222 research outputs found
On the Role of AI in the Ongoing Paradigm Shift within the Cognitive Sciences
This paper supports the view that the ongoing shift from orthodox to embodied-embedded cognitive science has been significantly influenced by the experimental results generated by AI research. Recently, there has also been a noticeable shift toward enactivism, a paradigm which radicalizes the embodied-embedded approach by placing autonomous agency and lived subjectivity at the heart of cognitive science. Some first steps toward a clarification of the relationship of AI to this further shift are outlined. It is concluded that the success of enactivism in establishing itself as a mainstream cognitive science research program will depend less on progress made in AI research and more on the development of a phenomenological pragmatics
Lost in the socially extended mind: Genuine intersubjectivity and disturbed self-other demarcation in schizophrenia
Much of the characteristic symptomatology of schizophrenia can be understood as resulting from a pervasive sense of disembodiment. The body is experienced as an external machine that needs to be controlled with explicit intentional commands, which in turn leads to severe difficulties in interacting with the world in a fluid and intuitive manner. In consequence, there is a characteristic dissociality: Others become problems to be solved by intellectual effort and no longer present opportunities for spontaneous interpersonal alignment. This dissociality goes hand in hand with a progressive loss of the socially extended mind, which normally affords opportunities for co-regulation of cognitive and affective processes. However, at times people with schizophrenia report that they are confronted by the opposite of this dissociality, namely an unusual fluidity of the self-other boundary as expressed in experiences of ambiguous body boundaries, intrusions, and even merging with others. Here the person has not lost access to the socially extended mind but has instead become lost in it, possibly due to a weakened sense of self. We argue that this neglected aspect of schizophrenic social dysfunction can be usefully approached via the concept of genuine intersubjectivity: We normally participate in a shared experience with another person by implicitly co-regulating how our interaction unfolds. This co-regulation integrates our respective experienceâs dynamical bases into one interpersonal process and gives the interaction an ambiguous second-person character. The upshot is that reports of abnormal
self-other fluidity are not indicative of hallucinations without any basis in reality, but of a heightened sensitivity and vulnerability to processes of interpersonal alignment and mutual incorporation that form the normal basis of social life. We conclude by discussing implications of this view for both the science of consciousness as well as approaches to intervention and therapy
The direct perception hypothesis: perceiving the intention of anotherâs action hinders its precise imitation
We argue that imitation is a learning response to unintelligible actions, especially to social conventions. Various strands of evidence are converging on this conclusion, but further progress has been hampered by an outdated theory of perceptual experience. Comparative psychology continues to be premised on the doctrine that humans and nonhuman primates only perceive othersâ physical âsurface behaviorâ, while mental states are perceptually inaccessible. However, a growing consensus in social cognition research accepts the Direct Perception Hypothesis: primarily we see what others aim to do; we do not infer it from their motions. Indeed, physical details are overlooked â unless the action is unintelligible. On this basis we hypothesize that apesâ propensity to copy the goal of an action, rather than its precise means, is largely dependent on its perceived intelligibility. Conversely, children copy means more often than adults and apes because, uniquely, much adult human behavior is completely unintelligible to unenculturated observers due to the pervasiveness of arbitrary social conventions, as exemplified by customs, rituals, and languages. We expect the propensity to imitate to be inversely correlated with the familiarity of cultural practices, as indexed by age and/or socio-cultural competence. The Direct Perception Hypothesis thereby helps to parsimoniously explain the most important findings of imitation research, including childrenâs over-imitation and other species-typical and age-related variations
Where there is life there is mind: In support of a strong life-mind continuity thesis
