What's in a sign? Trademark law and enconomic theory.

The aim of this paper is to summarise the extant theory as it relates to the economics of trademark, and to give some suggestions for further research with reference to distinct streams ofliterature. The proposed line of study inevitably looks at the complex relationship between signs and economics. Trademark is a sign introduced to remedy a market failure. It facilitates purchase decisions by indicating the provenance of the goods, so that consumers can identify specific quality attributes deriving from their own, or others', past experience. Trademark holders, on their part, have an incentive to invest in quality because they will be able to reap the benefits in terms of reputation. In other words, trademark law becomes an economic device which, opportunely designed, can produce incentives for maximising market efficiency. This role must, of course, be recognised, as a vast body of literature has done, with its many positive economic consequences. Nevertheless, trademark appears to have additional economic effects that should be properly recognized: it can determine the promotion of market power and the emergence of rent-seeking behaviours. It gives birth to an idiosyncratic economics of signs where very strong protection tends to be assured, even though the welfare effects are as yet poorly understood. In this domain much remains to be done and the challenge to researchers is open.trademark, brand, economics and signs, asymmetric information, intellectual property rights, law and economics

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS - ISSUE 2

The European Journal of Comparative Economics, an online refereed journal for scientific articles publishing theoretical and empirical research in any field of comparative economic studies, is promiting the issue 2 2004 freely downloadable at the website http://eaces.liuc.it/ New submission for the next issues are welcome. Table of contents: Corporate and public governances in transition: the limits of property rights and the significance of legal institutions by Jean-François Nivet Price and Income Elasticities of Russian Exports by Bernardina Algieri Measuring and Analyzing Poverty (with a particular reference to the case of Nepal) by Sanjaya Acharya Managerial ownership and corporate performance in Slovenian post-privatisation period by Marko Simoneti, Aleksandra Gregoric Employment Performance and Convergence in the European Countries and Regions by Cristiano Perugini, Marcello Signorelli Congress announcement : SERCIAC05

Pelle sub agnina latitat mens saepe lupina. Copyright in the marketplace

This paper focus on the relationship between the right's aims of providing an incentive for creative activities, and the overall efficiency. It can in fact be shown that, even if the commodification of intellectual works by means of copyright does provide some incentive for creative activities, this benefit is offset by certain ‘side effects’ on the diversity and quality of the ideas produced, and interference with access to information and the incremental process of creation. All of which, if duly taken into account, can seriously call into question the overall balance of efficiency. In the present-day debate, the justifications given for copyright and author's rights invoke both considerations of economic efficiency, as well as ethics and rhetoric. However such arguments neglect to factor in the social costs, thus portraying in false light an institution that has, in practice, often served private interests very distant from its purported aims, injecting a significant amount of inefficiency into the economic system. This state of affairs can therefore be aptly summed up by the Latin adage of the title: "A wolf often lies concealed in the skin of a lamb". Nevertheless, the objections raised thus far, in the literature on the economic analysis of intellectual property rights, have inevitably resorted to the contra position of extra-economic values, such as equity and justice, against those of economic efficiency. In the present discussion we shall seek to reconcile these two sides, showing how, under an expanded analytical perspective with respect to costs and benefits, and taking into consideration additional elements, copyright proves to be fundamentally inefficient even from a strictly economic standpoint, and that this will only be aggravated by technological progress. We will therefore demonstrate that an examination of the dynamics of the right within the market and society can seriously call into question, or even entirely overturn, the traditional economic arguments in favour of copyright.

