5,361 research outputs found
Negotiating a stable government - an application of bargaining theory to a coalition formation model
In this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition formation. The notions of a feasible government and a stable government are central in the model considered. By a government, we mean a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The aim of this paper is to establish which stable government should be created if more than one stable government exists or, in case there is no stable one, which feasible government should be formed if more than one feasible government exists. Several bargaining procedures leading to the choice of one stable (or feasible) government are proposed. We define bargaining games in which only parties belonging to at least one stable (or feasible) government bargain over the creation of a government. We consider different bargaining costs. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining games defined. It turns out that the prospects of a party depend on the procedure applied, and on the bargaining costs assumed. We also apply the coalition formation model to the Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections and apply the different bargaining games for the creation of a government to this example.stable government; bargaining game; subgame perfect equilibrium
On some properties of the Hoede-Bakker index
In this paper, we analyze the decisional power index, the so called Hoede-Bakker index. This index takes the preferences of the players into account, as well as the social structure in which players may influence each other. We investigate the properties of the Hoede-Bakker index. We adapt some postulates for power indices and voting power paradoxes for the Hoede-Bakker set up. We investigate whether this decisional power index displays the adapted voting power paradoxes and whether it satisfies the adapted postulates for power indices.Hoede-Bakker index; power index; inclination vector; group decision; voting power paradoxes; postulates for power indices
How Dark Matter Came to Matter
The history of the dark matter problem can be traced back to at least the
1930s, but it was not until the early 1970s that the issue of 'missing matter'
was widely recognized as problematic. In the latter period, previously separate
issues involving missing mass were brought together in a single anomaly. We
argue that reference to a straightforward 'accumulation of evidence' alone is
inadequate to comprehend this episode. Rather, the rise of cosmological
research, the accompanying renewed interest in the theory of relativity and
changes in the manpower division of astronomy in the 1960s are key to
understanding how dark matter came to matter. At the same time, this story may
also enlighten us on the methodological dimensions of past practices of physics
and cosmology.Comment: Accepted for publication in Nature Astronomy. Corrected typ
Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW
We describe a simple computing technique for the tournament choice problem. It rests upon a relational modeling and uses the BDD-based computer system RelView for the evaluation of the relation-algebraic expressions that specify the solutions and for the visualization of the computed results. The Copeland set can immediately be identified using RelView's labeling feature. Relation-algebraic specifications of the Condorcet non-losers, the Schwartz set, the top cycle, the uncovered set, the minimal covering set, the Banks set, and the tournament equilibrium set are delivered. We present an example of a tournament on a small set of alternatives, for which the above choice sets are computed and visualized via RelView. The technique described in this paper is very flexible and especially appropriate for prototyping and experimentation, and as such very instructive for educational purposes. It can easily be applied to other problems of social choice and game theory.Tournament, relational algebra, RelView, Copeland set, Condorcet non-losers, Schwartz set, top cycle, uncovered set, minimal covering set, Banks set, tournament equilibrium set.
- …