84,496 research outputs found
Africaās Ed-Tech Platforms: Protecting Childrenās Right to Privacy
Ed-tech platforms are used to create a more engaging, inclusive, and individualized learning experience. A number of these platforms utilize Artificial Intelligence (AI). AI-enabled learning tools and approaches have revolutionized the global education sector (Pedro et al., 2019). They have been recognized for their contributions to enhancing the quality of learning and teaching. AI aids teachers and students in their lessons (Pedro et al., 2019). Additionally, AI has been lauded for its potential to boost students' knowledge and learning habits, while also creating a more personalized approach to learning (Pedro et al., 2019). Children are less likely to read or understand privacy policies, and they may have a limited understanding of their right to privacy and data protection. In addition, they are more susceptible to marketing techniques that adults can identify. The existence of their personal information online poses potential safety and security risks. Therefore, privacy policies on Ed-tech platforms must incorporate children's rights and an understanding of their right to privacy. This includes online protection and security measures established to protect children's data. The primary audience for this policy brief is corporations. Although, childrenās rights to privacy are a collective responsibility of the parents, legal guardians, and other individuals legally responsible for the child. In the Ed-tech space, this responsibility extends to AI platform owners, who manage the platforms, and policymakers and regulators concerned with data protection and childrenās rights
Features of the Legal Regulation Ensuring the Right of Minors to Private Life and the Protection of Personal Data
The quality protection of minor's right to privacy cannot be achieved without sufficient protection of
personal data. The General Data Protection Regulation provides specific protection rules for the processing of
minor's personal data, as they may be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards concerned and their
rights in relation to the processing of personal data. Minors merit specific protection, any information and
communication when it comes to their privacy and data protection.
This scientific article aim is to investigate the legal regulation for the protection of minors's personal data
and to show the connection of this legal regulation with the individualās fundamental right to privacy and identify
the problems of this legal regulation.
In order to achieve these goals, there will be discussed the main legal aspects of children's data protection,
such as consent, age requirements and other aspects. This scientific article analyzes not only the legal regulation
of the protection of children's personal data but also the connection with the right to privacy
Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery: A Lost Opportunity for the UK's Protection of Physical Privacy
The inadequacies of English common and statutory law have left a noticeable gap in the UK's protection of physical privacy. Mann J's 2019 decision in Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery helped fill this gap as it acknowledged that overlooking between neighbours could constitute an actionable nuisance. A year later, the Court of Appeal reversed this development and reaffirmed that private nuisance cannot be used to combat breaches of privacy. This article evaluates the extent to which the High Court decision in Fearn was a useful and desirable tool for defending physical privacy in order to assess the correctness of the appellate decision. The article contends that Mann J's extension was a justified development as it conformed with precedent, the scheme and principles of private nuisance, the text and horizontal effect of art 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, cases decided in the European Court of Human Rights, and broader policy. However, the article acknowledges that Fearn was also a problematic development with limited potential as a protection mechanism. Its limitations arose from the conflict between traditional understandings of the right to privacy and nuisance's association with property, the land-based rationale for compensation in nuisance, the standing restrictions retained from Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, irregularities with the common law's favourable attitude towards children's privacy, and Fearn's similarities to anti-harassment legislation. Overall, the article concludes that although Fearn was imperfect in its treatment of physical privacy, it was a step in the right direction and contributed at least partially to filling the persistent lacuna in English privacy law
The GDPR child's age of consent for data processing across the EU ā one year later (July 2019)
Spiritual Custody: Relational Rights and Constitutional Commitments
Patricia and David Zummo were married on December 17, 1978. When they divorced ten years later, the Zummos were unable to come to agreement about the religious upbringing of their three children. Prior to their marriage, Patricia and David had agreed that they would raise their children in the Jewish faith, and while they were married, the Zummo family participated fully in the life of the Jewish faith and community. But after the divorce David wanted to take the children to Roman Catholic services as he saw fit, and he refused to arrange for the children\u27s attendance at Hebrew School during his visitation periods. Patricia Zummo, on the other hand, opposed exposing the children to a second religion. She was concerned that such a mixed spiritual message would confuse and disorient them. The Zummos brought their custody dispute to the Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.
The facts of the Zummo case are distressingly typical of the spiritual custody dispute. With high rates of interfaith marriage and divorce, the subject of spiritual custody is certain to be one of continuing concern. To date, courts have treaded with great care on the uncertain constitutional landscape that underlies the competing claims of divorced parents who seek to control the religious education of their children. Of course, the best interests of the child are of central concern in custody cases. In spiritual custody cases, however, the First Amendment rights of the parents significantly complicate the judicial inquiry. Most courts have refused to restrain the noncustodial parent from exposing a minor child to his or her religious beliefs or practices absent a clear, affirmative showing that these religious activities will be harmful to the child. Nonetheless, it is argued that even this high degree of deference to parental authority is too open to judicial discretion. Critics of the best interests standard point to the constitutional hazards of such meddling in religious affairs--violations of either or both of the religion clauses of the First Amendment--and call for a direct prohibition of such consideration or some stricter version of strict scrutiny.
I do not think ignoring these religious disputes is practically desirable. Growing up in the midst of a domestic religious civil war, given the special volatility of such disputes, is never in the best interests of the child. To leave this kind of conflict to the good intentions of feuding parents is to abandon the child to a Hobbesian space in which there is no law. The reluctance of courts to intervene in spiritual custody cases is reminiscent of an earlier era in family law where the state would not make its courts available for resolving disputes between husband and wife. The notion of family autonomy made women and children particularly vulnerable to unrestrained authority. Beyond protection against serious harm, children were subject to public neglect justified by the theory that only parents are responsible for them. Judicial deference in spiritual custody cases presents a similar risk of neglect, similarly masked as a matter of constitutional rights.
Deference to family autonomy or parental free exercise rights in such cases may be a choice our society wishes to make, but it is not a choice that is constitutionally required. The right that people have to direct the spiritual upbringing of children, I will argue, is contingent on the commitment to the work of social ordering they have agreed to undertake as parents--that is, the right of religious parenting (1) is called into existence by a community of interests centered on the welfare of the child, and (2) may cease to exist when that community devolves into a contest of parental religious preferences
You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor Agreement and its Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission
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