The evolution of both the government and the public with emotional states.

The evolution of both the government and the public with emotional states.</p

Tripartite benefits.

Tripartite benefits.</p

Method logic diagram.

Method logic diagram.</p

The evolution of rational government.

a. The evolution of rational government and pessimistic public. b. The evolution of rational government and optimistic public. Through the setting of the public sentiment index, it can be seen that the evolutionary trajectory has changed significantly. In addition, people’s pessimism had a stronger effect on the results.</p

Eigenvalues of each equilibrium point.

Eigenvalues of each equilibrium point.</p

Stakeholders in NIMBY conflicts and their action mechanism.

Stakeholders in NIMBY conflicts and their action mechanism.</p

The evolution of rational government and the emotional state of the public.

The evolution of rational government and the emotional state of the public.</p

Stability conditions of equilibrium points.

Stability conditions of equilibrium points.</p

The influence of initial value change on the strategy evolution path of local government.

(a) Influence of initial value change of Y on strategy evolution of local government; (b) Influence of initial value change of X and Z on strategy evolution of local government. Fig 10 to investigate the influence of the change of initial value of the main body’s strategy in the tripartite game on the evolutionary path of the public group’s strategy. As showed in the figure, although the evolution speed of public group strategy varies when the initial value of the main body strategy in the three-party game changes, the evolution result of z→1 does not change (Fig 10A and Fig 10B). The public has historically been playing the role of victim in NIMBY conflicts. The negative externalities generated by NIMBY facilities have an increasing impact on the production and life of the public. Therefore, the public will get a more positive attitude towards environmental protection reconstruction of polluting NIMBY facilities enterprises.</p

The influence of initial value change on the strategy evolution path of NIMBY enterprises.

Influence of initial value change of X on strategy evolution of NIMBY enterprises; (b) Influence of initial value change of Y and Z on strategy evolution of NIMBY enterprises. Fig 9 to investigate the influence of the change of initial value of the main strategy of the tripartite game on the evolutionary path of local government’s group strategy. As showed in the figure, Y value first decreases and then increases over time (Fig 9A and Fig 9B). This may be because at the beginning, NIMBY conflict is not obvious, just a small protest by nearby residents, and the cost of local government supervision is greater than the benefits gained. At this time, the local government does not pay attention to the phenomenon of NIMBY conflict, so it will not take supervisory action. Later, as time went on, the NIMBY conflict became more and more serious. Residents nearby protested in a large scale and even put pressure on the government through public opinion. If the government strictly supervises and solves the conflicts between polluting NIMBY facilities enterprises and nearby residents, the public image and credibility of the government will be greatly improved, far exceeding the cost of government supervision, which makes the local government adopt strict supervision strategy and eventually evolve to a balanced state.</p