What Do Institutional Investors Know and Act on Before Almost Everyone Else: Evidence from Corporate Bankruptcies

We analyze investment behavior of institutional managers who hold and trade shares of firms that file for bankruptcy. We find that during the five-year period preceding a bankruptcy filing, institutional investors (except those managing investment companies) are net buyers with a positive abnormal net number of shares traded during the period. Institutional managers start to sell shares of bankrupt firms sooner in some firms than in others; these earlier sales are of smaller firms with weaker operating performance, and lower equity risk. We do not find evidence that institutional stockholders trade strategically and avoid material price declines before they occur

Acquisitions of Bankrupt and Distressed Firms

In this paper we focus on acquisitions of bankrupt firms and firms that recently emerged from Chapter 11 and compare these firms with acquired distressed firms to determine whether or not transaction timing plays a role in the outcomes of the mergers. We analyze deal premiums (or lack thereof) and evaluate post-merger operating cash flows to determine whether or not timing of the transactions impacts their effectiveness and success. We also evaluate targets and their acquirers’ stock price reactions to the announcements of acquisitions. We find that distressed targets sell their assets at a premium or at a discount smaller than bankrupt firms do, thereby benefiting from acquisitions more than bankrupt targets—and the announcement day abnormal returns are reflective of the disparity of these purchases with bankrupt firms having significant negative abnormal returns and distressed firms having significant positive announcement day abnormal returns and acquirers of both having material announcement day abnormal returns. We also find that abnormal post-merger cash flow and cumulative abnormal return changes are more pronounced for bankrupt than distressed firms, indicating that acquisitions in Chapter 11 add greater economic value for both target and its acquirer than do acquisitions outside of bankruptcy. We also find post-merger market performance improvements for bankrupt and not distressed firms. In summary, distressed firms get a merger announcement premium and bankrupt firms give it away to their acquirers whose shareholders benefit from acquisition premiums in a year after the mergers

Analyst Ratings for Firms Filing and Reorganizing Under Chapter 11

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine analyst followings of firms starting from one year prior to their filing for Chapter 11 and as the firms progress through bankruptcy proceedings with a focus on firms receiving “Hold” or better recommendations. The authors attempt to answer questions such as what the common characteristics of the firms receiving stronger than expected recommendations one year prior to filing for bankruptcy reorganization or while in bankruptcy are, and how the market reacts to the issuance of stronger ratings for those firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors design various regressions and apply them to a total of 2,754 sell-side analyst recommendations and 325 firms that are either approaching bankruptcy filing or in the process of reorganizing. In each analysis, the authors control for several firm and performance characteristics. Findings The authors find that the probability of securing stronger ratings is higher for small firms and for those followed by a greater number of analysts than for large firms and firms followed by fewer analysts. The market becomes more skeptical of optimistic evaluations closer to the date of bankruptcy filing (perhaps reflecting some anticipation) and reacts more positively to rating upgrades issued during bankruptcy protection than to the upgrades issued before the bankruptcy filing. Research limitations/implications The conclusions are based on the analysis of analyst recommendations issued shortly before Chapter 11 filings and during bankruptcy proceedings. The conclusions could be strengthened by further analysis of firms’ post-bankruptcy recovery and performance and examination of analyst recommendations issued for the firms after they emerge from Chapter 11.. Practical implications Analyst security ratings that are more positive than expected are perhaps the result of superior expertise and access to private information. During bankruptcy proceedings, when information disclosure is limited, investors could greatly benefit from reports issued by security analysts. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, the authors contribute to the literature on the analyst ratings of firms in distress by considering the period between bankruptcy filing and emergence, while the existing literature provides analysis of pre-bankruptcy recommendations and forecasts. Second, the authors focus on better than expected ratings rather than all types of ratings as the firms approach bankruptcy filings and proceed through reorganization. Finally, they evaluate how investors react to stronger than expected analyst ratings

Differential Informativeness of Accrual Measures to Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy

This paper evaluates whether analysts incorporate formal measures of earnings quality into their earnings forecasts. It examines whether the accrual ratio and abnormal accruals, measured with the Modified Jones (1991) Model of discretionary accruals, differentially inform analysts’ earnings forecasts. It uses the accuracy of analysts’ forecast as a context in which to evaluate how well analysts incorporate effects of the information contained in accrual ratio and abnormal accruals. The results indicate that the accrual ratio is negatively related to the absolute value of analysts’ forecast errors while the Modified Jones (1991) Model of discretionary accruals have virtually no economic effect on analysts’ forecast error. The insignificant effect of discretionary accruals on analysts’ forecast may be attributed to analysts having already incorporated the information therein in their earnings forecasts, effect of the accrual anomaly having been largely arbitraged away by market participants or both. This paper contributes to the research on analysts’ earnings forecast and earnings quality and helps bridge the gap between practice and theory by demonstrating the differential impact of discretionary accruals (favored by academics) and the accrual ratio (favored by analysts) on analysts’ forecast accuracy. This study informs researchers and policy makers interested in better understanding how analysts affects the financial markets including how they may have learned from previously documented market anomalies such as the accrual anomaly. This is important as ultimately, efficient economy-wide capital allocation decisions are based partly on outputs of analysts’ forecasting processes

