The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap

The paper examines the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in an open economy with and without a binding zero bound on nominal interest rates. In particular, a foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap is presented, consisting of a price-level target path, a devaluation of the currency and a temporary exchange rate peg, which is later abandoned in favor of price-level or inflation targeting when the price-level target has been reached. This will jump-start the economy and escape deflation by a real depreciation of the domestic currency, a lower long real interest rate, and increased inflation expectations. The abandonment of the exchange-rate peg and the shift to price-level or inflation targeting will avoid the risk of overheating. Some conclusions for Japan are included.

Monetary Policy with Flexible Exchange Rates and Forward Interest Rates as Indicators

In the new situation with flexible exchange rates, monetary policy in Europe will have to rely more on indicators than previously under fixed rates. One of the potential indicators, the forward interest rate curve, can be used to indicate market expectations of the time-paths of future short interest rates, monetary policy, inflation rates and currency depreciation rates. The forward rate curve separates market expectations for the short, medium and long term more easily than the standard yield curve. Monetary policy in France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and the United States is interpreted with the help of forward rates.

The First Year of the Eurosystem: Inflation Targeting or Not?

This paper is a brief evaluation of the Eurosystem's monetary-policy regime after its first year, in particular of the extent to which it is similar to inflation targeting as practiced by an increasing number of central banks. I examine the Eurosystem's goals, framework for monetary-policy decisions and communication with outsiders. Criteria for evaluation are whether the goals are unambiguous and appropriate; whether the decision framework is efficient in collecting and processing information and reaching decisions that are appropriate relative to the goals; and whether the communication is effective in motivating decisions, simplifying external evaluation and thereby improving transparency and accountability. I also consider whether the actual instrument setting has been appropriate, given the information available at the times of decision.

Portfolio Choice and Asset Pricing With Nontraded Assets

This paper examines portfolio choice and asset pricing when some assets are nontraded, for instance when a country cannot trade claims to its output on world capital markets, when a government cannot trade claims to future tax revenues, or when an individual cannot trade claims to his future wages. The close relation between portfolio choice with and implicit pricing of nontraded assets is emphasized. A variant of Cox, Ingersoll and Ross's Fundamental Valuation Equation is derived and used to interpret the optimal portfolio. Explicit solutions are presented to the portfolio and pricing problem for some special cases, including when income from the nontraded assets is a diffusion process, not spanned by traded assets, and affected by a state variable.

Does the P* Model Provide Any Rationale for Monetary Targeting?

The so-called P* model is frequently used or referred to in discussions of monetary targeting. This gives the impression that the P* model might provide some rationale for monetary targeting or for the monetary reference value used by the Eurosystem. The P* model implies that inflation is determined by the level of and changes in the 'money gap' (the deviation of current real balances from their long-run equilibrium level), and hence that the real money gap is an important indicator for future inflation. Nevertheless, the P* model does not seem to provide any rationale for either a Bundesbank-style money-growth target or a Eurosystem-style money-growth indicator.

The Simplest Test of Target Zone Credibility

A credible target zone exchange rate regime with a given exchange rate band implies bounds on the amount of depreciation and appreciation of the domestic currency. This implies, for given foreign interest rates, bounds on the domestic-currency rate of return on foreign investment: a rate-of-return band for each time to maturity. Whether domestic interest rates are outside these rate-of-return bands can be used as a simple test of exchange rate credibility, under the assumption of sufficient international capital mobility. This test is applied to the Swedish target zone during February 1986-February 1990. Under the additional assumption of uncovered interest rate parity, an equivalent test is whether expected future exchange rates are outside the exchange rate band. In addition, the expected future exchange rates are used to give an estimate of the probability of future devaluations.

How Should Monetary Policy be Conducted in an Era of Price Stability?

The paper discusses several issues related to how monetary policy should be conducted in an era of price stability. Low inflation (with base drift in the price level) and price-level stability (without such base drift) are compared, and a suitable loss function (corresponding to flexible inflation targeting) is discussed, including the index and level for the inflation target. Three ways of maintaining price stability are examined, namely (1) a commitment to a simple instrument rule, (2) "forecast targeting," and (3) monetary targeting. Both (1) and (3) are found to be inferior to forecast targeting in maintaining price stability. The benefits of credibility (private inflation expectations coinciding with the inflation target) are discussed. Credibility improves the tradeoff between inflation variability, output-gap variability and instrument variability and makes it easier for the central bank to meet its inflation target. The threat of deflation and a liquidity trap is examined. Transparent inflation targeting and a contingency plan with emergency measures, including a coordinated fiscal and monetary expansion, are likely to avoid a liquidity trap, but also contribute to escaping from one if already trapped.

Targeting versus instrument rules for monetary policy: what is wrong with McCallum and Nelson?

In their paper "Targeting versus Instrument Rules for Monetary Policy," McCallum and Nelson critique targeting rules for the analysis of monetary policy. Their arguments are rebutted here. First, McCallum and Nelson's preference to study the robustness of simple monetary policy rules is no reason at all to limit attention to simple instrument rules; simple targeting rules may have more desirable properties. Second, optimal targeting rules are a compact, robust, and structural description of goal-directed monetary policy, analogous to the compact, robust, and structural consumption Euler conditions in the theory of consumption. They express the very robust condition of equality of the marginal rates of substitution and transformation between the central bank's target variables. Indeed, they provide desirable micro foundations of monetary policy. Third, under realistic information assumptions, the instrument rule analog to any targeting rule that McCallum and Nelson have proposed results in very large instrument rate volatility and is also, for other reasons, inferior to a targeting rule.Monetary policy

Monetary Policy and Japan’s Liquidity Trap

During the long economic slump in Japan, monetary policy in Japan has essentially consisted of a very low interest rate (since 1995), a zero interest rate (since 1999), and quantitative easing (since 2001). The intention seems to have been to lower expectations of future interest rates. But the problem in a liquidity trap (when the zero lower bound on the central bank’s instrument rate is strictly binding) is rather to raise private-sector expectations of the future price level. Increased expectations of a higher future price level are likely to be much more effective in reducing the real interest rate and stimulating the economy out of a liquidity trap than a further reduction of already very low expectations of future interest rates. Therefore, monetarypolicy alternatives in a liquidity trap should be assessed according to how effective they are likely to be in affecting private-sector expectations of the future price level. Expectations of a higher future price level would lead to current depreciation of the currency. Quantitative easing would induce expectations of a higher price level if it were expected to be permanent. The absence of a depreciation of the yen and other evidence indicates that the quantitative easing is not expected to be permanent. In an open economy, the Foolproof Way (consisting of a price-level target path, currency depreciation and commitment to a currency peg and a zero interest rate until the price-level target path has been reached) is likely to be the most effective policy to raise expectations of the future price level, stimulate the economy, and escape from a liquidity trap. It is the first-best policy to end stagnation and deflation in Japan. The Foolproof Way without the explicit exchange-rate policy, namely a price-level target path and a commitment to a zero interest rate until the price-level target path has been reached, would be a second-best policy. The current policy, a commitment to a zero interest rate until inflation has become nonnegative is at best a third-best policy, since it accommodates all deflation that has occurred before inflation turns nonnegative and therefore is not effective in inducing inflation expectations.