Top ranking economics journals impact variability and a ranking update to the year 2002

In this paper I address four questions concerning the quality of scientific economic papers. First, I validate the ex-ante procedure of computing the average impact of economic papers by comparing its results with the expost values. Second, I calibrate an estimator of papers normalised impact. Third, I compute the ranking variability of journals using a bootstrap procedure. Fourth, I test the statistical hypothesis that journals’ ranking did not changed over the time interval between 1980 and 2000. I concluded that this hypothesis is rejected only for the ‘Quarterly Journal of Economics’ and ‘Econometrica’, which saw their citation impact improved.

Thermodynamics of nonsingular bouncing universes

Homogeneous and isotropic, nonsingular, bouncing world models are designed to evade the initial singularity at the beginning of the cosmic expansion. Here, we study the thermodynamics of the subset of these models governed by general relativity. Considering the entropy of matter, radiation and that the entropy of the apparent horizon is proportional to its area, we argue that these models do not respect the generalised second law of thermodynamics, also away from the bounce.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures. Version published in the European Physical Journal

Black holes with constant topological Euler density

A class of four dimensional spherically symmetric and static geometries with constant topological Euler density is studied. These geometries are shown to solve the coupled Einstein-Maxwell system when non-linear Born-Infeld-like electrodynamics is employed.Comment: 7 pages, REVTeX 4, 1 figure, to appear in EP

Flip invariance for domino tilings of three-dimensional regions with two floors

We investigate tilings of cubiculated regions with two simply connected floors by 2 x 1 x 1 bricks. More precisely, we study the flip connected component for such tilings, and provide an algebraic invariant that "almost" characterizes the flip connected components of such regions, in a sense that we discuss in the paper. We also introduce a new local move, the trit, which, together with the flip, connects the space of domino tilings when the two floors are identical.Comment: 33 pages, 34 figures, 2 tables. We updated the reference lis

Do Migrants Improve Governance at Home? Evidence from a Voting Experiment

This paper tests the hypothesis that international migration experiences may promote better institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability. In order to examine this question, we use a simple postcard voting experiment designed to capture the population’s desire for better governance. Using data from a tailored household survey, we examine the determinants of voting behavior in our experiment, and isolate the positive effect of international emigration on the demand for political accountability. We find that this effect can be mainly attributed to the presence of return migrants, particularly to those who emigrated to countries with better governance.international migration, household survey, governance, political accountability, institutions, effects of emigration in origin countries, Cape Verde, Sub-Saharan Africa

Legal Corruption

We challenge the conventional definition of corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain, making a distinction between legal and illegal forms of corruption, and paying more attention to corporate patterns of corruption (which also affect public corruption). We undertake to identify general determinants of the pattern of legal and illegal corruption worldwide, and present a model where both corruption (modeled explicitly in the context of allocations) and the political equilibrium are endogenous. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified as a function of basic parameters, namely initial conditions (assets/productivity), equality, and fundamental political accountability. These equilibria are: i) an illegal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite does not face binding incentives; ii) a legal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite is obliged to incur on a cost to deceive the population; and iii) a no-corruption equilibrium, where the population cannot be deceived. An integral empirical test of the model is performed, using a broad range of variables and sources. Its core variables, namely regarding legal corruption (and other manifestations of corporate corruption) come from an original survey developed with the World Economic Forum (in the Executive Opinion Survey 2004 of the Global Competitiveness Report). The empirical results generally validate the model and explanations. Some salient implications emerge.