124 research outputs found

    Game-Theoretic Model of Incentivizing Privacy-Aware Users to Consent to Location Tracking

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    Nowadays, mobile users have a vast number of applications and services at their disposal. Each of these might impose some privacy threats on users' "Personally Identifiable Information" (PII). Location privacy is a crucial part of PII, and as such, privacy-aware users wish to maximize it. This privacy can be, for instance, threatened by a company, which collects users' traces and shares them with third parties. To maximize their location privacy, users can decide to get offline so that the company cannot localize their devices. The longer a user stays connected to a network, the more services he might receive, but his location privacy decreases. In this paper, we analyze the trade-off between location privacy, the level of services that a user experiences, and the profit of the company. To this end, we formulate a Stackelberg Bayesian game between the User (follower) and the Company (leader). We present theoretical results characterizing the equilibria of the game. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to model the economically rational decision-making of the service provider (i.e., the Company) in conjunction with the rational decision-making of users who wish to protect their location privacy. To evaluate the performance of our approach, we have used real-data from a testbed, and we have also shown that the game-theoretic strategy of the Company outperforms non-strategic methods. Finally, we have considered different User privacy types, and have determined the service level that incentivizes the User to stay connected as long as possible.Comment: 8 pages, 7 figures, In Proceedings of 2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISP

    Selecting Security Mechanisms in Secure Tropos

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    An options approach to cybersecurity investment

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    Cybersecurity has become a key factor that determines the success or failure of companies that rely on information systems. Therefore, investment in cybersecurity is an important financial and operational decision. Typical information technology investments aim to create value, whereas cybersecurity investments aim to minimize loss incurred by cyber attacks. Admittedly, cybersecurity investment has become an increasingly complex one, since information systems are typically subject to frequent attacks, whose arrival and impact fluctuate stochastically. Furthermore, cybersecurity measures and improvements, such as patches, become available at random points in time making investment decisions even more challenging. We propose and develop an analytical real options framework that incorporates major components relevant to cybersecurity practice, and analyze how optimal cybersecurity investment decisions perform for a private firm. The novelty of this paper is that it provides analytical solutions that lend themselves to intuitive interpretations regarding the effect of timing and cybersecurity risk on investment behavior using real options theory. Such aspects are frequently not implemented within economic models that support policy initiatives. However, if these are not properly understood, security controls will not be properly set resulting in a dynamic inefficiency reflected in cycles of over or under investment, and, in turn, increased cybersecurity risk following corrective policy actions. Results indicate that greater uncertainty over the cost of cybersecurity attacks raises the value of an embedded option to invest in cybersecurity. This increases the incentive to suspend operations temporarily in order to install a cybersecurity patch that will make the firm more resilient to cybersecurity breaches. Similarly, greater likelihood associated with the availability of a cybersecurity patch increases the value of the option to invest in cybersecurity. However, the absence of an embedded investment option increases the incentive to delay the permanent abandonment of the company’s operation due to the irreversible nature of the decision

    How secure is home: assessing human susceptibility to IoT threats

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    The use of Internet of Things (IoT) devices within the home has become more popular in recent years and with the COVID-19 pandemic more employees are working from home. Risk management has become decentralised, which is problematic for organisations since potential risks towards the company can not be controlled in a standardised and formal way. On the other side, users are suffering from smart home attacks due to the nature of IoT such as its heterogeneity and non-standardised architecture. However, the behaviour and attitudes of the user can dictate the increase or decrease of risk and possible losses due to the end user’s responsibility within the IoT life cycle. In this paper, we suggest that a user’s behaviour and attitude towards IoT devices within the smart home is imperative when designing a risk model for the home. We then consider the human element in the risk assessment process in IoT. We present a Smart Home Behaviour and Attitude Risk Model (SH-BARM) to discuss the importance of human behaviour and attitudes within the home and propose a solution to that will aid smart home inhabitants and organisations

    Game-theoretic decision support for cyber forensic investigations

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    The use of anti-forensic techniques is a very common practice that stealthy adversaries may deploy to minimise their traces and make the investigation of an incident harder by evading detection and attribution. In this paper, we study the interaction between a cyber forensic Investigator and a strategic Attacker using a game-theoretic framework. This is based on a Bayesian game of incomplete information played on a multi-host cyber forensics investigation graph of actions traversed by both players. The edges of the graph represent players’ actions across different hosts in a network. In alignment with the concept of Bayesian games, we define 8 two Attacker types to represent their ability of deploying anti-forensic techniques to conceal their activities. In this way, our model allows the Investigator to identify her optimal investigating 10 policy taking into consideration the cost and impact of the available actions, while coping with the uncertainty of the Attacker’s type and strategic decisions. To evaluate our model, we construct a realistic case study based on threat reports and data extracted from the MITRE ATT&CK STIX repository, Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), and interviews with cyber-security practitioners. We use the case study to compare the performance of the proposed method against 15 two other investigative methods and three different types of Attackers
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