Asian Energy and Environmental Policy: Promoting Growth While Preserving the Environment

Asia has truly experienced spectacular economic growth over the past 15 years. However, this economic progress has come at a high cost. It has led to unprecedented environmental consequences. The ecological footprint shows that, despite the fact that one-fifth of the population in Asia still lives on less than US$ 1 per day (PPP-adjusted), the region is already living beyond its ecological carrying capacity. The region is facing a dilemma. On the one hand, continued economic growth is needed to alleviate the poverty of the two-thirds of the world’s poor living in this region. On the other hand, that economic growth will further place tremendous strains on the natural environment. In order to extricate itself from this difficult position, the region needs to shift the conventional pattern of “develop first and then treat the pollution” to a different trajectory of sustainable development. To that end, this paper examines a variety of policy responses at national, regional and international levels to deal with growing concerns about the environmental challenges in Asia in order to help to put the region on a more sustainable development path. In the context of national responses, special attention is paid to the following issues: coordination between the central and local governments, market-based environmental instruments and industrial policies, tougher emissions standards for mobile and stationary sources and for fuel quality, policies to promote energy efficiency and the use of clean energy and biofuels, the integration of environmental policies with economic and sectoral policies, and engagement of the private sector through e.g., ecolabelling, green government procurement, corporate ratings and disclosure programs, and drawing the support of financial institutions to promote improved corporate environmental performance. It is concluded that having the right policy mix, coupled with strengthened cooperation at national, local and regional levels, will ensure continuing economic growth in the region without compromising its limited ecological carrying capacity and environmental quality.Energy policy; Market-based environmental instruments; Asia

The size of the carbon market study: discussion

This is an invited discussion on the Morozova and Stuart’s paper “The Size of the Carbon Market Study”. It suggests a number of issues for consideration in appropriately estimating the size of carbon markets. They include Annex 1 (industrialised) countries’ baseline emissions; qualitative and quantitative assessments of the role of carbon sinks; and the difficulty from an economic and legal perspective of interpreting and inferring impacts in relation to specific provisions attached to each flexibility mechanism for regulating the extent of their use.Emissions trading; Clean development mechanism; Joint implementation; Carbon market; Greenhouse gases; European Union; Supplementarity restrictions

Ways to improve the design of the EU emissions trading scheme: key issues and answers

The Europe Union is about to lunch the world’s first greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in history. This represents an enormous challenge because there is no previous experience with such an unprecedented scheme, and because its final outcome might shape the design of future environmental market-based policies as well as the political viability of future efforts towards emissions reductions. There are five basic issues that not only will shape the final design of the scheme but also might hinder the performance of such a scheme, if not effectively addressed. They include universal vs. reduced scope, member country vs. European-wide sector objectives and allocations, allocation methodology and base year choice, energy mix and national security, and incentives for technological innovation. This paper aims to address these key issues to help to shape the final design of the scheme in a positive manner.EU emissions trading scheme; Allowance allocations; Carbon price; Energy mix; Technological innovation; Competitiveness concerns

Climate change meets trade in promoting green growth: potential conflicts and synergies

To date, border adjustment measures in the form of emissions allowance requirements (EAR) under the U.S. proposed cap-and-trade regime are the most concrete unilateral trade measure put forward on the table to level the carbon playing field. If improperly implemented, such measures could disturb the world trade order and trigger trade war. Because of these potentially far-reaching impacts, this paper focuses on this type of unilateral border adjustment that requires importers to acquire and surrender emissions allowances corresponding to the embedded carbon contents in their goods from countries that have not taken climate actions comparable to that of home country. Our discussion is mainly on the legality of unilateral EAR under the WTO rules. Given that the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures is widely considered essential to secure passage of any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions, we argue that, on the U.S. side, in designing such trade measures, WTO rules need to be carefully scrutinised, and efforts need to be made early on to ensure that the proposed measures comply with them. After all, a conflict between the trade and climate regimes, if it breaks out, helps neither trade nor the global climate. The U.S. needs to explore with its trading partners cooperative sectoral approaches to advancing low-carbon technologies and/or concerted mitigation efforts in a given sector at an international level. Moreover, to increase the prospects for a successful WTO defence of the Waxman-Markey type of border adjustment provision, 1) there should be a period of good faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing such trade measures; 2) WTO consistency also requires considering alternatives to trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions; and 3) trade provisions can refer to the designated special international reserve allowance pool, but should allow importers to submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products. The paper concludes by arguing that the major developing countries being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures should make the best use of the forums provided under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to effectively deal with the proposed border adjustment measures to their advantage.Post-2012 climate negotiations; Border carbon adjustments; Carbon tariffs; Emissions allowance requirements; Cap-and-trade regime; Lieberman-Warner bill; Waxman-Markey bill; World Trade Organization; Kyoto Protocol; Developing countries; United States

