Hybrid R&D

We develop a model of R&D competition and collaborationin which individual firms carry out independent in-house researchand also undertake joint research projects with other firms. Weexamine the impact of collaboration on in-house research andexplore the circumstances under which a hybrid organization ofR&D which combines the two is optimal for firms andsociety. We find that investments in independent research and injoint research are complementary: an increase in the number ofjoint projects also increases in-house research. Firm profits arehighest under a hybrid organization if the number of firms issmall (less than 5) while they are highest with pure in-houseresearch if the number of firms is large (5 or more). However,social welfare is maximized under a hybrid organization of R&D inall cases. Our analysis also yields new results on the role ofcooperative R&D. We find that non-cooperative decision making byfirms leads to larger R&D investments and higher social welfarethan fully cooperative decision making. However, a hybrid form ofdecision making where there is bilateral cooperation in jointprojects and non-cooperative decision making in in-house researchyields the highest level of welfare in concentrated industries.

Hybrid R&D

We develop a model of R&D competition and collaboration in which individual firms carry out independent in-house research and also undertake joint research projects with other firms. We examine the impact of collaboration on in-house research and explore the circumstances under which a hybrid organization of R&D which combines the two is optimal for firms and society. We find that investments in independent research and in joint research are complementary: an increase in the number of joint projects also increases in-house research. Firm profits are highest under a hybrid organization if the number of firms is small (less than 5) while they are highest with pure in-house research if the number of firms is large (5 or more). However, social welfare is maximized under a hybrid organization of R&D in all cases. Our analysis also yields new results on the role of cooperative R&D. We find that non-cooperative decision making by firms leads to larger R&D investments and higher social welfare than fully cooperative decision making. However, a hybrid form of decision making where there is bilateral cooperation in joint projects and non-cooperative decision making in in-house research yields the highest level of welfare in concentrated industries.

R and D in R&D. Endogenous growth and welfare.

No abstract availableResearch, Industrial -- Mathematical models;

Additionality effects of public R&D funding: ‘R’ versus ‘D’.

Several studies have already addressed the question whether R&D subsidies lead to additionality effects or crowd out firms’ private investment. This paper provides insights into the impact of R&D grants on private R&D expenditure, distinguishing between research and development activities. We employ parametric treatment effects models and IV regression methods. The hypothesis that firms respond differently to R&D subsidies depending on the nature of the R&D activity is confirmed. R&D subsidies are found to mainly contribute to an increase in development expenditure. By contrast, crowding out effects for the research part cannot be rejected.R&D subsidies; R&D expenditure; research; development; policy evaluation; treatment effects model; IV model;