1,958 research outputs found
The Econometrics of Social Networks
In a social network, agents have their own reference group that may influence their behavior. In turn, the agents' attributes and their behavior affect the formation and the structure of the social network. We survey the econometric literature on both aspects of social networks and discuss the identification and estimation issues they raise.Social network, peer effects, identification, network formation, pair-wise regressions, separability, mutual consent
Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey
This survey covers extensively the theoretical and the empirical work that was done on the incentive effects related to the existence of workers' compensation (WC) in the North American context. It first analyzes the economic rationale for compulsory WC. Then it studies the impact of WC on behavior. Three types of effects can be distinguished: 1) WC may influence frequency, duration and nature of claims through a variety of incentive effects. Under asymmetrical information about accident prevention activities, WC may affect safety behavior of both employers and employees and the risk level in the market place. Under asymmetrical information about the true nature of workplace injuries, insured workers may attempt to report false or off-the-job accidents and to undertake activities in order to obtain higher WC benefits, especially in the case of hard-to-diagnose injuries. Moreover, substitution between WC and other insurance programs may be observed. The decision of reporting a workplace accident may also be affected by the generosity of WC benefits. 2) WC may induce changes in occupational wages rates and 3) WC may affect firms' productivity. So far, the literature has focused mainly on the first type of effects. The main results show that increases in WC insurance are associated with an increase in the frequency of injuries (elasticities ranging from 0.4 to 1), and with an increase in the average duration of claims (elasticities ranging from 0.2 to 0.5). Furthermore, increases in WC are associated with more reporting of injuries that are hard-to-diagnose and, in the same line, there are some evidence (at least in Canada) of substitution between unemployment insurance and WC insurance. Lastly, there are empirical results showing that the presence of WC insurance induces important reductions in wage rates, while an emerging literature suggests that changes in WC insurance may also have negative productivity effects. Cette Ă©tude couvre un grand nombre des travaux thĂ©oriques et empiriques rĂ©alisĂ©s sur les effets incitatifs de l'existence d'indemnisation pour les accidentĂ©s du travail (IAT) dans le contexte nord- amĂ©ricain. Nous analysons d'abord la rationalitĂ© Ă©conomique de l'indemnisation obligatoire des accidentĂ©s du travail. Nous Ă©tudions ensuite l'impact de l'IAT sur le comportement. On peut distinguer trois types d'effets : 1) l'IAT peut influencer la frĂ©quence, la durĂ©e et la nature des rĂ©clamations Ă travers une variĂ©tĂ© d'effets incitatifs. Dans le cas d'information asymĂ©trique sur les activitĂ©s de prĂ©vention des accidents, l'IAT peut affecter les activitĂ©s prĂ©ventives des employĂ©s et des employeurs, ainsi que le niveau de risque sur le marchĂ©. Dans le cas d'information asymĂ©trique sur la vĂ©ritable nature des accidents du travail, les travailleurs assurĂ©s peuvent tenter de dĂ©clarer de faux accidents, ou des accidents survenus Ă l'extĂ©rieur de leur lieu de travail. Ils pourront aussi entreprendre certaines activitĂ©s afin de bĂ©nĂ©ficier d'indemnisations plus Ă©levĂ©es, particuliĂšrement dans le cas de blessures difficiles Ă diagnostiquer. De plus, on peut observer une substitution entre l'IAT et d'autres programmes d'assurance. La dĂ©cision de dĂ©clarer un accident du travail peut Ă©galement ĂȘtre affectĂ©e par la gĂ©nĂ©rositĂ© des prestations. 