104 research outputs found

    Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments

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    Subjects submitted strategies for playing a public good game. The strategies interacted with each other in a computer simulation. They could be revised and resubmitted for a second and a third simulation round. The strategies' average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation to the next. The majority of the strategies submitted for the final simulation show the same pattern: In the first period, they signal their willingness to cooperate by contributing the entire endowment to the public good. Then, they reciprocate the others' average contribution in the previous period. In the final period(s), cooperation is given up, whatever the history of the game. Les participants Ă  une expĂ©rience ont soumis des stratĂ©gies pour jouer Ă  un jeu de biens publics. Les stratĂ©gies ont interagi dans une simulation par ordinateur. Les participants ont eu l'opportunitĂ© de rĂ©viser et de re-soumettre leurs stratĂ©gies pour une deuxiĂšme et une troisiĂšme simulation. La contribution moyenne des stratĂ©gies au bien public a augmentĂ© d'une simulation Ă  l'autre. La majoritĂ© des stratĂ©gies soumises montrent le mĂȘme patron de comportement. Dans la premiĂšre pĂ©riode le participant signale sa volontĂ© Ă  coopĂ©rer par une contribution totale au bien public. Puis il s'aligne sur la contribution moyenne faite par les autres dans la pĂ©riode prĂ©cĂ©dente. Dans la (les) pĂ©riode(s) finale(s), la coopĂ©ration est abandonnĂ©e indĂ©pendamment du dĂ©veloppement du jeu.Public goods, experimental economics, strategy method, Biens publics, Ă©conomie expĂ©rimentale, mĂ©thode stratĂ©gique

    Trust and Reputation Building in E-Commerce

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    Transactions on online markets require a great deal of trust among anonymous trading partners. To mitigate some of the risks involved in anonymous transactions, several online market sites have implemented reputation management mechanisms that differ in structure and probably functionality. In a series of experiments, this study examines the impact of two simple reputation management mechanisms on the evolution of trust and trustworthiness in a repeated trust game among strangers. Les transactions par Internet exigent une confiance considérable entre les intervenants anonymes. Pour minimiser les risques associés à des opérations anonymes, les responsables de plusieurs marchés en ligne ont mis en place des mécanismes de gestion de réputation différant en structure et fonctionnalité. Dans une série d'expériences, cette étude évalue l'impact de deux mécanismes relativement simples sur la confiance et la coopération dans un jeu de confiance répété entre étrangers.Trust, Reputation, Experimental Economics, E-commerce, Mondialisation, commerce international, temps de travail, intégration économique

    Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments (followed by a comment by Claude Montmarquette)

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    This text (Keser) is a survey and a discussion of experimental studies on cooperation in public goods experiments. It is followed by a comment (Montmarquette) suggesting some economic applications from these experimental studies. Ce texte (Keser) prĂ©sente une revue et une discussion des Ă©crits de la littĂ©rature en Ă©conomie expĂ©rimentale sur la coopĂ©ration dans la production de biens publics. Le texte est suivi d'un commentaire (Montmarquette) qui met l'accent sur les applications Ă©conomiques que l'on peut tirer de ces Ă©tudes.Experimental economics, public goods, survey, Économie expĂ©rimentale, bien public, revue

    Why Do Experimental Subjects Choose an Equilibrium which Is Neither Payoff Nor Risk Dominant?

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    In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we observe that, in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), only half of the subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium. We propose modified risk dominance as an explanation for the observed deviations from payoff and risk dominance. Dans un jeu de coordination expérimental avec deux équilibres stricts nous observons que, contrairement à la théorie de sélection des équilibres (Harsanyi et Selten 1988), seulement la moitié des participants choisissent la stratégie reliée à l'équilibre qui est simultanément dominante par rapport au gain et dominante par rapport au risque. Nous proposons d'utiliser la dominance au risque modifiée comme explication des déviations observées par rapport à la dominance au gain et la dominance au risque.Equilibrium selection, modified risk dominance, prominence theory, experimental economics, Sélection des équilibres, dominance par rapport au risque modifiée, théorie de la proéminence des nombres, économie expérimentale

    THEORIES OF BEHAVIOR IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH HIDDEN ACTION.

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    In Keser and Willinger (IJIO, 2000) we found that many contracts offered by experimental subjects do not satisfy incentive compatibility. While the combination of incentive compatibility and a binding participation constraint would require that the agent incurs a net loss in the less favorable state for the principal, experimental subjects in the role of principals propose contracts in which the agent never risks to make a loss. We identified in the principals’ decision making three basic principles that, combined together, describe a fair offers area into which a large number of the observed contract offers falls. These principles imply that net expected surplus is more evenly allocated between the principal and the agent than agency theory predicts. The aim of the experiments presented in this paper is to test the robustness of these principles when the effort costs increase and the net expected surplus becomes smaller, and to compare their predictive success to the predictive success of agency theory under the assumption either of a risk-averse or a risk-neutral agent. The results show that the fair offers prediction describes the observed contract offers better than agency theory as long as an important net expected surplus is created. However, when the effort costs are so high that the net expected surplus is negligible, standard agency theory does better than the combination of the three principles in predicting the observed contract offers.

