The Chinese government’s policies related to platform economy after 2018.

The Chinese government’s policies related to platform economy after 2018.</p

The strategy interaction payment matrix of the "multi-agent co-governance" mode.

The strategy interaction payment matrix of the "multi-agent co-governance" mode.</p

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Unfair competition on internet platforms (UCIP) has become a critical issue restricting the platform economy’s healthy development. This paper applies evolutionary game theory to study how to utilize multiple subjects’ synergy to supervise UCIP effectively. First, the "multi-agent co-governance" mode of UCIP is constructed based on the traditional "unitary supervision" mode. Second, the government and internet platform evolutionary game models are built under two supervision modes. Finally, MATLAB is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary stage and parameter sensitivity. In addition, we match the model’s evolutionary stage with China’s supervisory process. The results show that (1) the Chinese government’s supervision of UCIP is in the transitional stage from "campaign-style" to "normalization." (2) Moderate government supervision intensity is essential to guide the game system to evolve toward the ideal state. If the supervision intensity is too high, it will inhibit the enthusiasm for supervision. If the supervision intensity is too low, it cannot form an effective deterrent to the internet platforms. (3) When the participation of industry associations and platform users is low, it can only slow down the evolutionary speed of the game system’s convergence to the unfavorable state. Nevertheless, it cannot reverse the evolutionary result. (4) Maintaining the participation level of industry associations and platform users above a specific threshold value while increasing punishment intensity will promote the transition of government supervision from the "campaign-style" to the "normalization" stage. This paper provides ideas and references for the Chinese government to design a supervision mechanism for UCIP.</div

Typical cases of UCIP.

Unfair competition on internet platforms (UCIP) has become a critical issue restricting the platform economy’s healthy development. This paper applies evolutionary game theory to study how to utilize multiple subjects’ synergy to supervise UCIP effectively. First, the "multi-agent co-governance" mode of UCIP is constructed based on the traditional "unitary supervision" mode. Second, the government and internet platform evolutionary game models are built under two supervision modes. Finally, MATLAB is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary stage and parameter sensitivity. In addition, we match the model’s evolutionary stage with China’s supervisory process. The results show that (1) the Chinese government’s supervision of UCIP is in the transitional stage from "campaign-style" to "normalization." (2) Moderate government supervision intensity is essential to guide the game system to evolve toward the ideal state. If the supervision intensity is too high, it will inhibit the enthusiasm for supervision. If the supervision intensity is too low, it cannot form an effective deterrent to the internet platforms. (3) When the participation of industry associations and platform users is low, it can only slow down the evolutionary speed of the game system’s convergence to the unfavorable state. Nevertheless, it cannot reverse the evolutionary result. (4) Maintaining the participation level of industry associations and platform users above a specific threshold value while increasing punishment intensity will promote the transition of government supervision from the "campaign-style" to the "normalization" stage. This paper provides ideas and references for the Chinese government to design a supervision mechanism for UCIP.</div

The strategy interaction payment matrix of the " unitary supervision " mode.

The strategy interaction payment matrix of the " unitary supervision " mode.</p

The "unitary supervision" system of UCIP.

Unfair competition on internet platforms (UCIP) has become a critical issue restricting the platform economy’s healthy development. This paper applies evolutionary game theory to study how to utilize multiple subjects’ synergy to supervise UCIP effectively. First, the "multi-agent co-governance" mode of UCIP is constructed based on the traditional "unitary supervision" mode. Second, the government and internet platform evolutionary game models are built under two supervision modes. Finally, MATLAB is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary stage and parameter sensitivity. In addition, we match the model’s evolutionary stage with China’s supervisory process. The results show that (1) the Chinese government’s supervision of UCIP is in the transitional stage from "campaign-style" to "normalization." (2) Moderate government supervision intensity is essential to guide the game system to evolve toward the ideal state. If the supervision intensity is too high, it will inhibit the enthusiasm for supervision. If the supervision intensity is too low, it cannot form an effective deterrent to the internet platforms. (3) When the participation of industry associations and platform users is low, it can only slow down the evolutionary speed of the game system’s convergence to the unfavorable state. Nevertheless, it cannot reverse the evolutionary result. (4) Maintaining the participation level of industry associations and platform users above a specific threshold value while increasing punishment intensity will promote the transition of government supervision from the "campaign-style" to the "normalization" stage. This paper provides ideas and references for the Chinese government to design a supervision mechanism for UCIP.</div

Simulation diagram of dynamic evolution of game system without evolutionarily stable strategy.

(a) The “unitary supervision” mode. (b) The “multi-agent co-governance” mode. (c) The “unitary supervision” mode. (d) The “multi-agent co-governance” mode.</p

Aqueous Liquid Crystals of Graphene Oxide

The formation of liquid crystals (LCs) is the most viable approach to produce macroscopic, periodic self-assembled materials from oriented graphene sheets. Herein, we have discovered that well-soluble and single-layered graphene oxide (GO) sheets can exhibit nematic liquid crystallinity in water and first established their isotropic−nematic solid phase diagram versus mass fraction and salt concentration. The zeta potential of GO dispersion is around −64 mV, and its absolute value decreases with increasing salt concentration, implying that the electrostatic repulsive force between negatively charged GO sheets is the dominant interaction in the system of GO LCs and also explaining the salt-dependent phase behavior. For single-layer GO sheets with average diameter of 2.1 μm and polydispersity index of 83%, the isotropic−nematic phase transition occurs at a mass concentration of ∼0.025%, and a stable nematic phase forms at ∼0.5%. Rheological measurements showed that GO aqueous dispersions performed as typical shear flows and confirmed the isotropic−nematic transition. The ordering of GO sheets in aqueous dispersions and the solid state is demonstrated by the characterizations of polarized-light optical microscopy, small-angle X-ray scattering, scanning electron microscopy, and transmission electron microscopy. The direct, real-time fluorescent inspections by confocal laser microscopy further reveal that the individually dispersed fluorescent GO sheets align with orientational directions along their long axes. These novel findings shed light on the phase behaviors of diversely topological graphenes and lay the foundation for fabrication of long-range, ordered nano-objects and macroscopically assembled graphene-based functional materials

The ESS and parameter value conditions of the " multi-agent co-governance " mode.

The ESS and parameter value conditions of the " multi-agent co-governance " mode.</p

The influence of industry association participation on the ESS.

(a) The punishment intensity z>z0. (b) The punishment intensity z0.</p