuality irrespectively of the associated incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with 10% of participants stealing overall. Our findings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted

    GSFC magnetic field experiment Explorer 43

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    The magnetic field experiment flown on Explorer 43 is described. The detecting instrument is a triaxial fluxgate magnetometer which is mounted on a boom with a flipping mechanism for reorienting the sensor in flight. An on-board data processor takes successive magnetometer samples and transmits differences to the telemetry system. By examining these differences in conjunction with an untruncated sample transmitted periodically, the original data may be uniquely reconstructed on the ground

    Rewarding Altruism? A Natural Field Experiment

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    We present evidence from a natural field experiment involving nearly 100,000 individuals on the effects of offering economic incentives for blood donations. Subjects who were offered economic rewards to donate blood were more likely to donate, and more so the higher the value of the rewards. They were also more likely to attract others to donate, spatially alter the location of their donations towards the drives offering rewards, and modify their temporal donation schedule leading to a short-term reduction in donations immediately after the reward offer was removed. Although offering economic incentives, combining all of these effects, positively and significantly increased donations, ignoring individuals who took additional actions beyond donating to get others to donate would have led to an under-estimate of the total effect, whereas ignoring the spatial effect would have led to an over-estimate of the total effect. We also find that individuals who received a reward by surprise were less likely to donate after the intervention than subjects who received no reward, suggesting that for some individuals a surprise reward adversely affected their intrinsic motivations. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding pro-social behavior.

    The Geologic Remote Sensing Field Experiment (GRSFE)

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    Field measurements for the Geologic Remote Sensing Field Experiment (GRSFE) were concentrated in the Lunar Lake area of Nevada. The GRSFE data are meant to be used in a variety of investigations, including tests of multispectral radiative transfer models for scattering and emission from planetary surfaces in support of the Earth Observing System (EOS), Mars Observer, and Magellan Missions. Studies will also be pursued to establish the neotectonic and paleoclimatic history of the arid southwestern United States. The data will also be used to support Mars Rover Sample Return (MRSR) simulation studies

    Self-discrimination: A field experiment on obesity.

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    While it is well-established in the literature that obese people are discriminated against in the working environment, little is known about their own actual behavior. Our experimental setting investigates whether these potentially discriminated people respond in a different way when faced with the opportunity of earning a positive amount of money. Significant lower money requests by people who are self-reported as obese confirm our self-discrimination hypothesis, offering an additional explanation for the wage gap; Thus, it seems that these obese people earn less not only because of discrimination against them but also because they themselves are less demanding. Interestingly, results are more robust for females, especially for those who "feel", but they are not actually, obese.Discrimination, obesity, field experiment, gender, self-perception

    Dynamic Consistency in Denmark: A Longitudinal Field Experiment

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    Evidence that individuals have dynamically consistent preferences is usually generated by studying the discount rates of the individual over different horizons, but where those rates are elicited at a single point in time. If these elicited discount rates vary by horizon the individual is typically claimed to have preferences that imply a dynamic inconsistency, although this inference requires additional assumptions such as intertemporal separability. However, what one really wants to know is if the same subject has the same discount rate function when that individual is asked at a later point in time. Such panel tests then require than one allow for possible changes in the states of nature that the subject faces, since they may confound any in-sample comparisons of discount rate functions at different points in time. We report the results of a large-scale panel experiment undertaken in the field that allows us to examine this issue. In June 2003 we elicited subjective discount rates from 253 subjects, representative of the adult Danish population. Between September 2003 and November 2004 we re-visited 97 of these subjects and repeated these tasks. In each visit we also elicited information on their individual characteristics, as well as their expectations about the state of their own economic situation and macroeconomic variables. We find evidence in favor of dynamic consistency.

    Unwillingness to pay for privacy: A field experiment

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    We measure willingness to pay for privacy in a field experiment. Participants were given the choice to buy a maximum of one DVD from one of two online stores. One store consistently required more sensitive personal data than the other, but otherwise the stores were identical. In one treatment, DVDs were one Euro cheaper at the store requesting more personal information, and almost all buyers chose the cheaper store. Surprisingly, in the second treatment when prices were identical, participants bought from both shops equally often. -- Wir messen die Zahlungsbereitschaft für Datenschutz in einem Feldexperiment. Die Teilnehmer konnten maximal eine DVD bei einem von zwei Online-Shops kaufen. Einer der beiden Läden verlangte immer mehr sensitive Daten als der andere, aber abgesehen davon waren die Läden gleich. Im ersten Treatment waren alle DVDs genau einen Euro günstiger bei dem Laden, der mehr sensitive Daten abfragte, und fast alle Käufer wählten diesen günstigeren Laden. In einem zweiten Treatment mit identischen Preisen bei beiden Läden kauften die Teilnehmer überraschenderweise bei beiden Läden gleich häufig.privacy,willingness to pay,field experiments

    PAY-AS-YOU-SPEED: AN ECONOMIC FIELD-EXPERIMENT

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    We report a vehicle-fleet experiment with an economic incentive given to car drivers for keeping within speed limits. A pay-as-you-speed traffic insurance scheme was simulated with a monthly participation bonus that was reduced by a non-linear speeding penalty. Actual speed was monitored by a GPS in-vehicle device. Participating drivers were randomly assigned into two-by two treatment groups, with different participation-bonus and penalty levels, and two control groups (high and low participation bonus, but no penalty). A third control group consists of drivers with the same technical equipment who did not participate but whose driving could be monitored. We evaluate changes in behaviour from twelve-month differences in proportion of driving time per month that the car was exceeding the maximum allowed speed on the road. We find that the participating drivers significantly reduced severe speeding violations during the first experiment month, while in the second experiment month, after having received feedback reports with an account of earned payments, only those participating subjects that were given a speeding penalty reduced severe speed violations. We find no significant effects from the size of the participation bonus (high vs. low), or the size of the penalty (high vs. low rate).Traffic insurance; traffic safety; Intelligent Transport Systems; ITS; Intelligent Speed Adaptation; ISA
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