Enhanced Cooperation under the Lisbon Treaty

Enhanced cooperation is often regarded as being a way out of EU decision-making deadlock and as a major possibility of proceeding with European integration in selected areas. Although the mechanism has been in place since the Treaty of Amsterdam, enhanced cooperation has only recently become a reality, in two policy fields: divorce law and the single EU patent. Using these two cases, in this paper the pros and cons of enhanced cooperation (as compared to unitary integration and alternative integration) are analyzed. The paper concludes by pointing out some possible weaknesses of the enhanced cooperation mechanism

Cooperation in the snowdrift game on directed small-world networks under self-questioning and noisy conditions

Cooperation in the evolutionary snowdrift game with a self-questioning updating mechanism is studied on annealed and quenched small-world networks with directed couplings. Around the payoff parameter value $r=0.5$, we find a size-invariant symmetrical cooperation effect. While generally suppressing cooperation for $r>0.5$ payoffs, rewired networks facilitated cooperative behavior for $r<0.5$. Fair amounts of noise were found to break the observed symmetry and further weaken cooperation at relatively large values of $r$. However, in the absence of noise, the self-questioning mechanism recovers symmetrical behavior and elevates altruism even under large-reward conditions. Our results suggest that an updating mechanism of this type is necessary to stabilize cooperation in a spatially structured environment which is otherwise detrimental to cooperative behavior, especially at high cost-to-benefit ratios. Additionally, we employ component and local stability analyses to better understand the nature of the manifested dynamics.Comment: 7 pages, 6 figures, 1 tabl

To cooperate or to defect? Altruism and reputation

The basic problem in the cooperation theory is to justify the cooperation. Here we propose a new approach, where players are driven by their altruism to cooperate or not. The probability of cooperation depends also on the co-player's reputation. We find that players with positive altruism cooperate and met cooperation. In this approach, payoffs are not relevant. The mechanism is most efficient in the fully connected network.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figure

Cooperation of Nature and Physiologically Inspired Mechanism in Visualisation

A novel approach of integrating two swarm intelligence algorithms is considered, one simulating the behaviour of birds flocking (Particle Swarm Optimisation) and the other one (Stochastic Diffusion Search) mimics the recruitment behaviour of one species of ants – Leptothorax acervorum. This hybrid algorithm is assisted by a biological mechanism inspired by the behaviour of blood flow and cells in blood vessels, where the concept of high and low blood pressure is utilised. The performance of the nature-inspired algorithms and the biologically inspired mechanisms in the hybrid algorithm is reflected through a cooperative attempt to make a drawing on the canvas. The scientific value of the marriage between the two swarm intelligence algorithms is currently being investigated thoroughly on many benchmarks and the results reported suggest a promising prospect (al-Rifaie, Bishop & Blackwell, 2011). We also discuss whether or not the ‘art works’ generated by nature and biologically inspired algorithms can possibly be considered as ‘computationally creative’

Resolving social dilemmas on evolving random networks

We show that strategy independent adaptations of random interaction networks can induce powerful mechanisms, ranging from the Red Queen to group selection, that promote cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas. These two mechanisms emerge spontaneously as dynamical processes due to deletions and additions of links, which are performed whenever players adopt new strategies and after a certain number of game iterations, respectively. The potency of cooperation promotion, as well as the mechanism responsible for it, can thereby be tuned via a single parameter determining the frequency of link additions. We thus demonstrate that coevolving random networks may evoke an appropriate mechanism for each social dilemma, such that cooperation prevails even by highly unfavorable conditions.Comment: 6 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Europhysics Letter

Flexible Integration

For a club such as the European Union, an important question is when, and under which conditions, a subset of the members should be allowed to form "inner clubs" and enhance cooperation. Flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit, but it generates a freerider problem if potential members choose to opt out. The analysis shows that flexible cooperation is better if the heterogeneity is large and the externality small. The best possible symmetric and monotonic participation mechanism, however, is implemented by two thresholds: A mandatory and a minimum participation rule. Rigid and flexible cooperation are both special cases of this mechanism. For each of these thresholds, the optimum is characterized.