From Plurality Rule to Proportional Representation

I consider the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system for the forthcoming elections from plurality rule to proportional representation. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated. They care about winning and about the share of seats obtained. I consider two di¤erent scenarios of how parties in the government share the spoils of o¢ ce: Equally or proportionally to their share of seats. If the government is formed by a single party and parties expect that each party will obtain the same share of votes in the next election the electoral rule will never be changed. That is, for a change to occur the government should be formed by a coalition. I ?nd that a change is more likely to occur when the number of parties is larger and also when the spoils of o¢ ce are shared equally among the members in the governing coalition. I extend these results to analyze the decision of a change from a less proportional rule to a more proportional one.Electoral systems, Plurality, Proportional Representation, Coalitions.

Centrist's Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints

I analyze a model of electoral competition in which a candidate?s reputation and his need of cred- ibility restricts his policy choice to a certain subset of the policy space, its ideology set. Candidates are o¢ ce-motivated. They care about winning and also about the share of votes they get. I consider both two and three party systems. I describe the equilibrium outcomes assuming that plurality rule applies, and obtain for two party competition, in some cases, equilibrium outcomes di¤erent than what the median voter theorem suggests because of the restrictions on the ideology sets implied by the credibility constraints. I show that centrist parties are disadvantaged compared to leftist and rightist ones, since, in equilibrium, leftist and rightist parties choose policy points that are as close as possible to each other and obtain votes from the centrist parties?ideology set. A centrist candidate needs a higher concentration of voters in his credibility set compared to his opponents in order to have a chance to win. I also analyze a run-off system for three parties and show that centrist parties have more opportunities to win under this rule than under plurality rule.Electoral competition, plurality, run-off, credibility, spatial models.

Income Redistribution and Public Good Provision in a Diverse Society

I analyze the post-electoral coalition formation process in a two dimensional political environment. The two dimensions are the degree of a proportional tax rate and the degree of a group-speci?c public good. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated and care instrumentally about policy. I analyze when stable coalitions exist and obtain that for that to occur o¢ ce bene?ts should exceed a certain level. I analyze how this critical level and the set of policies implemented are a¤ected by the income levels and the degree of diversity. For both o¢ ce and policy-motivated parties the same result holds but the critical level might be lower.Electoral competition, coalition formation, public goods, income redistribution.

Income redistribution and public good provision in ha diverse society

I analyze the post-electoral coalition formation process in a two dimensional political environment. The two dimensions are the degree of a proportional tax rate and the degree of a group-specific public good. Parties are office-motivated and care instrumentally about policy. I analyze when stable coalitions exist and obtain that for that to occur office benefits should exceed a certain level. I analyze how this critical level and the set of policies implemented are a¤ected by the income levels and the degree of diversity. For both office and policy-motivated parties the same result holds but the critical level might be lower

From plurality rule to proportional representation

I consider the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system for the forthcoming elections from plurality rule to proportional representation. Parties are office-motivated. They care about winning and about the share of seats obtained. I consider two di¤erent scenarios of how parties in the government share the spoils of office: Equally or proportionally to their share of seats. If the government is formed by a single party and parties expect that each party will obtain the same share of votes in the next election the electoral rule will never be changed. That is, for a change to occur the government should be formed by a coalition. I ?nd that a change is more likely to occur when the number of parties is larger and also when the spoils of o¢ ce are shared equally among the members in the governing coalition. I extend these results to analyze the decision of a change from a less proportional rule to a more proportional one

Centrist's curse? An electoral competition model with credibility constraints

I analyze a model of electoral competition in which a candidate's reputation and his need of credibility restricts his policy choice to a certain subset of the policy space, its ideology set. Candidates are office-motivated. They care about winning and also about the share of votes they get. I consider both two and three party systems. I describe the equilibrium outcomes assuming that plurality rule applies, and obtain for two party competition, in some cases, equilibrium outcomes different than what the median voter theorem suggests because of the restrictions on the ideology sets implied by the credibility constraints. I show that centrist parties are disadvantaged compared to leftist and rightist ones, since, in equilibrium, leftist and rightist parties choose policy points that are as close as possible to each other and obtain votes from the centrist parties' ideology set. A centrist candidate needs a higher concentration of voters in his credibility set compared to his opponents in order to have a chance to win. I also analyze a run-off system for three parties and show that centrist parties have more opportunities to win under this rule than under plurality rule

The foreign trade pattern and foreign trade specialization of candidates of the European Union

The enlargement of the European Union will bring many political, economical and structural changes on the Continent, which require careful and deep analysis to be made. This paper will grasp the enlargement of the European Union from the aspect of the trade pattern and trade specialization of six major European Union candidates; namely, Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic by focusing on the years from 1996 to 2002. In other words, the main purpose of this paper is to examine the international competitiveness of six candidate countries and to compare the structure of specialization in foreign trade with each other and the EU/15

Centrist's curse? An electoral competition model with credibility constraints

I analyze a model of electoral competition in which candidates' need of credibility restricts their policy choice to a subset of the policy space, their ideology set. I focus on three party competition where candidates care about winning and their share of votes. I show that centrist parties are highly disadvantaged compared to leftist and rightist ones losing the election under a wide range of parameters. I also show that centrist parties' winning opportunities increase under a run-off system.Publisher's Versio

Gender differences in economic experiments

This paper reviews the experimental economics literature on gender differences concerning four subjects: risk aversion, trust, deception and leadership. The vast majority of the articles we have revised document gender differences in behavior; differences which could be explained by sex-role stereotypes and/or hormonal differences.Financial support from the MCI (SEJ2007-62081/ECON), Junta de Andalucía- Excelencia (P07.SEJ.02547) and Instituto de la Mujer (2007 I+D+I/031)

Some surface properties of thermally modified scots pine after artificial weathering

In this study, it was aimed to investigate some surface characteristics such as surface roughness, color, and glossiness of Scots pine (Pinus sylvestris) wood specimens after 500 hours artificial weathering exposure.  The results showed that surface characteristics of thermally modified Scots pine gave better results than unmodified Scots pine after artificial weathering. Artificial weathering caused an increase in surface roughness and a decrease in glossiness of Scots pine wood. Results showed artificial weathered wood become darker, reddish, and yellowish. Generally, higher duration and temperature for Scots pine resulted in better surface characteristics of Scots pine after artificial weathering.