Recent evolution of large-value payment systems : balancing liquidity and risk

Large-value payment systems have evolved rapidly in the last 20 years, continually striking a balance between providing liquidity and keeping settlement risk under control. Changes to the design or to the risk management policies of such systems were needed, in part, due to the growth in the value of transactions on these systems. For example, in the United States the value of transactions on Fedwire, the Federal Reserve’s large-value payment system, increased from about 50 times GDP in 1989 to over 62 times GDP in 2003. This value exceeded $704 trillion in 2003. This growth raised concerns that the settlement failure of a large institution could pose severe economic consequences. The disruption in settlements after September 11, 2001, brought new focus to questions such as: How reliable are the payment systems? How should liquidity be provided to system participants? And how can central banks protect themselves from excessive risk? Martin considers the evolution of large-value payment systems in light of the trade-off between providing liquidity and limiting settlement risk. First, he provides some background on large-value payment systems and discusses the trade-off between providing liquidity and controlling settlement risk. Second, he describes the recent evolution of payment systems and explains how this evolution was spurred by increasing concerns about settlement failure, particularly in the EU, the United States, and Canada. Third, he explains some of the differences between three of the major large-value payment systems. Finally, he describes how technological progress and faster computers are allowing new systems to combine the best features of delayed net settlement and real-time gross settlement systems. These systems could offer a better trade-off between liquidity and risk.Payment systems

An economic analysis of liquidity-saving mechanisms

A recent innovation in large-value payments systems has been the design and implementation of liquidity-saving mechanisms (LSMs), tools used in conjunction with real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems. LSMs give system participants, such as banks, an option not offered by RTGS alone: they can queue their outgoing payments. Queued payments are released if some prespecified event occurs. LSMs can reduce the amount of central bank balances necessary to operate a payments system as well as quicken settlement. This article analyzes the performance of RTGS systems with and without the addition of an LSM. The authors find that, in terms of settling payments early, these mechanisms typically outperform pure RTGS systems. However, there are times when RTGS systems can be preferable to LSMs, such as when many banks that send payments early in RTGS choose to queue their payments when an LSM is available. The authors also show that the design of a liquidity-saving mechanism has important implications for the welfare of system participants, even in the absence of payment netting. In particular, the parameters specified determine whether the addition of an LSM increases or decreases welfare.Payment systems ; Banks and banking, Central ; Bank liquidity

Banks, Markets, and Efficiency

Following Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004) we use a model in which financial market access of households restrains the efficiency of the liquidity insurance that banks' deposit contracts provide to households that are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. But in contrast to these approaches we assume spacial monopolistic competition among banks. Since monopoly rents are assumed to bring about inefficiencies, improved financial market access that limits monopoly rents also entails a positive effect. But this beneficial effect is only relevant if competition among banks does not sufficiently restrain monopoly rents already. Thus our results suggest that in the bank-dominated financial system of Germany, in which banks intensely compete for households' deposits, improved financial market access might reduce welfare because it only reduces risk sharing. In contrast, in the banking system of the U.S., with less competition for households' deposits, a high level of households' financial market participation might be beneficial.Financial Intermediaries, Risk Sharing, Banking Competition, Comparing Financial Systems

Banks, markets, and efficiency

Following Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004) we use a model in which financial market access of households restrains the efficiency of the liquidity insurance that banks' deposit contracts provide to households that are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. But in contrast to these approaches we assume spacial monopolistic competition among banks. Since monopoly rents are assumed to bring about inefficiencies, improved financial market access that limits monopoly rents also entails a positive effect. But this beneficial effect is only relevant if competition among banks does not sufficiently restrain monopoly rents already. Thus our results suggest that in the bank-dominated financial system of Germany, in which banks intensely compete for households' deposits, improved financial market access might reduce welfare because it only reduces risk sharing. In contrast, in the banking system of the U.S., with less competition for households' deposits, a high level of households' financial market participation might be beneficial. --Financial Intermediaries,Risk Sharing,Banking Competition,Comparing Financial Systems

Monetary policy implementation: common goals but different practices

While the goals that guide monetary policy in different countries are very similar, central banks diverge in their methods of implementing policy. This study of the policy frameworks of four central banks—the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank—focuses on two notable areas of difference. The first is the choice of an interest rate target, a standard feature of conventional monetary policy. The second is the choice of instruments for managing the central banks’ expanded balance sheets—a decision made necessary by the banks’ unconventional practice of acquiring large quantities of assets during the financial crisis.Banks and banking, Central ; Monetary policy ; European Central Bank ; Federal Reserve System ; Bank of England ; Swiss National Bank ; Interest rates ; Assets (Accounting)

Optimality of the Friedman Rule in Overlapping Generations Model with Spatial Separation

Recent papers suggest that when intermediation is analyzed seriously, the Friedman rule does not maximize social welfare in overlapping generations model in which money is valued because of spatial separation and limited communication. These papers emphasize a trade-off between productive efficiency and risk sharing. We show financial intermediation or a trade-off between productive efficiency and risk sharing are neither necessary nor sufficient for that result. We give conditions under which the Friedman rule maximizes social welfare and show any feasible allocation such that money grows faster than the Friedman rule is Pareto dominated by a feasible allocation with the Friedman rule. The key to the results is the ability to make intergenerational transfers.monetary policy, Friedman rule, fiat money

A guide to deposit insurance reform

Deposit insurance was introduced in the United States during the Great Depression primarily to promote financial stability. Stability is enhanced because deposit insurance reduces the likelihood of a bank run. During its first four decades, deposit insurance appeared to work well as few banks failed. But in the 1980s, a wave of financial troubles in the banking and thrift industry exposed an unfortunate side of deposit insurance-moral hazard. In other words, deposit insurance encouraged undercapitalized depository institutions to take excessive risk. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, or FDICIA, was designed to prevent moral hazard, which many observers claim was a major cause of the 1980s crisis. ; Today's banking system is not in crisis. In fact, most banks are doing well. Still, both houses of Congress are debating new ways to reform deposit insurance. The view of many in the banking industry is that currently deposit insurance has a number of flaws. ; Martin provides a guide to key issues in the current deposit insurance debate. He gives a brief history of deposit insurance, exploring the roots of the problems that concern the industry today. Next, he provides an overview of the current reform proposals as they relate to three issues: the size of the fund, the structure of insurance premiums and rebates, and insurance coverage.Deposit insurance

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. This paper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. We consider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications for optimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held among banks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregate liquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Two different instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required to cope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs.Bank liquidity, interbank markets, central bank policy, financial fragility, bank runs.

Rediscounting Under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature, these policies are indistinguishable. However, Freeman's argument that the central bank should absorb losses associated with default to provide risk-sharing stands in stark contrast to the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses and Freeman's argument breaks down. However, we show that policies resembling discount window lending and open market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy is for the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. By making them compete with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the economy.Payment, clearing, and settlement systems; Financial markets; Central bank research