750 research outputs found

    International Percussions of Direct Taxes

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    This paper anlyzes the impact of tax competition between two countries of un- equal per-capita capital endownments on tax rates and efficiency when distorting wage, residence-based and source-based capital taxes (or any combination of two instruments) are available for governments. The national welfare costs and benefits of tax rate variations are shown to be ambiguous in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium due to the existence of tax base and terms of trade effects. Moreover, numerical simulation results indicate that non-cooperative equilibria in Nash strategies are inefficient from an international perspective, even if residence-based capital taxes are in the set of tax instruments available to fiscal authorities.

    International Percussions of Direct Taxes

    Get PDF
    This peper anlyzes the impact of tax competition between two countries of un- equal per-capita capital endownments on tax rates and efficiency when distorting wage, residence-based and source-based capital taxes (or any combination of two instruments) are available for governments. The national welfare costs and benefits of tax rate varia- tions are shown to be ambiguous in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium due to the existence of tax base and terms of trade effects. Moreover, numerical simulation results indicate that non-cooperative equilibria in Nash strategies are inefficient from an international perspective, even if residence-based capital taxes are in the set of tax instruments available to fiscal authorities.

    Double Taxation, Tax Credits and the Information Exchange Puzzle

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    This paper analyzes the choice of taxes and international information exchange by governments in a capital tax competition model. We explain situations where countries can choose tax rates on tax savings income and exchange information about the domestic savings of foreigners, implying that the decentralized equilibrium is efficient. However, we also identify situations with adverse welfare properties in which information exchange is compatible with zero taxes on capital income. The model helps to identify the linkage between voluntary information exchange and the choice of tax rates. It is shown that the recent development in information exchange treaties may not be useful to overcome the inefficiencies caused by decentralized tax setting.withholding tax, tax credit, international tax competition, information exchange

    Company tax coordination cum tax rate competition in the European Union

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    This paper reviews the recent theoretical literature that analyses the European Union's policy to eliminate preferential corporate tax regimes and the proposal to introduce a consolidated EU tax base with formula apportionment for the taxation of multinational firms. Since neither proposal includes a harmonisation of corporate tax rates, a core issue is how tax competition between member states will be affected by these partial coordination measures. The conclusions from our review are supportive of the EU's ban on preferential tax regimes, but the economic incentive effects of a switch to formula apportionment are found to be ambiguous

    Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and Unemployment.

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    Fiscal policy is examined in a model of an open economy which is characterised by unemployment caused by efficiency wages. It is shown that the conventional conclusion, according to which mobile capital is untaxed in the presence of wage taxation, is not generally valid. A positive capital tax allows to indirectly tax profits, thereby mitigating unemployment through the reduction in the effective tax burden on labour. It is argued that these policy conclusions are qualitatively unaffected by the cause of unemployment. Moreover, the welfare loss from labour market imperfections increases when tax bases become internationally mobile, which suggests an increasing relevance of domestic labour market reforms.

    Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria, and Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition

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    We analyze tax competition between large and asymmetric countries and derive conditions under which countries assist foreign authorities in collecting tax revenues via information exchange. It turns out that voluntary exchange of information is a Nash equilibrium between asymmetric countries, resulting in an efficient use of taxes by governments. However, this equilibrium is not unique and the structure of the resulting equilibrium-selection problem depends on the relative size of countries. Our model gives an explanation for the empirical observation that especially smaller countries are reluctant to co-ordinate on the full-information equilibrium, whereas countries of similar size kan solve the information problem.

    Contests with Size Effects

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    In this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number of individuals. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agents and where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second we analyze a situation where the agents face a trade-off between productive and appropriative investments. Here, the number of agents may also influence the productivity of productive investments. It turns out that both types of contests may lead to opposing results concerning the optimal number of individuals depending on the strength of size effects. Whereas in the former case individual utility is u-shaped when the number of agents increases, the opposite holds true for the latter case. We discuss the implications of our findings for the case of anarchic societies and competition on markets.size effects, contests, anarchy, competition

    Contests with Size Effects

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    In this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number of individuals. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agents and where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second we analyze a situation where the agents face a trade-off between productive and appropriative investments. Here, the number of agents may also influence the productivity of productive investments. It turns out that both types of contests may lead to opposing results concerning the optimal number of individuals depending on the strength of size effects. Whereas in the former case individual utility is u-shaped when the number of agents increases, the opposite holds true for the latter case. We discuss the implications of our findings for the case of anarchic societies and competition on markets.Size Effects, Contests, Anarchy, Competition.

    Company Tax Coordination cum Tax Rate Competition in the European Union

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    This paper reviews the recent theoretical literature that analyses the European Union’spolicy to eliminate preferential corporate tax regimes and the proposal to introduce aconsolidated EU tax base with formula apportionment for the taxation of multinationalfirms. Since neither proposal includes a harmonisation of corporate tax rates, a coreissue is how tax competition between member states will be affected by these partialcoordination measures. The conclusions from our review are supportive of the EU’s banon preferential tax regimes, but the economic incentive effects of a switch to formulaapportionment are found to be ambiguous.Corporate taxation, tax coordination, multinational firms

    Is tax harmonization useful?

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    It is a widely acknowledged result of the literature on capital tax competition that underprovision of public goods can only be avoided if tax coordination between governments is intensive and residence-based capital taxation can be enforced. In this paper we use a model where commodity and factor taxes are available and we show that governments competing for tax bases will choose a globally efficient tax structure. In contrast to previous conclusions, we also show that the availability of a destination-based commodity tax or a labor tax is necessary to mitigate the problem of inefficient Nash equilibria and thus reduces the necessity of supranational tax harmonization or coordination.
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