2) L'IAT peut modifier le taux de salaire des travailleurs et 3) l'IAT peut affecter la productivitĂ© de la firme. Jusqu'Ă prĂ©sent, les Ă©crits ont mis l'accent sur le premier type d'effets. Les principaux rĂ©sultats montrent qu'une hausse de l'IAT est associĂ©e Ă une augmentation de la frĂ©quence des blessures (Ă©lasticitĂ©s entre 0.4 et 1), et Ă une hausse de la durĂ©e moyenne des rĂ©clamations (Ă©lasticitĂ©s entre 0.2 et 0.5). Par ailleurs, on peut constater une relation positive entre l'accroissement de l'IAT et le nombre de blessures difficiles Ă diagnostiquer. Et, dans le mĂȘme ordre d'idĂ©es, les Ă©tudes ont montrĂ© (du moins au Canada) qu'il s'effectue une substitution entre l'assurance chĂŽmage et l'assurance contre les accidents du travail. Enfin, des rĂ©sultats empiriques ont montrĂ© que la prĂ©sence de l'assurance contre les accidents du travail conduit Ă d'importantes rĂ©ductions du taux de salaire, tandis qu'une nouvelle vague d'Ă©tudes suggĂšre que les changements de l'assurance contre les accidents du travail peuvent Ă©galement exercer un effet nĂ©gatif sur la productivitĂ©.Assurance, accidents du travail, sĂ©curitĂ© du travail, incitation, salaires, productivitĂ©, Insurance, workers' compensation, occupational safety and health, incentives, wages, productivity
A Test of Collective Rationality for Multi-Person Households
This paper provides a test of efficiency of consumption decisions in households with many decision-makers. It also presents a method of determining the number of these decision-makers. Information on some distribution factors in needed to implement this approach.Intra-household allocation, Collective model, Polygamy, Extended family, Pareto optimality
Assessing the Impact of Tax and Transfer Policies on Labour Supply: A Survey
Changes in parameters of tax and transfer programs can induce individuals to alter their behaviour in a wide variety of ways, including changes in labour supply, in the nature of employee compensation, in the choice of working in the underground economy, in savings decisions, in human capital investments and in fertility decisions. The magnitude of these responses is of critical importance in the formulation of adequate tax and transfer policies. Thus the behavioural effects of income taxes and those implicit in means-tested transfer programs may strongly influence the impact of these policies on income, tax receipts, budgetary costs and welfare. In this paper, we abide with the tradition of evaluating the impact of tax and transfer programs on labour supply at both the extensive (the decision to work or not) and the intensive margins (the number of hours worked). We provide both a theoretical and empirical survey of the labour supply impact of tax and transfer programs. An important part of the empirical results discussed in this paper focuses on the labour supply impact of tax and transfer reforms that occurred in the US, in the UK and in Canada.
Peer Effects, Fast Food Consumption and Adolescent Weight Gain
This paper aims at opening the black box of peer effects in adolescent weight gain. Using Add Health data on secondary schools in the U.S., we investigate whether these effects partly flow through the eating habits channel. Adolescents are assumed to interact through a friendship social network. We first propose a social interaction model of fast food consumption using a generalized spatial autoregressive approach. We exploit results by BramoullĂ©, Djebbari and Fortin (2009) which show that intransitive links within a network (i.e., a friend of one of my friends is not my friend) help identify peer effects. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood and generalized 2SLS strategies. We also estimate a panel dynamic weight gain production function relating an adolescentâs Body Mass Index (BMI) to his current fast food consumption and his lagged BMI level. Results show that there are positive significant peer effects in fast food consumption among adolescents belonging to a same friendship school network. The estimated social multiplier is 1.59. Our results also suggest that, at the network level, an extra day of weekly fast food restaurant visits increases BMI by 2.4%, when peer effects are taken into account.Obesity, overweight, peer effects, social interactions, fast food, spatial models
Physician Payment Mechanisms, Hospital Length of Stay and Risk of Readmission: a Natural Experiment
