In the field:Coase an exemplar in the tradition of Smith, Marshall and Ostrom

This paper argues that Coase provides the primary 20th century exemplar of the grounding of analytical developments in economics in direct fieldwork observation. In particular, his focus on the business enterprise, its internal functions (including decision-making), and its external relations (including contracting) has provided a stimulus for radical developments in microeconomics and in managerial and decision economics in particular. The argument is developed by a stylization of the development of economics, referring to Adam Smith in the 18th century, Alfred Marshall in the 19th century, Ronald Coase in the 20th century, and Elinor Ostrom in the 21st century

Diptych varieties. I

We present a new class of affine Gorenstein 6-folds obtained by smoothing the 1-dimensional singular locus of a reducible affine toric surface; their existence is established using explicit methods in toric geometry and serial use of Kustin-Miller Gorenstein unprojection. These varieties have applications as key varieties in constructing other varieties, including local models of Mori flips of Type A.Comment: 50 pages. The webpage at www-staff.lboro.ac.uk/~magdb/aflip.html contains links to auxiliary materia

Venture capital and risk in high-technology enterprises

We find UK investors and entrepreneurs are significantly concordant in rankings of investments and key factors for risk but significantly discordant on risk classes. Investors emphasise agency risk (e.g., motivation, empowerment, alignment), and entrepreneurs emphasise business risk (e.g., market opportunities)

Venture capital investor behaviour in the backing of UK high technology firms : financial reporting and the level of investment

This paper is an empirical investigation into the ways in which venture capitalists value (and invest in) high technology firms, focusing on financial reporting, risk disclosure and intangible assets. It is based on questionnaire returns from UK investors in diverse sectors, ranging from biotechnology, through software/ computer services, to communications and medical services. This evidence is used to examine: (a) the usefulness of financial accounts; (b) the implications of technopole investment; (c) the extent of investor control over the investee's AIS; and (d) the role of investor opinion (e.g. on disclosure, due diligence and risk reporting) in determining the level of equity provision

What's it worth to keep a secret?

This article is the first major study of protection and valuation of trade secrets under federal criminal law. Trade secrecy is more important than ever as an economic complement and substitute for other intellectual property protections, particularly patents. Accordingly, U.S. public policy correctly places a growing emphasis on characterizing the scope of trade secrets, creating incentives for their productive use, and imposing penalties for their theft. Yet amid this complex ecosystem of legal doctrine, economic policy, commercial strategy, and enforcement, there is little research or consensus on how to assign value to trade secrets. One reason for this gap is that intangible assets in general are notoriously difficult to value, and trade secrecy by its opaque nature is ill-suited to the market-signaling mechanisms that offer at least some traction in other forms of valuation. Another reason is that criminal trade secret law is relatively young, and the usual corrective approaches to valuation in civil trade secrecy are not synonymous with the greater distributive concerns of criminal law. To begin to fill this gap, we examine over a decade of trade secret protection and valuation under the U.S. Economic Espionage Act of 1996. From original data on EEA prosecutions, we show that trade secret valuations are lognormally distributed as predicted by Gibrat’s Law, with valuations typically low on the order of $5 million but reaching as high as$250 million. There is no notable difference among estimates from various valuation methods, but a difference between high and low estimates on one hand and the sentencing estimates on the other. These findings suggest that the EEA has not been used to its full capacity, a conclusion buttressed by recent Congressional actions to strengthen the EEA

What\u27s It Worth to Keep a Secret?

This article is the first major study of protection and valuation of trade secrets under federal criminal law. Trade secrecy is more important than ever as an economic complement and substitute for other intellectual property protections, particularly patents. Accordingly, U.S. public policy correctly places a growing emphasis on characterizing the scope of trade secrets, creating incentives for their productive use, and imposing penalties for their theft. Yet amid this complex ecosystem of legal doctrine, economic policy, commercial strategy, and enforcement, there is little research or consensus on how to assign value to trade secrets. One reason for this gap is that intangible assets in general are notoriously difficult to value, and trade secrecy by its opaque nature is ill-suited to the market-signaling mechanisms that offer at least some traction in other forms of valuation. Another reason is that criminal trade secret law is relatively young, and the usual corrective approaches to valuation in civil trade secrecy are not synonymous with the greater distributive concerns of criminal law. To begin to fill this gap, we examine over a decade of trade secret protection and valuation under the U.S. Economic Espionage Act of 1996. From original data on EEA prosecutions, we show that trade secret valuations are lognormally distributed as predicted by Gibrat’s Law, with valuations typically low on the order of $5 million but reaching as high as$250 million. There is no notable difference among estimates from various valuation methods, but a difference between high and low estimates on one hand and the sentencing estimates on the other. These findings suggest that the EEA has not been used to its full capacity, a conclusion buttressed by recent Congressional actions to strengthen the EEA

Performance and strategy:simultaneous equations analysis of long-lived firms

A simultaneous equations model of performance, strategy and size is tested using fieldwork evidence on long-lived firms in Scotland. Estimation is by I3SLS, with correction for sample selection bias. The contributions of this paper are that it: (a) grounds estimation on fieldwork evidence; (b) calibrates performance and competitive strategy; (c) tests and models endogeneity; and (d) computes robust trade-off elasticities between firm size and performance. It shows how this trade-off provides the entrepreneur with two strong incentives: (i) to seek greater efficiency typically by an increase in the human capital of the ‘core’ workforce; (ii) to achieve higher levels of performance by adopting more diverse competitive strategies

Fano 3-folds in codimension 4, Tom and Jerry, Part I

This work is part of the Graded Ring Database project [GRDB], and is a sequel to [Altinok's 1998 PhD thesis] and [Altinok, Brown and Reid, Fano 3-folds, K3 surfaces and graded rings, in SISTAG (Singapore, 2001), Contemp. Math. 314, 2002, pp. 25-53]. We introduce a strategy based on Kustin-Miller unprojection that constructs many hundreds of Gorenstein codimension 4 ideals with 9x16 resolutions (that is, 9 equations and 16 first syzygies). Our two basic games are called Tom and Jerry; the main application is the biregular construction of most of the anticanonically polarised Mori Fano 3-folds of Altinok's thesis. There are 115 cases whose numerical data (in effect, the Hilbert series) allow a Type I projection. In every case, at least one Tom and one Jerry construction works, providing at least two deformation families of quasismooth Fano 3-folds having the same numerics but different topology.Comment: 34pp. This article links to the Graded Ring Database http://grdb.lboro.ac.uk/, and more information is available from webloc. cit. + Downloads. Update includes several clarifications and improvements; results essentially unchanged. To appear in Comp. Mat

Decision support for firm performance by real options analytics

This paper develops a real options decision support tool for raising the performance of the firm. It shows how entrepreneurs can use our intuitive tool quickly to assess the nature and type of action required for improved performance. This exploits our estimated econometric relationship between precipitators of entrepreneurial opportunities, time until exercise, and firm performance. Our 3D chromaticity plots show how staging investments, investment time, and firm performance support entrepreneurial decisions to embed, or to expedite, investments. Speedy entrepreneurial action is securely supported with this tool, without expertise in econometric estimation or in formulae for real options valuation