31,437 research outputs found

    Which hadronic decay modes are good for ηb\eta_b searching: double J/ψJ/\psi or something else?

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    It has been controversial whether ηb\eta_b can be discovered in Tevatron Run 2 through the decay ηbJ/ψJ/ψ\eta_b\to J/\psi J/\psi followed by J/ψμ+μJ/\psi\to \mu^+\mu^-. We clear this controversy by an explicit calculation which predicts Br[ηbJ/ψJ/ψ]{\rm Br}[\eta_b\to J/\psi J/\psi] to be of order 10810^{-8}. It is concluded that observing eta_b through this decay mode in Tevatron Run 2 is rather unrealistic. The eta_b may be observed in the forthcoming LHC experiments through the 4-lepton channel, if the background events can be significantly reduced by imposing some kinematical cuts. By some rough but plausible considerations, we find that the analogous decay processes eta_b to VV, D^*\bar{D}^* also have very suppressed branching ratios, nevertheless it may be worth looking for \eta_b at LHC and Super B factory through the decay modes \eta_b \to K_S K^{\pm}\pi^{\mp}, D^*\bar{D}.Comment: v2; 28 pages, 2 figures. References added, presentation improved. Discussion on possible nonperturbative mechanism for eta_b->VV added, analysis for eta_b->VP updated by incoprating the U-spin violation effec

    Honesty Is the Best Policy–When There Is Money in It: Can Firms Promote Honest Reporting Behavior by Managers?

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    This paper provides experimental evidence on how incentive compensation, peer-group behavior, and audit (team) effectiveness influence managerial reporting behavior. Results show that an increase in incentive compensation intensity induces subjects to report less truthfully. High level of peer honesty promotes truthful reporting; however, the effects are weaker when incentive compensation intensity is high. Audit (team) effectiveness shows no significant influence on reporting behavior. The results provide the first clear evidence that firms need to consider carefully the effect of incentive compensation as well as the influence of peer groups when designing contracts. Furthermore, without a credible penalty for untruthful financial report, increased audit (team) effectiveness will not promote honest reporting.Managerial honesty;Incentive compensation intensity;Peer behavior;Audit effectiveness