Copyright and endogenous market structure: a glimpse from the journal-publishing market

This article explores the journal publishing industry in order to shed light on the overall economic consequences of copyright in markets. Since the rationale for copyright is among others to promise some market power to the holder of the successful copyrighted item, it also provides incentives to preserve and extend market power. A regular trait of copyright industries is high concentration and the creation of large catalogues of copyrights in the hands of incumbents. This outcome can be observed as the aggregation of rights and is one of the pivotal strategies for obtaining or extending market power, consistently with findings in other cases. Journal publishing is no different in this respect from other copyright industries, and in the last decade has experienced a similar trajectory, leading to a highly concentrated industry in which a handful of large firms increasingly control a substantial part of the market. It also provides a clear example of the effect of copyright dynamics on market structure, suggesting that a different attitude should be taken in lawmaking and law enforcement.copyright and market power, endogenous market structure, journal-publishing industry

Aggregate Litigation and Regulatory Innovation: Another View of Judicial Efficiency

In this article, we argue that aggregate litigation and the court system can not only restore the protection of victims and the production of deterrence, but also play a pivotal role in stimulating regulatory innovation. This is accomplished through a reward system that seems largely to mimic the institutional devices used in other domains, such as intellectual property rights, by defining a proper set of incentives. Precisely the described solution relies on creating a specific economic framework able to foster economies of scale and grant a valuable property right over a specific litigation to an entrepreneurial individual, who in exchange provides the venture capital needed for the legal action, and produces inputs and focal points for amending regulations. In this light, aggregate litigation thus can be equally seen as an incubator for regulation.aggregate litigation, efficiency, market for risk, hierarchy, regulation, innovation, asbestos

Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: another view of judicial efficiency

In this article, we argue that aggregate litigation and the court system can not only restore the protection of victims and the production of deterrence, but also play a pivotal role in stimulating regulatory innovation. This is accomplished through a reward system that seems largely to mimic the institutional devices used in other domains, such as intellectual property rights, by defining a proper set of incentives. Precisely the described solution relies on creating a specific economic framework able to foster economies of scale and grant a valuable property right over a specific litigation to an entrepreneurial individual, who in exchange provides the venture capital needed for the legal action, and produces inputs and focal points for amending regulations. In this light, aggregate litigation thus can be equally seen as an incubator for regulation.aggregate litigation, efficiency, market for risk, hierarchy, regulation, innovation, asbestos

Access to vs. exclusion from knowledge: Intellectual property, efficiency and social justice.

The main rationale for intellectual property relies on the thesis of the incentive to create. Creators and inventors are economic agents attracted by the returns they expect from their effort. This depiction is practical, but does not give due weight to the complexity of knowledge production. This work does not contest the potential benefit of the opportunity for creators and inventors to reap some profit from their work. Rather, it considers the idiosyncratic nature of knowledge, which is simultaneously input, output and productive technology, and is closely linked to the social dimension. This provides further insight into the production process and suggests a significantly different framework for policy. More specifically, because of the increasing returns governing creative technology, the efficiency criterion used to guide the economic choice calls for weak intellectual property rights, thus preserving wide access to knowledge. A stronger appropriation regime would significantly impair the total outcome of the creative processes. Interestingly, this appears to apply equally from a social justice perspective, perhaps in an effortless solution to the age-old trade-off between economic efficiency and social justice.intellectual property rights, knowledge production, increasing returns, knowledge sharing, productivity, social justice

Property rights and externalities: The uneasy case of knowledge

Drawing from Coase's methodological lesson, this article discusses the specific case of knowledge, which was for a long time chiefly governed by exchange mechanisms lying outside the market, and has only recently been brought into the market. Its recent, heavy "colonization" by the property paradigm has progressively elicited criticism from commentators who, for various reasons, believe that the market can play only a limited role in pursuing efficiency in the knowledge domain. The article agrees with the enounced thesis and tries to provide an explanation of it that relates to the fact that in specific circumstances property-rights can produce distinct market failures that affect the social cost and can consequently prevent attainment of social welfare. In particular, the arguments set forth here concern three distinct externalities that arise when enforcing a property rights system over knowledge. First, the existence of a property right may itself alter individual preferences and social norms, thus causing specific changes in individuals' behaviour. Second, the idiosyncratic nature of knowledge, as a collective and inherently indivisible entity, means that its full propertization can be expected to produce significant harm. Third, property rights can cause endogenous drifts in the market structure arising from the exclusive power granted to the right holder: though generally intended as a necessary mechanism for extracting a price from the consumer, in the knowledge domain property rights can become a device for extracting rents from the market.property rights, knowledge, invention, externalities, efficiency