100 research outputs found

    Multi-Service Serial Cost Sharing: A Characterization of the Moulin-Shenker Rule

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    We focus on the Moulin-Shenker cost sharing rule as a natural extension of the serial rule to multi-service facilities where services are personalized. We show that it is the unique regular rule that is compatible with scale invariance and self consistency.Serial cost sharing;multi-service facilities

    General Aggregation of Demand and Cost Sharing Methods

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    econometric models;demand;cost sharing

    Multi-Service Serial Cost Sharing:A Characterization of the Moulin-Shenker Rule

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    We focus on the Moulin-Shenker cost sharing rule as a natural extension of the serial rule to multi-service facilities where services are personalized. We show that it is the unique regular rule that is compatible with scale invariance and self consistency

    Cost Allocation in a Bank ATM Network

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    We consider a situation in which a group of banks consider connecting their Automated TellerMachines (ATMs) in a network, so that the banks customers may use ATMs of any bank in the network.The problem studied is that of allocating the total transaction costs arising in the network, among the participating banks.The situation is modeled as a cooperative game with transferable utility. We propose two allocation rules, and discuss their relation to the core and other well-known solution concepts, as well as to population monotonicity.cost allocation;banks;networks;transaction costs

    Core Representations of the Standard Fixed Tree Game

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    This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We introduce the concept of a weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. The notion of home-down allocation is developed to create further insight in the local behavior of the weighted constrained egalitarian allocation. A similar and dual approach by the notion of down-home allocations gives us the class of weighted Shapley values. The constrained egalitarian solution is characterized in terms of a cost sharing mechanism.Cooperative game theory;tree games;core;weighted constrained egalitarian solution

    Multi-Service Serial Cost Sharing:An Incompatibility with Smoothness

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    We focus on the radial serial rule as a natural extension of the Moulin-Shenker cost sharing rule. We show that it is the unique regular rule that is compatible with the radial serial principle. In particular this shows the incompatability of the serial prionciple with differentiability of a cost sharing rule as a function of the individual demands.

    Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Public Projects

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    The problem of financing a set of public goods (facilities, projects) by private contri- butions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game, is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This contribution game is shown to be best-response equivalent with a coordination game in which the payoff to all players is the utilitarian collective welfare function, i.e., the sum of the utility functions of the players. Several equilibrium proper- ties are derived: no money is wasted in an equilibrium; a player whose necessary projects are not all realized does not contribute. Strategy profiles maximizing utilitarian welfare are strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Each strong Nash equilibrium corre- sponds to a core element of the realization game in a natural way. It is shown that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game and the largest set of core elements of the realization game, that is consistent with maximizing the number of players with non-zero payoffs. It is precisely the subset of the core according to which rewards zero indicate null players

    Multi-Service Serial Cost Sharing: An Incompatibility with Smoothness

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    We focus on the radial serial rule as a natural extension of the Moulin-Shenker cost sharing rule. We show that it is the unique regular rule that is compatible with the radial serial principle. In particular this shows the incompatability of the serial prionciple with differentiability of a cost sharing rule as a function of the individual demands.Cost-sharing;serial rule;multi-service facilities

    Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games

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    The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987,1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It is shown that in general there is at most one such weighted egalitarian solution for TU-games. Existence is proved for the class of convex games. Furthermore, the core of a postive valued convex game is covered by weighted constrained egalitarian solutions.Cooperative game theory;inequality;egalitarianism;Lorenz-ordering;core
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