This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is entropy. The paper then argues that there is no singular interpretation of the FEP for thinking about the relation between life and mind. Some FEP formulations express what we call an independence view of life and mind. One independence view is a cognitivist view of the FEP. It turns on information processing with semantic content, thus restricting the range of systems capable of exhibiting mentality. Other independence views exemplify what we call an overly generous non-cognitivist view of the FEP, and these appear to go in the opposite direction. That is, they imply that mentality is nearly everywhere. The paper proceeds to argue that non-cognitivist FEP, and its implications for thinking about the relation between life and mind, can be usefully constrained by key ideas in recent enactive approaches to cognitive science. We conclude that the most compelling account of the relationship between life and mind treats them as strongly continuous, and that this continuity is based on particular concepts of life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and non-semantic)
Motility at the origin of life: Its characterization and a model
Due to recent advances in synthetic biology and artificial life, the origin
of life is currently a hot topic of research. We review the literature and
argue that the two traditionally competing "replicator-first" and
"metabolism-first" approaches are merging into one integrated theory of
individuation and evolution. We contribute to the maturation of this more
inclusive approach by highlighting some problematic assumptions that still lead
to an impoverished conception of the phenomenon of life. In particular, we
argue that the new consensus has so far failed to consider the relevance of
intermediate timescales. We propose that an adequate theory of life must
account for the fact that all living beings are situated in at least four
distinct timescales, which are typically associated with metabolism, motility,
development, and evolution. On this view, self-movement, adaptive behavior and
morphological changes could have already been present at the origin of life. In
order to illustrate this possibility we analyze a minimal model of life-like
phenomena, namely of precarious, individuated, dissipative structures that can
be found in simple reaction-diffusion systems. Based on our analysis we suggest
that processes in intermediate timescales could have already been operative in
prebiotic systems. They may have facilitated and constrained changes occurring
in the faster- and slower-paced timescales of chemical self-individuation and
evolution by natural selection, respectively.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figures, Artificial Lif
Sense-making with a little help from my friends
The work of Ezequiel Di Paolo and Hanne De Jaegher has helped to transform the enactive approach from relative obscurity into a hotly debated contender for the future science of social cognition and cognitive science more generally. In this short introduction I situate their contributions in what I see as important aspects of the bigger picture that is motivating and inspiring them as well as the rest of this young community. In particular, I sketch some of the social issues that go beyond mere academic debate, including how the methods and assumptions that inform orthodox cognitive science are intrinsically related to the critical state of affairs in our world today. I conclude with some personal recollections in order to give an idea of the context in which their ideas, and mine as well, came to fruition
Breathing new life into cognitive science
In this article I take an unusual starting point from which to argue for a unified cognitive science, namely a position defined by what is sometimes called the âlife-mind continuity thesisâ. Accordingly, rather than taking a widely accepted starting point for granted and using it in order to propose answers to some well defined questions, I must first establish that the idea of life-mind continuity can amount to a proper starting point at all. To begin with, I therefore assess the conceptual tools which are available to construct a theory of mind on this basis. By drawing on insights from a variety of disciplines, especially from a combination of existential phenomenology and organism-centered biology, I argue that mind can indeed be conceived as rooted in life, but only if we accept at the same time that social interaction plays a constitutive role for our cognitive capacities
TchnÄ Ä nowe ĆŒycie w kognitywistykÄ
[PrzekĆad] W artykule tym opowiadam siÄ za zunifikowanÄ
kognitywistykÄ
, przyjmujÄ
c dla swej argumentacji niecodzienny punkt wyjĆcia: stanowisko okreĆlane czasem jako âteza o kontinuum ĆŒycia-umysĆuâ. Zamiast wiÄc traktowaÄ jako pewnik powszechnie akceptowane zaĆoĆŒenia poczÄ
tkowe, a nastÄpnie proponowaÄ odpowiedzi na pewne dobrze okreĆlone pytania, muszÄ najpierw dowieĆÄ, ĆŒe koncepcja kontinuum ĆŒycia-umysĆu moĆŒe w ogĂłle stanowiÄ wĆaĆciwy punkt startowy. ZacznÄ zatem od oceny pojÄciowych narzÄdzi, odpowiednich do budowania teorii umysĆu na tej podstawie. CzerpiÄ
c spostrzeĆŒenia z wielu rĂłĆŒnych dziedzin â szczegĂłlnie z poĆÄ
czenia egzystencjalistycznej fenomenologii ze skoncentrowanÄ
na organizmie biologiÄ
â dowodzÄ, ĆŒe moĆŒna pojmowaÄ umysĆ jako zakorzeniony w ĆŒyciu, ale tylko wtedy, gdy rĂłwnoczeĆnie zgodzimy siÄ, ĆŒe interakcja spoĆeczna gra konstytutywnÄ
rolÄ w naszych zdolnoĆciach poznawczych
- âŠ