122 research outputs found

    Why do central banks monitor so many inflation indicators?

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    Monetary policy is typically undertaken with an eye to achieving a select few objectives in the long run. The Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy to promote two long-run goals: price stability and sustainable economic growth. In many other countries, central banks have a single long-run goal defined in terms of an inflation target. Yet while central banks have narrowly defined long-run goals, most monitor a wide range of economic indicators.> Why do central banks collect and analyze so many indicators? Kozicki presents multicountry empirical evidence to assess whether any single indicator reliably predicts inflation. If such an indicator exists, it would need to perform adequately under a wide variety of economic conditions and changing economic structures, because no country faces an unchanging economic environment. One way to test for such robust performance is to examine the value of indicators across a variety of countries experiencing different economic conditions, financial structures, policy shifts, and so forth.> Kozicki first discusses why several widely used indicators might predict inflation. She explains how the predictive performance of these indicators can be compared and reports empirical results for 11 developed economies, including the United States. She concludes that while monitoring the change in GDP growth is useful on average across countries, no single economic indicator is always reliable. This evidence supports an approach to policymaking that involves monitoring a wide range of economic indicators.Banks and banking, Central ; Inflation (Finance)

    Term Structure Transmission of Monetary Policy

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    Under bond-rate transmission of monetary policy, the authors show that a generalized Taylor Principle applies, in which the average anticipated path of policy responses to inflation is subject to a lower bound of unity. This result helps explain how bond rates may exhibit stable responses to inflation, even in periods of passive policy. Another possible explanation is time-varying term premiums with risk pricing that depends on inflation. The authors present a no-arbitrage model of the term structure with horizon-dependent policy perceptions and time-varying term premiums to illustrate the mechanics and provide empirical results that support these transmission channels.Interest rates; Transmission of monetary policy

    Term structure transmission of monetary policy

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    The sensitivity of bond rates to macro variables appears to vary both over time and over forecast horizons. The latter may be due to differences in forward rate term premiums and in bond trader perceptions of anticipated policy responses at different forecast horizons. Determinacy of policy transmission through bond rates requires a lower bound on the average responsiveness of term premiums and anticipated policy responses to inflation.Monetary policy

    Permanent and Transitory Policy Shocks in an Empirical Macro Model with Asymmetric Information

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    Despite a large literature documenting that the efficacy of monetary policy depends on how inflation expectations are anchored, many monetary policy models assume: (1) the inflation target of monetary policy is constant; and, (2) the inflation target is known by all economic agents. This paper proposes an empirical specification with two policy shocks: permanent changes to the inflation target and transitory perturbations of the short-term real rate. The public sector cannot correctly distinguish between these two shocks and, under incomplete learning, private perceptions of the inflation target will not equal the true target. The paper shows how imperfect policy credibility can affect economic responses to structural shocks, including transition to a new inflation target – a question that cannot be addressed by many commonly used empirical and theoretical models. In contrast to models where all monetary policy actions are transient, the proposed specification implies that sizable movements in historical bond yields and inflation are attributable to perceptions of permanent shocks in target inflation.transmission mechanism, learning, policy credibility, time-varying natural rate, shifting endpoint, inflation target, term structure of interest rates

    Minding the gap : central bank estimates of the unemployment natural rate

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    A time-varying parameter framework is suggested for use with real-time multiperiod forecast data to estimate implied forecast equations. The framework is applied to historical briefing forecasts prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee to estimate the U.S. central bank’s ex ante perceptions of the natural rate of unemployment. Relative to retrospective estimates, empirical results do not indicate severe underestimation of the natural rate of unemployment in the 1970s.Unemployment
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