A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought.mechanism design; exact and approximate implementation; iteratively undominated strategies; restricted deception-proofness; incentive compatibility; measurability

THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM

I consider a strategic game form with a finite set of payoff states and employ undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) as a solution concept under complete information. I propose notions of the proximity of information according to which the continuity of UNE concept is considered as the robustness criterion. I identify a topology (induced by what I call d?) with respect to which the undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium (UBNE) correspondence associated with any game form is upper hemi-continuous at any complete information prior. I also identify a slightly coarser topology (induced by what I call d??) with respect to which the UBNE correspondence associated with some game form exhibits a failure of the upper hemi-continuity at any complete information prior. In this sense, the topology induced by d? is the coarsest one. The topology induced by d?? is also used in both Kajii and Morris (1998) and Monderer and Samet (1989, 1996) with some additional restriction. I apply this robustness analysis to the UNE implementation. Appealing to Palfrey and Srivastava’s (1991) canonical game form, I show, as a corollary, that almost any social choice function is robustly UNE implementable relative to d?. I show, on the other hand, that only monotonic social choice functions can be robustly UNE implementable relative to d??. This clarifies when Chung and Ely’s Theorem 1 2003) applies.

Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust measurability have been shown to be necessary for robust (full) exact and virtual implementation, respectively. This paper shows that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild condition on environments in which robust measurability is satisfied by all social choice functions over an open and dense subset of first-order types. We conclude that there is a precise sense in which robust virtual implementation can be significantly more permissive than robust exact implementation.

robust mechanism design; ex post incentive compatibility; robust monotonicity; robust measurability

A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies

Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition “restricted deceptionproofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought.mechanism design; exact and approximate implementation; iteratively undominated strategies; restricted deception-proofness; incentive compatibility; measurability

Rationalizable implementation of correspondences

We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are not only starkly different from, but also much weaker than those for Nash implementation, when we consider social choice correspondences