Is It Fair to Treat China as a Christmas Tree to Hang Everybody’s Complaints? Putting its Own Energy Saving into Perspective

China had been the world’s second largest carbon emitter for years. However, recent studies show that China had overtaken the U.S. as the world’s largest emitter in 2007. This has put China on the spotlight, just at a time when the world community starts negotiating a post-Kyoto climate regime under the Bali roadmap. China seems to become such a Christmas tree on which everybody can hang his/her complaints. This paper first discusses whether such a critics is fair by examining China’s own efforts towards energy saving, the widespread use of renewable energy and participation in clean development mechanism. Next, the paper puts carbon reductions of China’s unilateral actions into perspective by examining whether the estimated greenhouse gas emission reduction from meeting the country’s national energy saving goal is achieved from China’s unilateral actions or mainly with support from the clean development mechanism projects. Then the paper discusses how far developing country commitments can go in an immediate post-2012 climate regime, thus pointing out the direction and focus of future international climate negotiations. Finally, emphasizing that China needs to act as a large and responsible developing country and take due responsibilities and to set a good example to the majority of developing countries, the paper articulates what can be expected from China to illustrate that China can be a good partner in combating global climate change.Energy Saving, Renewable Energy, Post-Kyoto Climate Negotiations, Clean Development Mechanism, China, USA

Policies and Measures to Mitigate Potential Environmental Impacts of Cross Border Infrastructure Projects in Asia

While bringing positive impacts and benefits, cross-border infrastructure projects face additional challenges relative to national projects. Moreover, such projects involve a variety of technical, regulatory, institutional, and legal factors, and their obstacles constrain the development of cross-border infrastructure projects. This paper argues that proper technical specifications and well-functioning regulatory, institutional and legislative/legal frameworks with clearer lines of oversight are crucial to getting such projects off the ground in the first place and to ensure that they operate properly and reliably while minimizing their environmental impacts. It is pointed out that many issues in theses areas need to be addressed at the national level. The paper concludes that such domestic efforts, coupled with regional frameworks and arrangements wherever necessary, will promote the further development of cross-border infrastructure projects.asia cross-border infrastructure; environmental impact; asia regional integration

An assessment of the EU proposal for ceilings on the use of Kyoto flexibility mechanisms

The Kyoto Protocol is the first international environmental agreement that sets legally binding greenhouse gas emissions targets and timetables for Annex I countries. It incorporates emissions trading, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism. Because each of the Articles defining the three flexibility mechanisms carries wording that the use of the mechanism must be supplemental to domestic actions, the supplementarity provisions have been the focus of the international climate change negotiations subsequent to Kyoto. Whether the supplementarity clauses will be translated into a concrete ceiling, and if so, how should a concrete ceiling on the use of the three flexible mechanisms be defined remain to be determined. To date, the European Union (EU) has put forward a proposal for ceilings on the use of these flexibility mechanisms. Given the great policy relevance to the ongoing negotiations on the overall issues of flexibility mechanisms, this paper has provided a quantitative assessment of the implications of the EU ceilings with and without considering the however clause. Our results suggest that such ceilings are less restrictive to the EU than to the US and Japan in terms of levels of restriction on permits imports, and can prevent one third of the amount of hot air from entering the market. Our results also demonstrate that although the US and Japan are firmly opposed to such a restriction, they tend to benefit more from it than the EU which strongly advocates such ceilings, in terms of the reductions in the total abatement costs relative to the no trading case. Moreover, their gains can increase even further, provided that the however clause would operate as intended.Emissions trading; Clean development mechanism; Joint implementation; Greenhouse gases; European Union; Supplementarity restrictions

Assessing China’s Carbon Intensity Pledge for 2020: Stringency and Credibility Issues and their Implications

