Can Social Norms Affect the International Allocation of Innovation?

If economic agents coordinate on social norms more oriented towards the protection of national industries, an asymmetric international specialization in the research and development (R&D) arises even in a tariff free world with no a priori differences across countries in endowments, demography or technology. This paper exploits the indifference in the composition of R&D expenditure across sectors of the typical multi-sector Schumpeterian framework (forward-looking decisions, CRS R&D technology and free entry) to construct a theory of the international allocation of innovation and education based on sunspot equilibrium. A role for industrial policies as mere coordination devices emerges in an international Schumpeterian framework. The implications for the relationships between inequality and growth are examined.Schumpeterian Growth Theory, Inequality, International Trade, Social Norms, Indeterminacy, Sunspots.

Why the Rich Should Like R&D Less

It is well known that research and development (R&D) is an important engine for economic growth. Also, initial wealth inequality and subsequent economic growth are well known to be related. This paper links inequality and R&D-driven growth. It shows that in a class of economies where R&D is the main engine for growth, different wealth groups differ in their desire for aggregate innovative efforts: the higher the profit share of the individual's incomes the lower their ideal aggregate R&D and innovation. If rich shareholders were able to pursue their common interest and to discourage too much R&D compared, then a pro-labour government able to impose distortionary progressive taxation, by minimizing the difference between the rich and the poor can maximize growth. Such predicted negative relationship between desired R&D and dynastic wealth is robust to any subsidy rate lower than 100%R&D and Growth; Social Preferences for Innovation; Inequality, Redistribution and Growth.

Wealth Polarization and Pulverization in Fractal Societies.

In this paper we study the geometrical properties of the support of the limit distributions of income/wealth in economies with uninsurable individual risk, and how they are affected by technology and preference parameters and by policy variables. We work out two simple successive generation models with stochastic human capital accumulation and with R&D and we prove that intense technological progress makes the support of the wealth distribution converge to a fractal Cantor-like set. Such limit distribution implies the disappearance of the middle class, with a “gap” between two polarized wealth clusters that widens as the growth rate becomes higher. Hence, we claim that in a highly meritocratic world in which the payoff of the successful individuals is high enough, and in which social mobility is strong, societies tend to look highly “fractalized”. We also show that a redistribution scheme financed by proportional taxation does not help cure society’s disconnection/polarization; on the contrary, it might increase it. Finally we show that these results are not confined to our analytically worked out examples but are easily extended to a widely used class of macroeconomic and growth models.Inequality and Growth; Education; Technological Change; Wealth Polarization/ Pulverization; Iterated Function System; Attractor; Fractal; Cantor Set; Invariant Distribution

Upstream Innovation Protection: Common Law Evolution and the Dynamics of Wage Inequality

What is the most innovation-enhancing level of patent protection for the new ideas generated within the framework of multi-stage sequential innovation? How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, education, and wage inequality? What does the common law system imply on the macroeconomic responses to institutional change? We show how the jurisprudential changes in intellectual property rights witnessed in the US after 1980 can be related to the well-known increase in wage inequality and in education attainments. A Schumpeterian general equilibrium approach is followed.Basic and Applied R&D, Sequential Innovation, Skill Premium, Inequality and Education, Research Exemption, Common Law

Government spending composition, technical change and wage inequality

In this paper we argue that government spending played a significant role in stimulating the wave of innovation that hit the U.S. economy in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, as well as the simultaneous increase in inequality and in education attainment. Since the late 1970’s U.S. policy makers began targeting commercial innovations more directly and explicitly. We focus on the shift in the composition of public demand towards high-tech goods which, by increasing the market-size of innovative firms, functions as a de-facto innovation policy tool. We build a quality-ladder non- scale growth model with heterogeneous industries and endogenous supply of skills, and show that increases in the technological content of public spending stimulates R&D, raise the wage of skilled workers and, at the same time, stimulate human capital accumulation. A calibrated version of the model suggests that government policy explains between 12 and 15 percent of the observed increase in wage inequality in the period 1976-91.R&D-driven growth theory, heteregeneous industries, fiscal policy composition, innovation policy, wage inequality, educational choice.

Technology Policy and Wage Inequality

In this paper we argue that government procurement policy played a role in stimulating the wave of innovation that hit the US economy in the 1980s, as well as the simultaneous increase in inequality and in education attainment. Since the early 1980s U.S. policy makers began targeting commercial innovations more directly and explicitly. We focus on the shift in the composition of public demand towards high-tech goods which, by increasing the market-size of innovative …rms, functions as a de-facto innovation policy tool. We build a quality-ladders non-scale growth model with heterogeneous industries and endogenous supply of skills, and show both theoretically and empirically that increases in the technological content of public spending stimulates R&D, raises the wage of skilled workers and, at the same time, stimulates human capital accumulation. A calibrated version of the model suggests that government policy explains up to 32 percent of the observed increase in wage inequality in the period 1978-91.R&D-driven growth theory, government procurement, wage inequality, educational choice, technology policy.

Citations Profile and the Complexity of Innovation

Patent or article citations reflect the consequences of a published idea on the discovery of new ideas. We draw a simple theoretical model predicting that the shape of the future citations of an idea can reveal the complexity of its innovative research spillover. We apply this method to the patent forward citations in the US industries.Patent Forward Citations, Technological Complexity, Skewness.

Privatization of Knowledge: Did the U.S. Get It Right? (New Version).

To foster innovation and growth should basic research be publicly or privately funded? This paper studies the impact of the gradual shift in the U.S. patent system towards the patentability and commercialization of the basic R&D undertaken by universities. We see this movement as making universities becoming responsive to "market" forces. Prior to 1980, universities undertook research using an exogenous stock of researchers that were motivated by "curiosity." After 1980, universities patent their research and behave as private firms. This move, in a context of two-stage inventions (basic and applied research) has an a priori ambiguous effect on innovation and welfare. We build a Schumpeterian model and match it to the data to assess this important turning point.R&D and Growth; Sequential Innovation; Basic Research; Patent Laws.

Upstream innovation protection: common law evolution and the dynamics of wage inequality

The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth, and this question has not been explored in much detail so far. How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, education, and wage inequality? In the US, what does the common law system imply on the macroeconomic responses to institutional change? This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. We consider three issues (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual property rights; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators; and (c) the implications of strengthening patent protection on wage inequality and growth. We show analytically and numerically how the jurisprudential changes in intellectual property rights witnessed in the US after 1980 can be related to the well-known changes in wage inequality and in education attainments. Basic research patents may have grown disproportionately due increasing jurisdictional protection, eventually compromising applied innovation, education, and growth. By simulations, we show that the dynamic general equilibrium interations may mislead the econometric assessment of the temporary vs persistent effects IPR policy.Basic and Applied R&D; Two-Stage Sequential Innovation; Skill Premium; Inequality and Education; Common Law.

Privatization of Knowledge: Did the U.S. Get It Right?

Brilliant ideas are key to economic growth. They often emerge from scientific discoveries with no immediate commercial value - so rewards may not be aligned to effort. Should basic research be publicly or privately funded? And, to foster innovation and growth, what kinds of discovery should be protected? Post 1980, the US intellectual property institutions facilitated the patentability of basic research. The European and other patenting regimes are slowly changing in the same direction, also encouraged by TRIPs. Did the US choose the better path? We build a Schumpeterian model to re-assess this important turning point.R&D and Growth, Sequential Innovation, Research Tools, Patent Laws, Kremer Mechanism