    Voluntary Teaming and Effort

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    In a series of experimental games, each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high payoff for each player for cooperation, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take a free ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less.Team effort, voluntary collaboration, experimental economics

    Voluntary Contributions to Reduce Expected Public Losses

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    In this experimental study we examine behavior relating to voluntary contributions to reduce expected losses associated, for example, with the occurrence of natural disasters or major industrial accidents. We ask subjects to allocate tokens between a private investment and a public investment. The latter investment reduces, for all anonymous members of the group, the probability of a loss. Expected loss without public investment is constant across treatments in which the probability of loss and initial wealth vary. In some of these treatments, the participants play under incomplete information (ambiguity). Non-parametric statistical analyses and parametric regressions yield results that are reasonably consistent with classical studies on voluntary contributions to public goods. The Nash equilibrium, under the assumption of risk neutrality, cannot be construed as representative of typical behavior. The occurrence of a loss increases the probability of playing the Nash strategy at the individual level and decreases the voluntary contributions of the group (the gambler's fallacy), making the prospect of mobilizing the population after a natural disaster more difficult. Dans cette étude expérimentale, nous examinons les déterminants des contributions volontaires visant à réduire les pertes attendues associées à des désastres naturels ou des accidents industriels majeurs. Les sujets doivent allouer leurs jetons entre un investissement privé et un investissement public. Ce dernier investissement réduit, pour tous les membres de l'équipe, la probabilité d'une perte. La perte attendue sans investissement public est constante pour tous les traitements, mais la probabilité d'une perte et la dotation initiale des sujets varie selon les traitements. Dans certains cas, les sujets jouent en situation d'information incomplÚte (ambiguïté). Les analyses non-paramétriques et paramétriques des données donnent des résultats cohérents avec les études classiques sur les contributions volontaires dans les biens publics. En retenant l'hypothÚse que les sujets sont neutres au risque, nous observons un comportement qui rejette, pour tous les traitements, la prédiction de l'équilibre de Nash de zéro contribution dans l'investissement public. L'occurrence d'une perte accroßt dans la période suivante la probabilité de jouer Nash et réduit le niveau de contribution dans l'investissement public (gambler's fallacy). Cette situation rend plus difficile la mobilisation des personnes aprÚs un désastre naturel.Voluntary contributions, public losses, risk, ambiguity, experimental data, Contributions volontaires, pertes publiques, risque, ambiguïté, données expérimentales

    Voluntary Teaming and Effort

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    In a series of experimental effort games each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high payoff for cooperation to each player, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take a free ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that when participants are not given the option of private remuneration they cooperate significantly less. Dans cette Ă©tude expĂ©rimentale, chaque paire de participants doit choisir entre une forme de rĂ©munĂ©ration d'Ă©quipe ou privĂ©e pour leurs efforts consentis. MĂȘme si le choix de la forme privĂ©e de rĂ©munĂ©ration est pour au moins un des deux joueurs une stratĂ©gie d'Ă©quilibre parfait en sous-jeu, nous observons que la rĂ©munĂ©ration d'Ă©quipe est frĂ©quemment choisie par les deux joueurs. La rĂ©munĂ©ration d'Ă©quipe permet un profit Ă©levĂ© de collaboration pour chaque joueur, mais elle incite Ă©galement au resquillage sur le niveau d'effort de l'autre participant. Fruit de cette collaboration, nous observons que les participants affichent des profits plus Ă©levĂ©s relativement au choix de la structure privĂ©e de rĂ©munĂ©ration. Finalement, lorsque les participants sont soumis Ă  la rĂ©munĂ©ration d'Ă©quipe, ils coopĂšrent moins que lorsque cette option est volontairement choisie.team effort, workforce management, experimental economics, effort d'Ă©quipe, gestion des ressources humaines, Ă©conomie expĂ©rimentale

    Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments

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    Les participants Ă  une expĂ©rience ont soumis des stratĂ©gies pour jouer Ă  un jeu de biens publics. Les stratĂ©gies ont interagi dans une simulation par ordinateur. Les participants ont eu l'opportunitĂ© de rĂ©viser et de re-soumettre leurs stratĂ©gies pour une deuxiĂšme et une troisiĂšme simulation. La contribution moyenne des stratĂ©gies au bien public a augmentĂ© d'une simulation Ă  l'autre. La majoritĂ© des stratĂ©gies soumises montrent le mĂȘme patron de comportement. Dans la premiĂšre pĂ©riode le participant signale sa volontĂ© Ă  coopĂ©rer par une contribution totale au bien public. Puis il s'aligne sur la contribution moyenne faite par les autres dans la pĂ©riode prĂ©cĂ©dente. Dans la (les) pĂ©riode(s) finale(s), la coopĂ©ration est abandonnĂ©e indĂ©pendamment du dĂ©veloppement du jeu.Subjects submitted strategies for playing a public good game. The strategies interacted with each other in a computer simulation. They could be revised and resubmitted for a second and a third simulation round. The strategies' average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation to the next. The majority of the strategies submitted for the final simulation show the same pattern: In the first period, they signal their willingness to cooperate by contributing the entire endowment to the public good. Then, they reciprocate the others' average contribution in the previous period. In the final period(s), cooperation is given up, whatever the history of the game

    Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run

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    In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects away from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions. Lorsque les sujets peuvent changer de groupes dans les expériences sur les contributions volontaires aux biens publics, nous observons que les sujets plus coopératifs délaissent les sujets moins coopératifs. De plus, ces derniers essaient de joindre les groupes coopératifs pour profiter comme resquilleurs de leurs contributions.Public goods, Tiebout hypothesis, migration, experimental economics, Biens publics, hypothÚse de Tiebout, migration, économie expérimentale
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