Just prior to the Copenhagen climate summit, China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels to help to reach an international climate change agreement at Copenhagen or beyond. This raises the issue of whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual. To put China’s climate pledge into perspective, this paper examines whether this proposed carbon intensity goal for 2020 is as challenging as the energy-saving goals set in the current 11th five-year economic blueprint, to what extent it drives China’s emissions below its projected baseline levels, and whether China will fulfill its part of a coordinated global commitment to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at the desirable level. Given that China’s pledge is in the form of carbon intensity, the paper shows that GDP figures are even more crucial to the impacts on the energy or carbon intensity than are energy consumption and emissions data by examining the revisions of China’s GDP figures and energy consumption in recent years. Moreover, the paper emphasizes that China’s proposed carbon intensity target not only needs to be seen as ambitious, but more importantly it needs to be credible. Finally, it is concluded with a suggestion that international climate change negotiations need to focus on 2030 as the targeted date to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of the world’s two largest emitters in a legally binding global agreement.Carbon Intensity, Post-Copenhagen Climate Change Negotiations, Climate Commitments, China

The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO Scrutiny and China’s Responses

With countries from around the world set to meet in Copenhagen to try to hammer out a post-2012 climate change agreement, no one would disagree that a U.S. commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions is essential to such a global pact. However, despite U.S. president Obama’s recent announcement to push for a commitment to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 17% by 2020, in reality it is questionable whether U.S. Congress will agree to specific emissions cuts, although they are not ambitious at all from the perspectives of both the EU and developing countries, without the imposition of carbon tariffs on Chinese products to the U.S. market, even given China’s own recent announcement to voluntarily seek to reduce its carbon intensity by 40-45% over the same period. This dilemma is partly attributed to flaws in current international climate negotiations, which have been focused on commitments on the two targeted dates of 2020 and 2050. However, if the international climate change negotiations continue on their current course without extending the commitment period to 2030, which would really open the possibility for the U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wants from the other, the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures seems essential to secure passage of any U.S. legislation capping its own greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the joint WTO-UNEP report indicates that border carbon adjustment measures might be allowed under the existing WTO rules, depending on their specific design features and the specific conditions for implementing them. Against this background, this paper argues that, on the U.S. side, there is a need to minimize the potential conflicts with WTO provisions in designing such border carbon adjustment measures. The U.S. also needs to explore, with its trading partners, cooperative sectoral approaches to advancing low-carbon technologies and/or concerted mitigation efforts in a given sector at the international level. Moreover, to increase the prospects for a successful WTO defence of the Waxman-Markey type of border adjustment provision, there should be: 1) a period of good faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing such trade measures; 2) consideration of alternatives to trade provisions that could reasonably be expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions; and 3) trade provisions that should allow importers to submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products. Meanwhile, being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures, China needs to, at the right time, indicate a serious commitment to address climate change issues to challenge the legitimacy of the U.S. imposing carbon tariffs by signaling well ahead that it will take on binding absolute emission caps around the year 2030, and needs the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute emissions caps. This paper argues that there is a clear need within a climate regime to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level. As exemplified by export tariffs that China applied on its own during 2006-08, the paper shows that defining the comparability of climate efforts can be to China’s advantage. Furthermore, given the fact that, in volume terms, energy-intensive manufacturing in China values 7 to 8 times that of India, and thus carbon tariffs have a greater impact on China than on India, the paper questions whether China should hold the same stance on this issue as India as it does now, although the two largest developing countries should continue to take a common position on other key issues in international climate change negotiations.Post-2012 Climate Negotiations, Border Carbon Adjustments, Carbon Tariffs, Emissions Allowance Requirements, Cap-And-Trade Regime, Lieberman-Warner Bill, Waxman-Markey Bill, World Trade Organization, Kyoto Protocol, China, United States

The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund and China

As the first global carbon fund, the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) aims to catalyze the market for project-based greenhouse gas emission reductions while promoting sustainable development and offering a learning-by-doing opportunity to its stakeholders. Since the inception in 2000, the PCF has engaged in a dialogue with China to get it to sign up as a host country, because the World Bank and other international and bilateral donors expect great potential of the clean development mechanism (CDM) in China and feel the significant need for building CDM capacity in China to enable it to gain more insight into the CDM and increase its capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects. This paper first discusses why China had hesitated to sign up as a host country of PCF projects until September 2003. Then the paper explains what has led China to endorse the PCF projects. The paper ends with discussions on the implications of the PCF’s offering prices for the emerging global carbon market.Carbon prices, Carbon market, China, Prototype Carbon Fund, The World Bank