The use and abuse of history by the military

This paper examines the use and abuse of history by the military. In particular it focuses on military history and its employment in support of officer education by professional armed forces. The paper will examine what is meant by the term ‘military history’, dividing the discipline into ‘popular’, ‘academic’, and ‘professional’ categories and analysing each in turn. The main focus of the paper is on the latter, which relates to the employment of military history by armed forces in the belief that it is ‘useful’. It is somewhat unusual for a subject in the arts and humanities to find its value discussed in such utilitarian terms and the paper seeks to establish just what ‘useful’ might mean in this context before offering suggestions as to what this implies about the way in which military history is taught

A Splutter of Musketry? The British military response to the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, 1951.

This paper examines the British response to the crisis that resulted from the Iranian decision to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951.The British government contemplated the use of military force from the outset of the crisis and a series of plans were developed. Unfortunately, in a manner similar to the Suez Crisis five years later, the military were unable to provide a suitable response until political considerations had made the use of force unattractive. Despite this, the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence, and the Chiefs of Staff continued to press for an armed response. This paper uses newly released archival sources to examine the military plans and preparations and to analyse the way in which these interacted with political considerations to undermine the British position in Iran

Maritime Strategy and policy for smaller navies

This paper focuses on small navies and seeks to examine the extent to which traditional approaches to maritime policy and strategy are relevant to them. It will examine alternative ways of defining what is meant by the term ‘small navy’ before addressing traditional interpretations about the roles and missions of navies, and of maritime strategy, in order to question the extent to which ‘small navies’ are different or distinct from their larger counterparts or, indeed, from each other. In terms of their size, capabilities and aspirations most navies are small. This is as true today as it has always been. Large navies dominate the headlines and receive ample coverage in both popular and academic publications but they are the exception not the rule. Their smaller counterparts have a lower profile except when they emerge as potential allies or enemies and there is a tendency to approach them in such terms, defining them by their relationship to larger navies regardless of whether this actually provides the most useful way in which to understand them. Equally, there is a tendency for historians and commentators to approach maritime strategy from a perspective built upon an examination of the activity of larger navies on the assumption that the resultant concepts and principles will apply to small navies as much as large ones. While this may be the case the relative paucity of literature devoted specifically to smaller navies makes it difficult to draw firm conclusion

Inter-service rivalry: British defence policy, 1956-1968

Varying service views on the most effective approach to project UK power globally during the Cold War proved problematic in settling UK defence policy. Contradictory views hindered defence procurement and proved costly, ultimately forcing the abandonment of key projects. The Royal Navy’s Joint Services Seaborne Force appeared viable but largely unrealised due to bitter opposition. Confronted by the current Defence Review, it is essential all three services buck the historical trend and opt for a ‘spirit of jointery’ in future defence planning

The Seaborne/Airborne Concept: Littoral Manoeuvre in the 1960s?

This paper examines the seaborne/airborne concept, an approach to expeditionary warfare developed in Britain in the early 1960s. It identifies the strategic challenges that forced Britain to reassess its approach to the projection of power overseas and identifies the ways in which the new concept sought to meet these challenges. The âlessonsâ learned from experience at Suez (1956) and Kuwait (1961) and their impact on procurement and on inter-service relations is addressed. The paper also examines modern British doctrine for maritime expeditionary warfare and argues that contemporary concepts such as âLittoral Manoeuvreâ reflect the basic principles established in the 1960s

Corbett, Liddell Hart and the ‘British Way in Warfare’ in the 1960s

The notion that there is, or at least was, a peculiarly ‘British way in warfare’, based around the use of maritime forces and the avoidance of major military commitments on the continent of Europe, has been the cause of one of the more enduring debates within the history of British defence policy. The debate has been a lively one that, in many respects, has revealed as much about the predilections of the various commentators as it has shed light on the past. Critics on both sides of the argument have not been averse to using and abusing the historical record for their own purposes. One of the reasons for this is that the debate is not just of academic interest. Arguments over the ‘British way in warfare’ have often been marshalled in support of a particular national strategy and, by extension, in favour of devoting greater or lesser resources to different military capabilities. To cut a complex story rather short, if one believes in the ‘British way’ then this suggests a focus on maritime capabilities whereas if one believes the alternative view, in the necessity and efficacy of a major military commitment to Europe, then the army and associated tactical air forces deserve a greater share. Such debates, always lively, take on a particular significance when resources are scarce and governments need to make hard decisions over prioritie

Delayed Reaction: UK Maritime Expeditionary Capabilities and the Lessons of the Falklands Conflict.

On 2 April 1982 Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands and the next day they occupied South Georgia. The small British garrisons based in both of these locations put up a spirited defense but were forced to capitulate in the face of overwhelming numbers. The Falkland Islands are situated in the South Atlantic, 400 miles to the west of Argentina and 8,000 miles southwest of the United Kingdom (UK). There are two main islands, West Falkland and East Falkland and the only town of any size, Port Stanley, is situated on the latter. South Georgia lies 800 miles to the south-east of the Falklands. To the apparent surprise of the Argentinean ruling Junta, the British dispatched a maritime task force to the South Atlantic intent on restoring British administration to the islands. The first ships of this task force sailed from the UK on 5 April. By 25 April British forces had recaptured South Georgia and on 14 June the Royal Marine commanding British land forces in the Falklands, Major-General Jeremy Moore, accepted the surrender of all Argentine forces in the Islands

'Hell has many different names': The raids on St. Nazaire and Dieppe, 1942.

The fall of France in June 1940 transformed Britain's strategic situation. It meant that amphibious operations, a form of warfare that had received very little priority to date, would become increasingly important. Such operations provided the only means of returning Allied armies to mainland Europe. As a result the British adopted two parallel and complementary approaches to amphibious warfare. In the long run the most important of these was the development of the equipment and techniques that would be required to conduct major landings against sophisticated opposition in Europe. The culmination of this remarkable process was seen on the beaches of Normandy on 6 June 1944 when over two thousand landing ships and landing craft, supported by seven battleships, 23 cruisers, 80 fleet destroyers and hundreds of smaller naval vessels, successfully landed 132,200 Allied troops by sea despite intense German opposition. The other approach, most evident in the period up to and including 1942, was the conduct of a series of amphibious raids designed to exploit Allied sea control by attacking enemy troops and installations along their long seaboard. Such activity was designed to harass the enemy and to force them to divert troops to defend the coast and also to boost morale at home and abroad at a time when little seemed to be going right for the Allies. It was also hoped that experience during raids would allow the British to test equipment and techniques that were novel and, as yet, unproven in battle. The same, of course, initially applied to most of the troops that would be employed in such raids

“Neither Fish nor Fowl nor Yet Good Red Herring”—Joint Institutions, Single-Service Priorities, and Amphibious Capabilities in Postwar Britain

A joint approach to institutional responsibility for amphibious warfare served British needs during the Second World War but contributed to poor results after 1945. British capabilities did not recover until amphibious warfare became the particular responsibility of the naval service