100 research outputs found

    Incentive Regulatory policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France

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    We assess the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation, using a principal-agent framework to study the regulatory schemes used in the French urban transport industry. Taking the current regulatory schemes as given, the model of supply and demand provides estimates for the firms’ inefficiency, the effort of managers, and the cost of public funds. It allows us to derive the first-best and second-best regulatory policies for each network and compare them with the actual situation in terms of welfare loss or gain. Fixed-price policies lie between fully informed and uninformed second-best schemes. Cost-plus contracts are dominated by any type of second-best contract. From these results, we may conjecture that fixed-price contracts call for better-informed regulators.Publicad

    Stochastic Frontiers and Asymmetric Information Models

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    This article suggests that the global inefficiency which generally affects a production process is endogenous and depends on the incentives generated by the process environment. We propose to treat the usual correlation between the inefficiency and the regressors of the production frontier through the economic constraints that interfere on the activity of the producer

    Spanish Football

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    The authors analyze the financial situation of the Spanish football industry. They first argue that a relevant analysis of the industry's financial results relies on a careful description of how historical and cultural factors have influenced its organization. Moreover, they stress the important relationship between the industry and television. The authors suggest that the situation of the Spanish football industry suffers from some structural weaknesses in its accounts. However, the situation seems less severe than in other major European football leagues, partly because local authorities in Spain have strong incentives to back football teams.Publicad

    Contract choice, incentives and political capture in public transport services

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    We consider a framework of contractual interactions between urban transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the choice of contract by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost reducing activity of the operators. We test whether regulatory schemes currently implemented in the industry are the observable items of a more general menu of second best contracts. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by the political aspects of regulation. Moreover, the cost reducing effort of the operators is greater under fixed-price regimes, compared to the cost-plus case

    Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services

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    We consider a framework of contractual interactions between public transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of the operators. We test whether the current regulatory schemes are the observable items of a complex menu of contracts, as proposed by Laffont and Tirole. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by a regulatory framework where an unsophisticated regulator is politically motivated. We show how these political preferences shape the contract choice and we shed light on how operating costs are affected. On average, operators' costs are 12.1% lower under fixed-plus regimes, compared to the cost-plus cases.

    Incentive Regulatory policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France

    Get PDF
    This paper is aimed at assessing the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation. It relies on a principal-agent framework for studying the regulatory schemes used in the French urban transport industry. Taking the current regulatory schemes as given, the model of supply and demand provides estimates for the firms' inefficiency, the effort of managers, and the cost of public funds. It allows deriving the first-best and second-best regulatory policies for each network and comparing them with the actual situation in terms of welfare loss or gain. Fixed-price policies are lying between fully informed and uninformed second best schemes. Cost-plus contracts are dominated by any type of second-best contract. From these results, we may conjecture that fixed prices contracts call for better informed regulators.

    The effects of airline alliances: What do the aggregate data say?

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    We consider an empirical model of worldwide airline alliances that we apply to a large set of companies for the period 1995-2000. Using observations at the network level, we estimate a cost, capacity, and demand system that accounts for cross-price elasticities. Our contribution consists in evaluating airlines' strategical interactions through the window of firms' network interconnections. We consider networks coincidences and potential connections with all their rivals. The results allow us to classify all company pairs as either complements or substitutes. We shed light on the fact that many airlines involved in the same alliance are potential substitutes.

    European Cooperative R&D And Firm Performance

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    The goal of this paper is to assess the impact on the performance of firms that participate in Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) funded by the Fifth European Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (EU-FP5). A special emphasis is made on the User-friendly Information Society (IST) programme, one of the most important thematic programmes of the EU-FP5. We use the funding available to the firms as an instrumental variable to account for self-selection and estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of participation by considering labor productivity and profit margin as performance measures. Our results show a large and positive impact of participation on the labor productivity of the firms, whereas the effect on profit margin is weaker. When taking into account the size of the RJV, we find that the positive impact on labor productivity comes mainly from participation in large projects and that participation in smaller RJVs has a negative effect on the profit margin.

    Regulation and Incentives in European Aviation

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    We study the effect of liberalization on costs and competition in the European airline industry. We construct and estimate a model that includes demand, capacity, and cost equations. The latter accounts for inefficiency and cost-reducing effort. We show that failure to account for the choice of effort would lead to biased estimates of efficiency and competition in the industry. We also find that the last European Union package of deregulatory measures has led to significant efficiency improvements and has fostered competition.Publicad
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