We provide an analysis of the effect of physician payment methods on their hospital patientsâ length of stay and risk of readmission. To do so, we exploit a major reform implemented in Quebec (Canada) in 1999. The Quebec Government introduced an optional mixed compensation (MC) scheme for specialist physicians working in hospital. This scheme combines a fixed per diem with a reduced fee for services provided, as an alternative to the traditional fee-for-service system. We develop a simple theoretical model of a physicianâs decision to choose the MC scheme. We show that a physician who adopts this system will have incentives to increase his time per clinical service provided. We demonstrate that as long as this effect does not improve his patientsâ health by more than a critical level, they will stay more days in hospital over the period. At the empirical level, using a large patient-level administrative panel data set from a major teaching hospital, we estimate a model of transition between spells in and out of hospital analog to a difference-in-differences method. The model is based on a two-state Mixed Proportional Hazard approach. We find that the hospital length of stay of patients treated in departments that opted for the MC system increased on average by 10.8% (0.71 days). However, the risk of readmission to the same department with the same diagnosis does not appear to be overall affected by the reform.Physician payment mechanisms, mixed compensation, hospital length of stay, risk of re-hospitalisation, duration model, natural experiment
RĂ©cents dĂ©veloppements dans lâanalyse de lâoffre de travail
Cet article prĂ©sente une recension de certaines contributions rĂ©centes Ă lâanalyse de lâoffre de travail. On Ă©tablit dâabord une distinction fondamentale entre les modĂšles walrassiens et non walrassiens dâoffre de travail. Les premiers se caractĂ©risent par lâhypothĂšse que les individus sont toujours sur leur courbe dâoffre notionnelle de travail. On discute de façon critique des rĂ©sultats obtenus dans les Ă©tudes qui ont adoptĂ© ce paradigme. On porte une attention particuliĂšre aux modĂšles rĂ©cents qui nâimposent pas la sĂ©parabilitĂ© intertemporelle des prĂ©fĂ©rences.On analyse ensuite certains modĂšles non walrassiens qui donnent lieu Ă la possibilitĂ© dâun rationnement quantitatif des heures de travail observĂ©es. Ces modĂšles sont classĂ©s en trois catĂ©gories : 1) les modĂšles avec rationnement quantitatif exogĂšne, 2) les modĂšles hĂ©donistes dâoffre de travail et 3) les modĂšles de contrats implicites. Pour chacune de ces catĂ©gories, on analyse la structure des modĂšles thĂ©oriques retenus, ainsi que les rĂ©sultats empiriques obtenus dans la littĂ©rature pertinente. On discute en particulier des tests permettant de discriminer entre les modĂšles walrassiens et non walrassiens
DĂ©pendance Ă lâĂ©gard de lâaide sociale et rĂ©forme de la sĂ©curitĂ© du revenu
Lâobjectif principal de cet article est dâanalyser les facteurs qui influencent la dynamique des sĂ©jours Ă lâaide sociale des mĂ©nages. On distingue quatre ensembles de variables : les variables qui affectent les conditions de travail ainsi que les prĂ©fĂ©rences des mĂ©nages; les variables influençant le rationnement sur le marchĂ© du travail; les paramĂštres du programme dâaide et des autres programmes sociaux. On met en particulier lâaccent sur la nature dynamique de la dĂ©pendance Ă lâaide en insistant sur les liens existant entre la participation prĂ©sente et future Ă lâaide. On prĂ©sente en outre les rĂ©sultats empiriques tirĂ©s dâĂ©tudes Ă©conomĂ©triques sur la question et appliquĂ©s au QuĂ©bec. Enfin, on tire des conclusions de cette analyse sur la rĂ©cente rĂ©forme de lâaide sociale proposĂ©e par le gouvernement du QuĂ©bec.The principal aim of this paper is to present an analysis of the factors that influence the dynamics of welfare spells among households. Four sets of variables are distinguished: variables that affect work conditions and individual preferences; variables that influence labour market rationing; parameters of the welfare program and of other social programs. A particular emphasis is put on the dynamic nature of welfare dependency and on the links relating present and future welfare participation. Econometric results applied to Quebec are also discussed. Finally, conclusions from this analysis are drawn concerning the recent welfare reform proposed by the Quebec Government
Alien Registration- Fortin, Bernard (Fort Fairfield, Aroostook County)
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