The effect of the JOBS act on analyst coverage of emerging growth companies

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the section of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act related to information dissemination by sell-side security analysts. The paper analyzes how the abolishment of the quiet period requirements for emerging growth companies (EGCs) changes the analyst initiation timing and market expectation of and reaction to the issuance of the analyst recommendations. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers the effect of the abolishment of the quiet period requirements on analyst coverage initiations for EGCs with IPOs between January 2006 and December 2015 using regression analyses and probability models. Findings The results confirm the current anecdotal and empirical evidence that a shorter, de facto, quiet period exists. Analyst issue stronger average ratings for EGCs than for similar firms with IPOs before the JOBS Act. EGCs with initiations from multiple analysts also experience stronger positive market reaction than the firms with initial offerings before the JOBS Act. The market seems to anticipate which EGCs will have initiations and particularly which EGCs will have initiations from multiple analysts. The investors, however, do not fully anticipate the strength of actual recommendations. Practical implications This paper is important for researchers, practitioners and policy-makers to understand how analysts impact the financial markets, how timing of analyst initiations affects stock prices of EGCs and what firm characteristics play a role in securing analyst coverage shortly after initial offerings. Originality/value This paper adds to the emerging literature on consequences of and changes brought by the JOBS Act. Specifically, this paper extends the limited literature on analyst initiations issued for firms with IPOs following the JOBS Act, timing of those initiations and magnitude of the market’s response to the initiations

Do Institutional Investors Trade Consistently with Sell-side Analyst Recommendations? Evidence from Corporate Bankruptcies

In this paper we analyze the relationship between the investment behavior of institutional managers who hold and trade shares of firms approaching bankruptcy and analyst recommendation changes for the firms in distress. When evaluating how institutions trade shares of distressed firms as they approach bankruptcy, we find that during the five-year period preceding bankruptcy filings institutional investors (except those managing investment companies) are net buyers with a positive abnormal net number of shares traded during the period as compared to a control sample. Institutional managers trade consistently with recommendations issued by security analysts. However, on average analysts do not materially downgrade their recommendations for the failing firms until only a few months prior to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings; consequently, the institutional managers\u27 decisions to divest of shares of the firms may be too-little-too-late

Factors affecting classroom participation and how participation leads to a better learning

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze various course- and student-related factors that affect participation grades within several college accounting classes. The second purpose is to determine whether in-class participation grades have an effect on exam performance in these classes. We find that, unlike in liberal arts and sciences courses, in accounting courses, participation grades for female students do not differ from participation grades for their male counterparts, regardless of class level. Overall, course level and student major have no direct effect on participation grades; however, the accounting majors and students in the lower level courses have better attendance than do non-accounting majors and students in more advanced courses. We observe that class schedule, in particular class duration and semester, affects students’ participation performance. Lastly, we find that students who participate more in classroom discussions perform 25% better on exams than do those with lower participation grades. This relationship holds for the three elements of participation grading: frequency of participation, consistency of participation, and attendance

Analyst ratings for firms filing for and reorganizing under Chapter 11

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine analyst followings of firms starting from one year prior to their filing for Chapter 11 and as the firms progress through bankruptcy proceedings with a focus on firms receiving “Hold” or better recommendations. The authors attempt to answer questions such as what the common characteristics of the firms receiving stronger than expected recommendations one year prior to filing for bankruptcy reorganization or while in bankruptcy are, and how the market reacts to the issuance of stronger ratings for those firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors design various regressions and apply them to a total of 2,754 sell-side analyst recommendations and 325 firms that are either approaching bankruptcy filing or in the process of reorganizing. In each analysis, the authors control for several firm and performance characteristics. Findings The authors find that the probability of securing stronger ratings is higher for small firms and for those followed by a greater number of analysts than for large firms and firms followed by fewer analysts. The market becomes more skeptical of optimistic evaluations closer to the date of bankruptcy filing (perhaps reflecting some anticipation) and reacts more positively to rating upgrades issued during bankruptcy protection than to the upgrades issued before the bankruptcy filing. Research limitations/implications The conclusions are based on the analysis of analyst recommendations issued shortly before Chapter 11 filings and during bankruptcy proceedings. The conclusions could be strengthened by further analysis of firms’ post-bankruptcy recovery and performance and examination of analyst recommendations issued for the firms after they emerge from Chapter 11.. Practical implications Analyst security ratings that are more positive than expected are perhaps the result of superior expertise and access to private information. During bankruptcy proceedings, when information disclosure is limited, investors could greatly benefit from reports issued by security analysts. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, the authors contribute to the literature on the analyst ratings of firms in distress by considering the period between bankruptcy filing and emergence, while the existing literature provides analysis of pre-bankruptcy recommendations and forecasts. Second, the authors focus on better than expected ratings rather than all types of ratings as the firms approach bankruptcy filings and proceed through reorganization. Finally, they evaluate how investors react to stronger than expected analyst ratings. </jats:sec