Optimal Inspection under Moral Hazard and Limited Liability of Polluter

TUPD Discussion Papers：No.16（TUPD-2022-004）の改訂版Revised: TUPD Discussion Papers: No.16 (TUPD-2022-004

Optimal Inspection under Moral Hazard and Limited Liability of Polluter

TUPD Discussion Papers：No.16（TUPD-2022-004）の改訂版Revised: TUPD Discussion Papers: No.16 (TUPD-2022-004

Political Economy of Voluntary Approaches: A Lesson from Environmental Policies in Japan

In this paper, we attempt to identify the reasons behind the differences in environmental policy between Japan and other developed countries, particularly the US. Japan’s environmental policy is unique in that voluntary approaches have been taken to reduce total emissions. This strategy is quite different from the traditional approach of heavy-handed regulation. In Japan, voluntary approaches are conducted through negotiations with polluters. The idea behind this type of voluntary approaches is that the government can induce polluters to abate emissions voluntarily by using light-handed regulations and the threat of heavy-handed regulations. The light-handed regulation is quite effective especially when it is costly to introduce heavy-handed regulations, although the negotiations are difficult to conduct when the number of stakeholders is large. To strengthen our analysis, we provide some examples of Japanese environmental policies which are successful and the ones that are not.This paper was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15H03354 (Shinkuma), Scientific Research (B) 15H03352 (Arimura), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) Grant-in-Aid for Specially Promoted Research #26000001 (Managi) and the Sumitomo Foundation Grant for Environmental Research Project #153421 (Kaneko, Yamamoto and Yoshida)

Economic Development and Law in Sub-Saharan Africa with Specific Reference to Legal Culture, Environmental Conservation and Technology Transfer

本取組は、2015-2017年度関西大学教育研究高度化促進費事業において、研究課題「アフリカの経済発展と法－サブサハラにおける法文化、環境保全、技術移転をめぐる総合的研究」として促進費を受け、ここにその成果の一部を公表するものである

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system. In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system. Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003illegal disposal, recycling, second-best policy, transaction costs,

Effectiveness of policy against illegal disposal of waste

Our objective is to analyze the effectiveness, against the illegal disposal of waste, of a licensing system that has been introduced in a waste management policy. We theoretically find enforcement leverage in the licensing system, and then examine the theoretical result empirically. The results suggest that extending liability to disposers, which forms the basis of the enforcement leverage, deters illegal disposal more effectively than increasing penalties for illegal disposal. We also obtain evidence of transboundary movement of illegal disposal, and find how the court determines penalties for illegal disposal

On the effectiveness of a license scheme for E-waste recycling : the challenge of China and India

It is well known that China and India have been recycling centers of WEEE, especially printed circuit boards, and that serious environmental pollution in these countries has been generated by improper recycling methods. After the governments of China and India banned improper recycling by the informal sector, improper recycling activities spread to other places. Then, these governments changed their policies to one of promoting proper recycling by introducing a scheme, under which E-waste recycling requires a license issued by the government. In this paper, the effectiveness of that license scheme is examined by means of an economic model. It can be shown that the license scheme can work effectively only if disposers of E-waste have a responsibility to sell E-waste to license holders. Our results run counter to the idea that international E-waste trade should be banned and provide an alternative solution to the problem. \u