Endogenous capital depreciation and technology shocks

I examine the dynamic impact of capital maintenance on key aggregates through the depreciation rate. I find that two factors are crucial for the short-run effects of Total Factor Productivity and Investment-Specific shocks: (i) the marginal efficiency of maintenance and its connection with the rate of utilization, and (ii) the interplay between the intertemporal effect of maintenance and the substitution effect between maintenance and utilization. The latter is expressed by the relative size of the elasticity of maintenance to the Hicksian elasticity of complementarity between maintenance and utilization. These theoretical results suggest that to match the observed responses of the macroeconomic aggregates the sign of the cross derivative should be negative and that the relative size of the Hicksian elasticity should be smaller than the maintenance elasticity of marginal depreciation. Finally, the model suggests that the main macroeconomic aggregates react procyclically, with the exception of maintenance, the behavior of which depends on the type of the shock

Real effects of bank capital regulations: global evidence

We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998-2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth

Bank enforcement actions and the terms of lending

Formal enforcement actions issued against banks for violations of laws and regulations related to safety and soundness can theoretically have both positive and negative effects on the terms of lending. Using hand-collected data on such enforcement actions issued against U.S. banks, we show that they have a strong negative effect on price terms (loan spreads and fees) for corporate loans and a positive one on non-price terms (loan maturity, size, covenants, and collateral). The results also indicate that in the absence of enforcement actions, the cost of borrowing during the subprime crisis would have been much higher, while punished banks intensify use of collateral

Enforcement of banking regulation and the cost of borrowing

We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement.36 month embargo - ACUpdate issue date during checkdate report - A

Education and Credit: A Matthew Effect

Using a unique corporate loans dataset for entrepreneurs with small and microenterprises, this paper examines how educational attainment affects bank credit decisions and subsequent individual and firm outcomes. Our results highlight a “Matthew Effect,” where an initial advantage is self-amplifying. We find that entrepreneurs who obtain university education are more likely to apply for credit, and receive higher credit scores, and better lending terms. Via this credit channel, such entrepreneurs have significantly better future firm outcomes compared to those without a university education. Furthermore, we find a key role for investments in innovation, intangible assets, and lower within-firm pay inequality

Corporate tax changes and credit costs

We examine changes in the corporate tax rate across the U.S. and their implications on the pricing and quantity of loans. We find an asymmetric effect on the cost of credit: loan spreads decrease by approximately 5.9 basis points in response to a one percentage tax cut, but they are insensitive to corporate tax increases. Primarily, a debt restructuring effect (working via firm’s leverage) and, secondarily, a credit supply effect (working via bank market power and bank capital) drive the easing effect of tax cuts on equilibrium loan pricing, while the effect on the equilibrium quantity of loans is insignificant

Author Correction: MUC1-C regulates lineage plasticity driving progression to neuroendocrine prostate cancer

An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via a link at the top of the paper